

Frame Building and Framing Effects
in Direct-Democratic Campaigns

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
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Theoretical Framework

Introduction

This book analyzes frame building and framing effects in three direct-democratic campaigns in Switzerland. Under contemporary conditions, the chain of communication from the political actors to the voters is – essentially – a multi-step process, which includes the flow of frames from the political actors to the journalists, and from the journalists to the voters. A frame is a central organizing idea “that provide[s] coherence to a designated set of idea elements” (Ferree et al. 2002: 105). It is like a “spotlight” that attracts our attention to certain aspects of an issue, and directs it away from other aspects (Gamson 2004: 245). By selectively emphasizing/evaluating certain aspects of a perceived reality and by making them salient in a communicating text, frames also “promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described” (Entman 1993: 52). Figure 1.1 illustrates the flow of frames linking each actor of the multi-step process: the political actors, the journalists and the voters.

Figure 1.1: Frame Building (Construction, Promotion and Mediation Processes) and Framing Effects in Direct-Democratic Campaigns



The step between the political actors to the journalists is called frame building and will be investigated first. It is illustrated on the left-hand side of Figure 1.1. *Frame building* (Scheufele 1999) uses media frames as dependent variable and investigates the processes and factors that influence the creation or changes of frames applied by journalists (frames in news media or media frames). Media frames refer to the arguments, words, or images that journalists use when relaying information about an issue to an audience. They are defined as working routines for journalists, which “organize the world both for journalists who report it and, in some important degree, for us who rely on their reports”¹ (Gitlin 2003(1980): 7). A news media frame “organizes everyday reality” (Tuchman 1978: 193) by providing “meaning to an unfolding strip of events” (Gamson and Modigliani 1987: 143, 1989). The processes which influence media frames have been neglected so far. “To turn the concept into a viable research avenue, future research should specify the conditions under which frames emerge” (De Vreese 2005: 60). In this regard, Ferree et al. (2002: 296) state that “the relative roles of parties and movements in taking leadership roles in framing issues in the media is an important and understudied aspect”. By exclusively focusing on framing and the effects of framing on public opinion or on voters, the whole question of how frames originate is side-stepped.

Figure 1.1 suggests that media frames originate in three processes. First, political actors *construct* the message, and second they *promote* it. Political actors are collective actors involved in the campaign, such as political parties, authorities, economic interest groups, citizens’ interest groups or ad hoc committees. The frames which result from the construction and promotion processes are called the *frames in media input*, i.e. the frames found in documents written for the media such as press releases or documents from media conferences. Third, the journalists contribute to frame building in the *mediation* process. Although the journalists of different media outlets or the journalists and editor from the same outlet sometimes differ in their reporting and commentary on an issue, more striking is their broad simi-

¹ See also Hall (1973).

larity in reporting. As a consequence, I define the news media actors as more or less homogenous actors – as the journalists – while noting significant variation where it occurs. I will explain each of the processes in greater detail below. Since the *media frames* result from the construction, promotion and mediation processes, frame building should actually be called media frame building. However, since I apply the term exclusively for the investigation of how media frames originate, it is unambiguous and I will thus employ the commonly used term of frame building. Some factors are particularly influential in leading a frame to become a news media frame. These are called the key factors in frame building and are analyzed separately. These factors might be traced back to one or more of the three processes – the construction, the promotion or the mediation process.

Since it has been largely neglected so far, the main emphasis of the book is placed on frame building. Nevertheless, the whole process of frame building would be irrelevant if the media frames remained without influence on the citizens. In order to gauge the impact of frame building in direct-democratic campaigns, I also evaluate the effects of the media frames. In Figure 1.1, they are illustrated on the right-hand side of the graph. Framing effects have been defined as effects from frames in communication on frames in thought (Druckman 2001). *Frames in thought* (or individual frames or audience frames (Entman 1993: 53)) are “internal structures of the mind” (Kinder and Sanders 1990: 74). For instance, a voter who reads a specific frame in the media might add some personal experience, forge links not made explicitly in the text or use another individual cognitive device to make sense of the political news. In other words, a frame in thought is the individual’s cognitive understanding of a given situation (Goffman 1974). By contrast, a *frame in communication* is “the key consideration emphasized in a speech act” (Chong and Druckman 2007c: 106). A media frame is a particular frame in communication, which is characterized by the fact that the information is provided by the media. Frames in communication are more comprehensive: They can also include information presented by other speakers such as campaigners, politicians or friends. For

this study, I define the frames in the news media together with the frames in the media input as the frames in communication. The graph does not show feedback mechanisms. However, one could think of feedback in the form of anticipated or perceived reactions of citizens, journalists or other political actors. These reactions can affect what political actors or journalists say and do.

Supply-Side View of Democracy

By investigating frame building and framing effects, I adopt a supply-side view of democracy. From this perspective, the citizens' votes appear as a reaction of the voters to the terms proposed by the political actors. The proposition of the terms is most important because it can have an effect on public opinion and/or policy-making. This was shown, for instance, by Baumgartner et al. (2008), who revealed that the rise of the innocence frame has led to shifts in public opinion and to a sharp decline in the use of the death penalty by juries across the country. Previously dominant morality and constitutionality frames have not been forgotten, but they have been relegated to the background in media discussions due to the rise of the innocence frame. The attention shift caused by the discovery of innocence prompted public opinion to consider the issue in new ways – the result was a decrease in public support for the death penalty. More importantly even, it led to one of the most dramatic and unlikely policy reversals in modern times – the steep decline of death sentences in the U.S.

By adopting a supply-side view of democracy, I conceive the “responsive leadership model”, presented by Kriesi (2010a), as the model for the democratic process. In this model, the chance that the democratic process produces “largely not a genuine but a manufactured will”, as Schumpeter (1976 (1942): 263) suggested, is small. It acknowledges that political leaders use rhetoric, i.e. the art of persuasion, to sway public opinion, but they “use it in a way, which facilitates public discussion, and they are held in check by a public that is capable

of assessing the validity of their talk” (Kriesi 2010a: 14). Kriesi suggests that this model requires the combination of three preconditions. First, it depends on the competitiveness of the political process, which implies the presence of competing frames. Second, it requires an attentive public. Third, the news media needs to be independent, resourceful and pluralistic.

Frame Building

Frame building allows research that analyzes the supply-side view of democracy. In frame building, the political actors struggle regarding the understanding and definition of a political issue by emphasizing a “subset of potentially relevant considerations” (Druckman and Nelson 2003: 739). This process is highly important. The “definition of the alternatives is the supreme instrument of power” (Schattschneider (1988 (1960): 66; see also Bachrach and Baratz 1970). From the point of view of my book, it is the frames that stand for alternatives which finally represent the supply. Certain issues or frames are organized into politics, while others are organized out. My general approach for conceptualizing the relationship between political actors and the media is an actor-centered political process model, as introduced by Wolfsfeld (1997). Thus, in contrast to Scheufele (1999, 2000), I conceive the political actors as the first source of influence in frame building, whereas Scheufele seems to adopt a more journalistic-centered view. Following Wolfsfeld’s (1997) lead, I believe that the best way to understand the role of the news media is to view it as part of a larger contest among political antagonists for the control of the public agenda and the public’s interpretation of specific policy issues. Given the crucial role of the news media for reaching out to the citizen public, the struggle for attention and for the meaning of political issues becomes a struggle for the control of the news agenda and for the framing of the news. The relationship between the political actors and the news media is one of mutual dependence: the political actors need the media to reach the public, while the media need the input from the political actors for their news production. As

Wolfsfeld (1997: 13) puts it, their relationship is one of a “competitive symbiosis”, “in which each side of the relationship attempts to exploit the other while expending a minimum amount of costs”. Or, as Gans (1979: 116) pointed out in an often cited quote: “the relationship between sources and journalists resembles a dance, for sources seek access to journalists, and journalists seek access to sources”. But, significantly, Gans went on to stress that this relationship was likely to be an asymmetrical one, too: “Although it takes two to tango, either sources or journalists can lead, but more often than not, sources do the leading”. Wolfsfeld’s (1997: 3) key hypothesis makes the same point: the political process is likely to be the driving force in this relationship. The reasons he provides for this hypothesis are numerous, but, most importantly, he suggests that the news media are much more likely to react to political events than to initiate them.

The term frame building is borrowed from the concept “agenda building”, which was introduced by Cobb and Elder (1971: 905) and is concerned with “how issues are created and why some controversies or incipient issues come to command the attention and concern of decision makers, while others fail” (see also Scheufele 2000: 303f). Whereas agenda building (e.g. Brandenburg 2002) is concerned with the issue level, frame building looks at the different dimensions or aspects of the same issue. In communication science, frame building is also called “second-level agenda building” (e.g. Kioussis et al. 2006) and is concerned with the salience of issue-specific attributes in the media. Most studies have been concerned with the production and selection of news (e.g., Gans 1979, Shoemaker and Reese 1996, Tuchman 1978), whereas the study of news media frames as dependent variable has been largely neglected. Nevertheless, there are some qualitative approaches to this aspect of framing. Edelman (1993) concludes that authorities and pressure groups use their societal influence to establish certain frames. The indexing approach (Bennett (1993), Bennett et al. (2007), Mermin (1999)) documents the relationship between elite dissent and frame contestation and basically argues that the media tend to “index” the range of elite views. Entman’s (2004) “cascade model”

then helps to explain whether elite dissent arises and therefore predicts whether and how much the indexing that occurs yields contesting of the elite's frame.

Framing Effects

Political actors finally try to reach a framing effect, i.e. an effect from a frame in communication on a frame in thought (Druckman 2001). The most commonly encountered framing effects in political contexts are *emphasis* framing effects (or issue or value framing effects) (Druckman 2001). A speaker involved in emphasis framing offers alternative frames, which focus on different aspects of the same policy problem. An emphasis framing effect occurs when he or she alters the salience and perceived strength of an accessible consideration about this issue (Iyengar and Kinder: 1987, Zaller 2005 (1992), Druckman 2001) and influences citizens' preferences or attitudes (e.g., O'Keefe 2002, Druckman and Holmes 2004, Chong and Druckman 2007c). A second class of framing effects involves the use of different, but logically equivalent, frames to alter individuals' preferences: *Equivalency framing effects* (or valence or message framing effects) typically occur when a frame casts the same information in a positive or negative light (Druckman 2001: 228). For the study at hand, equivalency framing effects are irrelevant. With framing effects, I exclusively refer to emphasis framing effects.

Studies about framing effects have built on studies about agenda-setting and priming. Agenda-setting was first examined empirically by McCombs and Shaw (1972) and was guided by the famous conclusion of an early study that "the press may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about" (Cohen 1963) (also see Kinder 2003: 361ff). Priming has been defined as salient issues or news stories which influence "the standards by which governments, presidents, policies and candidates for public office are judged" (Iyengar and Kinder 1987: 63). For Scheufele (2000: 306), priming (dependent variable) is the outcome of agenda setting (in-

dependent variable). Framing studies then expanded beyond the interest of agenda-setting and priming studies in what people talk or think about, and began to investigate also *how* they think and talk about political issues (Pan and Kosicki 1993: 70). Scheufele (2000) distinguishes between frame setting and individual-level effects. For him, frame-setting is the impact from the media frames on the frames in thought, whereas the individual-level effect is the impact from the frames in thought on the individual behaviors or attitudes. Since I am ultimately interested in the voters' attitudes toward the issue and not only in their frames in thoughts, I define the second step in my study as framing *effects* and not as frame *setting*. In addition, it seems unnecessary to distinguish between these two processes.

Chong and Druckman (2007c) question the utility of the distinctions between framing, priming and agenda-setting. Even if the distinction between these concepts should be shown as helpful, the approach adopted here of framing analysis seems to be highly suitable. First of all, it is essential to study contexts in which we find combinations of frames because in actual public policy debates, people are generally exposed to different perspectives on a issue (e.g., Sniderman and Theriault 2004, Nelson 2004, Brewer and Gross 2005, Chong and Druckman 2007a, Jerit 2009). Framing studies have explored the role of multiple competing frames, whereas priming and agenda setting have paid little attention to competitive situations (Chong and Druckman 2007b: 101). Second, framing analysis not only refers to the salience of an issue attribute, but it expands beyond the analysis of salience and tackles the way in which actors understand a political issue and attempt to influence the public's interpretation of it. "By appropriately framing an issue, political actors attempt to construct the meaning of the reality in question in a sense that supports their own point of view" (Kriesi 2010a: 8). Third, from a supply-based point of view, I am concerned with the speakers' (or senders') view, which is well suited to the framing approach (Selb 2003: 22), whereas agenda setting or priming are more concerned with the receivers' perspective.

Frame Construction (Substantive Emphasis Choice, Oppositional Emphasis Choice, and Contest Emphasis Choice)

In order to win a campaign, political actors frame the issue at stake strategically and “campaign on behalf of competing ways of understanding what is at issue” (Sniderman and Therault 2004: 158). By competing and framing the issue strategically, political actors face at least three strategic framing choices (Figure 1.1). First, the strategic actors are expected to search for a frame they think has the capacity to become a strong substantive frame. They might additionally provide a second or third main frame, to which they can switch if their core frame is not resonating well. At the same time, they do not want to overload the processing capacity of the media (Shoemaker and Reese 1996: 104) and might not promote too many frames. The number of frames with which they will ultimately campaign is an empirical question. I call this choice the “Substantive Emphasis Choice”. A strong frame is a frame that provokes a defensive reaction by the opponents and/or that resonates in the media. This conceptualization of strength is based on Koopmans’ idea that resonant messages (i.e. messages which provoke reactions) travel further (Koopmans 2004: 374). It means that a frame discussed by the opponent is a strong frame. In Chong and Druckman’s (2007a) experiments, the relative strength of a frame turned out to be the most important dimension of influence, under both one-sided and competitive conditions. However, the study was concerned with the effects of frames on voters, and not on the media. The relative strength of the frame is issue- and context-specific and difficult to determine in general.

Chong and Druckman (2007b: 100) argue that we have little knowledge about what determines the strength of a frame. They suggest that it depends on two sets of factors: the credibility of its source, and its congruence with central cultural themes.

Table 1.1: Constructing the Frame – the Three Strategic Framing Choices (Chapter 4)

strategic framing choices	the political actors...	central concepts
Substantive Emphasis Choice	...search for a frame they think has the capacity to become a strong substantive frame	strong frame in communication: a frame that provokes a defensive reaction by the opponents and/or that resonates in the media
Oppositional Emphasis Choice	...decide about the amount of attention they want to pay to the opponents' substantive frame(s) as compared to their own frames and whether they want to use their opponents' frames offensively or defensively	<i>trespassing</i> : offensive use of opponents' frames <i>counter-framing</i> : defensive use of opponents' frames
Contest Emphasis Choice	...decide about how much priority they want to give to their own substantive frame(s) as compared to the campaign contest	<i>substantive frames</i> : a frame with a focus on the substantive content of the debate – on policy <i>contest frames</i> : a frame which does not address the issue(s) at stake, but focuses on the actors involved or on the contest per se – on politics

Second, political actors have to decide about the amount of attention they want to pay to the opponents' substantive frame(s) as compared to their own frames and whether they want to use their opponents' frames offensively or defensively ("Oppositional Emphasis Choice"). The offensive use of the opponents' frames corresponds to what Sides (2006) has called "*trespassing*": political actors may use strong images, issues or issue attributes of their opponents in order to appear responsive to the general public. Even more widespread, however, may be the defensive use of the opponents' frames: political actors may feel forced to react to the successful frames of their opponents and to adopt *counter-frames* to offer rebuttals, and to counter-attack their adversaries.

Yes and no campaigners fighting against each other are expected to primarily rely on different frames (Riker 1996, Petrocik 1996). However, under some conditions, there are reasons to expect dialogue (Kaplan et al. 2006). *Frame dialogue* investigates the extent to which two camps converge with regard to *one* certain frame in a campaign, whereas *campaign dialogue* looks at *all main* frames in a campaign and investigates how far the two camps con-

verge on these frames. Of course, “dialogue” has many more connotations and denotations, which extend beyond paying attention to the same campaign frames. In this study, however, I will use these two.

Third, political actors have to decide about how much priority they want to give to their own substantive frame(s) as compared to the campaign contest (“Contest Emphasis Choice”). In this respect, I propose to distinguish between two types of frames – contest frames and substantive frames². The peculiarity of the former is that they do not address the issue(s) at stake, but focus on the actors involved or on the contest per se – on politics – while the latter focus on the substantive contents of the debate – on policy. Examples of the former include “strategic frames” (analyzing the rationale and strategy underlying the candidate’s rhetoric and positions), “horse race frames” (framing the campaign not as a contest of ideas or policy platforms, but as a race between two teams, each bent on getting more votes than the other), conflict frames (emphasizing conflict between individuals, groups, or institutions), or personalized frames (emphasizing personal characteristics of the actors involved or attacking another person). Contest frames are typically without content. Substantive frames, by contrast, are variable in scope: they can either be issue-specific or transcend a single issue (Gamson et al. 1992: 385, Matthes 2009). The substantive frames mainly focus on the aspect of the problem definition in terms of Entman’s frame definition³. The distinction between substantive and contest frames is relevant since it helps us to ascertain how much substance and dialogue we find in a debate. In the light of increasing media-centered politics, it is important to investigate the degree of substance in a debate. For deliberative theorists, the public debate that

² De Vreese (2005) makes a distinction between “issue-specific” and “generic” frames. This distinction suffers from the difficulty that it mixes up thematic and contest frames in both the generic and the issue-specific category. In addition, Chong and Druckman (2007c: 107) find it difficult to specify a frame as generic or general. I agree. However, I do not follow these authors when they suggest calling “script” a “feature in the communication such as a conflict” (ditto). Finally, Entman (2004: 5f.) explores two classes of frames, substantive and procedural frames. My distinction is similar, also in terms of meaning.

³ Framing devices, as opposed to frames, are condensing symbols that suggest the frame in shorthand (Gamson and Modigliani 1989: 3). They include metaphors, illustrative examples (from which lessons are drawn), catchphrases, descriptions, and visual images (icons). What Iyengar (1991) calls “episodic” frames, I would call a framing device.

precedes the democratic decision, its inclusiveness, and its deliberative quality are essential for the quality of a democracy (e.g. Habermas 1996).

The three framing choices are by no means exhaustive. In strategic framing, just as in any kind of strategic action, there are, as Jasper (2006: 171) points out, “few rules... but many choices”. However, I do suggest that all actors involved in strategic framing are implicitly or explicitly confronted with at least these three choices.

Frame Promotion

The political actors vary their choices depending on the communication channel. The study of social movements has shown the usefulness of the concept of the *action* repertoire of challengers because social movements in a given context tend to use more or less standardized repertoires of action (Tilly 1978, 1986, 1995). In an analogous way, Kriesi et al. (2009) propose the concept of the *communication* repertoire to characterize the channels that are used in direct-democratic campaigns. Campaigners have learnt how to use a well-defined set of communication routines, which they apply in a standardized way. Such routines may be legally prescribed, but more often they are the result of informal rules that have been established over the course of the years. While fairly institutionalized, such routines are also subject to change as new channels become available thanks to technological change, or as new actors enter the fray, who experiment with new techniques and who, if successful, are imitated by their competitors. I use a slightly different typology than Kriesi et al. (2009) because I am not interested in the way in which they reach the public but rather how they communicate differently depending on the target group.

In general, campaigners first vary their framing choices depending on whether they target the general public and citizens or their members. With regard to the communication with the general public, they secondly vary their framing choices depending on whether the

channel is mediated or unmediated. In the *mediated* channels, they promote messages which have to pass the selection by journalists. Campaigners must cater to the needs and values of journalists. They try to provide newsworthy messages (Shoemaker and Reese 1996). The news values theory states that news values determine how much prominence a message or frame is given by a media outlet. In the original theory (Galtung and Ruge 1965), news decisions are traced back to specific properties of events and actors – so-called news factors – that make them newsworthy and increase their chances of making news. Such news factors include, among other things, importance of the message (measured according to its impact: how many lives it affects), conflict or controversy, resonance with well-understood story themes, the involvement of personalization, proximity of an event, or the status and relevance of an actor (Galtung and Ruge 1965, Schulz 1976, Price and Tewksbury 1997). These characteristics of the news can be seen as endemic to newsgathering, stemming in one way or another from time pressures faced by journalists and from the challenge of relaying complex information in highly condensed formats (Tuchman 1978). The campaigners can rely on two mediated channels to reach out to the public: First and most important, political actors try to get news media coverage by producing *media input*. The organization of media conferences and the editing of news releases are among the most common forms of media input in Swiss direct-democratic campaigns. News coverage is also referred to as free media (Iyengar and McGrady 2007: 9), even though it is not always cost-free. Sometimes public relations or advertising professionals are hired in order to maximize the visibility of a campaign in the media. Second, campaigners also organize the writing of *letters to the editor*.

Unmediated channels guarantee campaigns control over the content and form of the message. They are a way to get the message to the public unfiltered by media gatekeepers (Shoemaker and Reese 1996: 174). In Norris et al.'s terms, unmediated channels offer the political actors the opportunity to use their "ideal" message. "Ideal" means that the political actors are in the "sole control of the content" (Norris et al. 1999: 62). "There is a significant

trade-off, however: advertising is unmediated, but it is also a much less credible messenger than news reports are” (Iyengar and McGrady 2007: 137). By comparing the media input with the unmediated channels, we can evaluate the ways in which the findings of the media input can be taken as the political actors’ true framing intention. Two channels provide campaigners with an unmediated route to the minds of voters: First, they can pay for political ads in the media and spend their money on posters in the public sphere. I will refer to this as the *political ads* channel. It is the largest expenditure incurred by campaigns. This channel is also called paid media (Iyengar and McGrady 2007: 9). Note that paid political advertising is prohibited on television and radio in Switzerland. Second, political actors also can target the citizens directly. For this form of political communication, direct mails, or flyers are particularly suitable. I call this the *direct mail* channel.

Table 1.2: Communication Channels in Swiss Direct-Democratic Campaigns (Chapter 5)

target	members	citizens or general public			
characteristic	internal	unmediated		mediated	
channel	info for members	direct mail	political ads	letters to the editor	media input
examples	newsletter magazine for members e-mail	direct mail flyer demonstration leaflet	newspaper ad poster	letters to the editor	media release media conference

Finally, political actors can address their members instead of addressing the general public or the citizens. They can target their members using such means as their own newspapers and magazines, newsletters, or e-mail actions. I call this channel the *info for members* channel. This channel also enables the campaigners to use their “ideal” or unmediated message. However, in this channel, the campaigners primarily want to tie and inform their members. Thus, as summarized in Table 1.2, I will investigate one internal channel, two unmediated channels (direct mail and political ads), and two mediated channels (letters to the editor and media input).

I consider the media input as the most important communication channel in direct-democratic campaigns. First, it is the channel which highly influences free media coverage because journalists rely on it in a routine way (Sigal 1973, Shoemaker and Reese 1996). In addition, direct-democratic campaigns generally enjoy high news coverage, making the other channels a small trickle in the cumulative message stream. Letters to the editor also can gain free publicity. Since these two free media channels entail considerably less costs than the paid media channel, all organizations should strive for newsworthy media input and letters to the editor.

By promoting their message, political actors also have to find a way in which they can garner media attention *during the whole campaign*. By promoting their message, political actors can use inductions and adaptations (Bentele et al. 1997: 240). In their “Intereffikation” model, Bentele et al. (1997) investigate the relationship between journalists and political actors and describe it as a complex relation of a mutually existing influence and a reciprocal dependency of relatively autonomous systems. Inductions are intended, directed communication suggestions or communication impulses which – were they noticed or absorbed – become communication influences. Adaptations are communicative actions which are geared to the social facts of the respective other side, often to optimize the communication success of one’s own side (Bentele 2005: 211).

Frame Mediation: Contribution by Journalists

The communication between the political actors and the voters is typically not direct, but rather mediated by the journalists. Research has demonstrated that the public does form its impressions about the political world from the news media (Graber 2001, Zaller 2003). Following Strömbäck and Nord (2006), the journalists mediate either at the content level or process level of framing. At the content level, the journalists and the political actors negotiate and bat-

tle over how the issue is framed. At the process level of frame building, the journalists and the political actors negotiate and battle over when and where the frames are reported. Even though the journalists generally respect the lead of the political actors with regard to the content of the debate, the journalists decide to which degree they want to balance out the messages (“Balancing Choice”), to whom they give standing (“Standing Choice”) and how much dialogue they want (“Dialogue Choice”). With regard to the process level, the journalists decide how much effort they want to put into the coverage of a campaign (“Effort Choice”) and determine when they want to report (“Timing Choice”).

Key Factors in Frame Building

In direct-democratic campaigns, the political actors take the lead by framing the issue strategically. The three strategic framing choices and the promoting activities are intended to influence the creation or changes of frames applied by journalists. Those characteristics of the frame or its speaker that are relevant for a frame appearing in the media are called key factors in frame building. In addition to these factors, external events taking place during the campaign can also be relevant in the frame-building process. Lawrence (2000) argues that high-profile media coverage of unplanned events provides a special opportunity for reframing. The importance of external events has also been shown by Baumgartner et al. (2008), when unexpected and scandalous events in and around the death penalty debate have triggered a shift in the existing debate towards the innocence frame. Moreover, banalities such as summer or Christmas holidays also structure the frame-building process. The journalists generally respect the lead of the powerful political actors and contribute to the debate by clarifying the opposing positions (which Bennett et al. 2004 call “recognition”) and by eliciting mutual reactions from the opposing political actors (which they call “responsiveness”).

Framing Effects

The influential theory by Zaller (2005 (1992)) regarding the nature and origin of mass opinion showed that the elites play a major role for the construction of individual opinion. However, the conventional view on the effect of mass communication on public opinion is highly skeptical about the extent of possible effects. Although the classic “minimal effect” verdict no longer constitutes the received wisdom, the conventional view is nevertheless that the effects of frames on public opinion are rather limited and contingent (Kinder 1998, 2003). Most strikingly, for citizens who discuss politics informally with others, the framing effects seem to disappear. In an experimental setting, Druckman and Nelson (2003) found that counter-framing and heterogeneous discussions limit framing effects by prompting deliberative processing and offering reformulations of the problems.

However, when distinguishing the *quality* of a frame, framing effects seem to be less limited. Jerit (2009: 423) finds that “predictive appeals can have a significant effect on public opinion”. Chong and Druckman (2007a: 651) show that “strong frames have a significant effect in both competitive and noncompetitive contexts”. Because scholars have only recently started to examine competitive framing conditions, there is much to learn about how different framing strategies influence public opinion (e.g., Druckman and Nelson (2003), Chong and Druckman (2007a), Jerit (2009)). In particular, the strength of the frames seems to be most relevant. The definition of a strong frame introduced above applies to the frames in communication (=frames in media input and news media). Thus, a strong frame in communication is a frame which provokes a defensive reaction by the opponents and/or resonates in the media. As we already know, credibility of source and cultural congruence of frame content have proved to be important in influencing strength (Chong and Druckman 2007b: 100). By contrast, a strong frame in thought is defined as persuasive or applicable (Druckman 2009: 25).

The precondition for a frame in thought to become strong (=applicable) is that it is accessible (= one is exposed to this frame) and available (=understandable) (Druckman 2009).

Table 1.3: Strength of the Frames in Communication and in Thought (Chapter 8)

	frames in communication (= frames in media input + media frames)	frames in thought
strong frame	a strong frame in communication is a frame that provokes a defensive reaction by the opponents and/or that resonates in the media	a strong frame in thought is a frame that is applicable (=persuadable)
precondition	- credible source - cultural congruence	- accessibility (one is exposed to a frame) - availability (the frame is understandable)

Direct-Democratic Approach of Frame Building and Framing Effects

Frame building and its effects will be studied in the framework of three direct-democratic campaigns in Switzerland. Such institutionalized political campaigns have several advantages (Kriesi 2010a): First, direct democratic campaigns are chosen due to their explicit start and end, which helps to restrict the effects on such a campaign. Second, they typically involve an important intensification of communication, which makes an impact more likely. Third, their coming is known in advance, which makes it possible to obtain a baseline of public opinion before they start. Fourth, direct-democratic campaigns typically give rise to the confrontation between two opposing camps. The presence of two competing camps guarantees competing information flows, and the bipolar character of the competition keeps the information flows within manageable proportions. Fifth, direct-democratic campaigns are issue-specific, which allows issue salience to be controlled for. During direct-democratic campaigns, the issue stays at the top of the political and media agenda and it enables a focus on the framing strategies of the political actors and their impact on the journalists and voters. However, the choice of direct-democratic campaigns also comes with a price attached. The institutional specificity of such campaigns may limit the generalizability of the findings. For this reason, I will outline in

which regard the findings might vary depending on the campaign type (Chapter 9). Furthermore, the problem is compounded by the fact that we will study frame building and its effects only in one single country – Switzerland – and that we will examine only a limited selection of three campaigns.

Outline of the Argument and Plan of the Book

In *chapter 2*, I will introduce the institutional context of the empirical studies, and the three selected campaigns. *Chapter 3* will present methods. Methods that are employed only in one chapter will be presented in the individual chapters.

The main part of the book is empirical. As briefly outlined above, the existing research is lacking in terms of the identification and exploration of processes and factors that influence media frames. I suggest that there are three relevant processes in frame building in direct-democratic campaigns: frame construction and frame promotion by the political actors, and the frame mediation by the journalists. In *chapter 4*, I will look at how political actors craft their messages for the media input in terms of framing. By *constructing* their message, I will argue that political actors strategically decide about at least three framing choices (“Substantive Emphasis Choice”, “Oppositional Emphasis Choice”, and “Contest Emphasis Choice”).

The *fifth chapter* will investigate the frame *promotion* process. In this process, I suggest that the political actors are concerned about how they can spread their message the furthest and maximize the impact of their campaign. The promotion effort can include both the variations of the strategic framing choices in the different communication channels and over time. The media input is the baseline channel because, as I will argue in chapter 5, it is the most important channel in frame building. The variation in different communication channels also tells us to which extent the political actors adapt their strategies to the media logic. Moreover, by promoting their message, the political actors think about how they can conti-

nuously garner media attention and bring their message into the media *during* the whole campaign. Instruments of direct democracy are well developed in Switzerland (Kriesi and Trechsel 2008: 49) and all actors involved know exactly how it works. Thus, it is routine action, and commonly, resources constrain the political actors to largely change their strategy during a campaign. By discussing the variation of the framing choices over time, I will argue that promoting practices used in direct-democratic campaign are used such that a frame finds media attention during the whole campaign.

The contribution of the journalists is analyzed separately in the final process of frame building, called the frame *mediation* process (chapter 6). This process could also have been called “contribution by the journalists” or “mediatization”. I prefer frame mediation because it is more similar to the terms of the other processes than “contribution by the journalists”, and more neutral than mediatization. Mediatization denotes a problematic consequence of the development of the modern mass media (Mazzoleni and Schulz 1999: 249). I consider the journalists and the media as an active element in society. In such a way, journalists have to select, process and interpret stimuli from the environment (Schulz 1989: 142). As already observed, I will suggest five choices which journalists decide upon (“Effort Choice”, “Balancing Choice”, “Standing Choice”, “Timing Choice”, “Dialogue Choice”).

The frame construction, promotion and mediation processes deal with the emergence of frames. As a final chapter of the whole frame building process, chapter 7 shall identify *key factors* which are relevant for a frame ultimately becoming a news media frame. In a first step, I will argue that the frame-building process is highly asymmetrical. Frames promoted by political actors in the media input influence media frames more strongly than vice versa. In a second step, I will then look at the factors in more detail. I will suggest that the power of a political actor, the role of the minister and the salience of the frames in the media input are key factors in frame building. This two-step procedure allows us to clarify causality question first

and then to increase the complexity of the model in a second step and look at the factors in greater detail. I cannot investigate all of these factors in one model and I do not want to take it as given that the political actors or the media input are the crucial actor and channel. By minister, I am referring to a Federal Councilor. The Federal Council is the Swiss government, which has seven members. Federal Councilors are faced with a dual task: they are a member of the governing college, and they direct one of the seven federal ministries (Kriesi and Trechsel 2008).

The *eighth chapter* will investigate framing effects and introduce the measure of strength of frames in communication. I will compare the new measure of a strong frame in communication to the commonly used measure of a strong frame in thought and will argue that the frames in communication are strong and have an effect on frames in thought. I will also explore the relative importance of the framing-based (=systematic) path of opinion formation process in comparison to the partisan heuristic path. I will develop specific hypotheses in the specific chapters. The *final chapter* summarizes the results. After pointing out the implications of my analysis, I will conclude the study with a discussion of the generalizability.

Empirically, I will explore the frame-building process and framing effects by analyzing three direct-democratic campaigns in Switzerland. I will analyze two campaigns related to optional referendums and one for a popular initiative. One of the referendum campaigns and the initiative concern the domain of immigration policy: the referendum by the left against the revised asylum law, which was voted on September 24, 2006, and the initiative ‘for democratic naturalizations’, launched by the populist right and submitted to the voters on June 1, 2008. The third campaign concerns fiscal matters. It also relates to an optional referendum launched by the left – the referendum against the revision of the corporation tax, on which the Swiss voted on February 24, 2008. The three campaign issues will be characterized with regard to

two criteria – their familiarity and complexity. The corporation tax constitutes a complex issue. In addition, the corporate tax and the naturalization initiative are highly unfamiliar issues whereas the asylum law is familiar. External events which are occurring independently of the campaign can also become relevant for frame building or framing effects. I will argue that summer holidays, the first 100 days of Eveline Widmer-Schlumpf in office as a minister, Christmas break and the subprime crisis of the UBS were relevant external events.

Theoretical Contributions

This research theoretically contributes to framing studies in different ways. First, it provides an important contribution to the literature on political communication and provides theory development by defining central processes and key factors in frame building. Although there are many other studies that analyze various aspects of frame building (although they do not use the term “frame building”), the understanding of frame building, its processes and key factors is still incomplete (De Vreese 2005: 60). To my knowledge, this is the first time that a framework for frame building has been outlined. The framework incorporates elements from research in agenda-setting and building (e.g., Kioussis et al. 2006, Lang and Lang 1981, Brandenburg 2002), media attention (e.g., Galtung and Ruge 1965, Schulz 1989, Gans 1979, Sigal 1973), political communication (e.g., Entman 2004, Bennett 1990) and framing (e.g., Sniderman and Theriault 2004, Chong and Druckman 2007c, Baumgartner et al. 2008). The model can identify the following key factors in frame building: the political actor as driving force and the media input channel as the relevant communication channel. In greater detail, we will see that the power of political actors, the minister as the most important individual actor, and the salience of a frame in the media input are key factors in a frame becoming a news media frame.

With regard to constructing the messages, the study defines three strategic framing choices as most important (“Substantive Emphasis Choice”, “Oppositional Emphasis Choice”, “Contest Emphasis Choice”). With regard to the “Oppositional Emphasis Choice”, a conceptual distinction between offensive and defensive use of the opponents’ frames is introduced. The offensive use of the opponents’ frame is defined as trespassing, whereas the defensive use is called counter-framing. Furthermore, with regard to the “Contest Emphasis Choice”, I distinguish between substantive and contest frames. Substantive frames focus on the substantive contents of the debate – on policy – while contest frames do not address the issue(s) at stake, but focus on the actors involved or on the contest per se – on politics. With regard to the contribution of the journalists, the book defines choices of journalists as central for frame building (“Effort Choice”, “Balancing Choice”, “Standing Choice”, “Timing Choice” and “Dialogue Choice”).

Empirical and Methodological Contributions

Empirically, I analyze the causal relationship between the frames promoted by the political actors and the news media frames. This simultaneous framing analysis at the levels of political actors and journalists allows a quantitative test of the indexing hypothesis. To date, this has only been conducted in qualitative terms (e.g., Entman 2004, Bennett et al. 2007). As a second empirical contribution, this research applies the indexing hypothesis to a European context and to the study of domestic policies. In the U.S. context, indexing is used most often for analyses about public debates on foreign policy. This appears to me to be a rather atypical case (see chapter 9). Researchers should explore how the processes work in different types of campaigns, in different countries and in different policies in order to draw generalizable conclusions. A third contribution in methodological terms is an innovative operationalization of the strength of frames in communication (chapter 8). A strong frame in communication is de-

defined as a frame that provokes a defensive reaction by the opponents and/or that resonates in the media. It is operationalized by the opponents' defensive reactions with respect to a given frame, i.e. by the shares of the opponents' counter-frames, averaged over the frames in the media input and the news media frames.

2

Context

Nowhere else are direct-democratic instruments more developed than in Switzerland (Kriesi and Trechsel 2008: 49). Between 1960 and 2009, a total of 365 referendums and initiatives were held at the national level in Switzerland. The Swiss Constitution creates different types of direct-democratic instruments. My study consists of two optional referendums and one initiative. The two instruments have in common the fact that they need to be called for by the citizens. By contrast, the two instruments differ according to the source of proposition. Referendums concern propositions from government, while initiatives are usually put forward by the people (Table 2.1). Accordingly, referendums and initiatives follow entirely different logics. The optional referendum intervenes at the end of the decision-making process. It requires 50,000 signatures, gathered within 100 days after its adoption by parliament. It can also be initiated at the request of eight cantons – which has happened only once since 1874. If an optional referendum is required, the legislative act has to be submitted to a popular vote. This effectively grants the electorate a veto on government legislation. The initiative, by contrast, generally occurs at the beginning of the decision-making process and has an agenda-

setting function. It can be forced if 100,000 signatures of citizens are gathered within 18 months. The proposed changes can relate to individual items in the constitution or even the constitution as a whole. Before a people's initiative is put to a popular vote, parliament will issue a recommendation to accept or reject it. In contrast to the practice in the U.S., in Switzerland, the government and the parliament discuss the text of the initiative before it is submitted to the popular vote, and provide it with a voting recommendation that almost always recommends its rejection (Kriesi and Bernhard 2010).

Table 2.1: Two Types of Swiss Direct-Democratic Institutions

	optional referendum	popular initiative
source of proposition	government	citizens
campaigns	Asylum, Corporation Tax	Naturalization

Direct-democratic instruments are not only frequently used; they also exert a profound impact on the political system. The most important impact is derived from the optional referendum and is of an indirect nature. The optional referendum hangs like a sword of Damocles over the legislative process (Neidhardt 1970) because the actors involved always have to fear that any political actor may submit the bill to the optional referendum, thus potentially ruining the entire bill. As a consequence, formal and informal institutional mechanisms have been developed in order to avoid this risk of veto. These mechanisms transformed Swiss democracy into a negotiation democracy. In the pre-parliamentary and parliamentary phase, negotiations take place in which political actors try to find a compromise that is sufficiently strong to avoid a popular vote. Along with federalism, it leads to the establishment of “concordance” or “consensus democracy” (Linder 1999: 24).

Swiss citizens are strongly attached to these direct-democratic instruments. Ninety percent of the electorate consider them as important or very important and are proud to very proud of them (Kriesi and Trechsel 2008: 66). Their attachment is probably linked to the fact that a majority of the electorate at least occasionally participate. Participation is selective and

depends above all on the expected effects of the bill, as well as the voter's personal interest and competence (Kriesi and Trechsel 2008: 62). In his "realist theory of direct democracy", Kriesi (2005) shows that citizens are able to efficiently make direct-democratic choices at the polls. They can either systematically consider the frames and arguments exchanged by two opposing camps (frame-based path of opinion formation) or form their opinion based on simplifying strategies (heuristic path of opinion formation). Of course, in reality, these two paths are not totally distinct from each other. Nevertheless, for the purpose of analysis, it is useful to separate them because it is relevant to gauge the importance of the frame-based path. With regard to the heuristic path, voters employ four different simplifying strategies (Kriesi 2005). First, they tend to abstain if they are uninformed about the proposal. Those who participate and rely on a cognitive shortcut mostly use the partisan heuristic. When using this simplification tool, voters rely on the voting recommendation of the party to which they feel closest and vote accordingly. Third, voters can trust the government and follow its recommendations. Fourth, they use the status quo heuristic and vote such that the status quo is preserved.

In the following, I will outline three relevant characteristics of direct-democratic campaigns for the study at hand. I will then present the types of political actors that are involved in campaigns and look at the Swiss media system. Finally, I will turn to the three cases and their selection.

Characteristics of Direct-Democratic Campaigns

Three institutional characteristics of direct-democratic campaigns (Kriesi and Bernhard: 2010) are particularly relevant for frame building: First, direct-democratic campaigns typically give rise to confrontation between *two opposing camps*. This is a consequence of the binary choice: Direct-democratic campaigns confront voters with a binary choice – either in favor (pro) or against (con) the issue-specific proposition at stake. Generally, one camp claims the

position of the government and the majority of Parliament, and the other argues in favor of the position of some challengers and the minority of Parliament. Pro and contra camp have different meanings for the optional referendum and the initiative. The pro camp in an optional referendum is always the government's camp, whereas the pro camp in an initiative is often the camp challenging the position of the government. The presence of two competing camps is most important for opinion formation because it guarantees competing information flows. Second, direct-democratic campaigns are of *limited duration*, with a clear beginning and a clear ending. This implies the intensification of flow in frame communication and allows causal inferences to be drawn about direct-democratic campaign effects: one can start to collect data before the direct-democratic campaign takes off and one can investigate the variation in the strategies of the political actors, in the content of the campaign material and news media and in the voters' political attitudes. In addition, direct-democratic campaigns are relatively short. This means that only few external events are likely to intrude into the campaign and intervene with the observed changes. Third, direct-democratic campaigns imply an *issue-specific choice*. This allows for a detailed study of the framing strategies and their impact on the voters with regard to one specific issue.

Involved Political Actor Types

In direct-democratic campaigns, different actor types are involved: large political parties ("large pol. parties"), small political parties ("small pol. parties"), economic interest groups and unions ("econ. interest groups"), citizens' interest groups, church organizations and SMOs ("citizens' int. group"), the minister in charge of the campaign issue and the public administration ("authorities"), and finally ad-hoc campaign committees ("ad hoc"). Even though Swiss political parties have traditionally been weak because they are lacking in resources (money and staff), they are key players in direct-democratic campaigns. It is their task

to articulate interests and mobilize their electorate in votes (Linder 1999). In addition, it appears that direct-democratic instruments allow political parties an advantage in terms of media attention and as such compensate their institutionally weak position (Höglinger 2008, Tresch 2007). With “large political parties”, I am referring to the five strongest parties in the Swiss multi-party system. The largest party is the Swiss People’s Party (SVP), which accumulated 28.9 percent of votes in the last election (2007) for the national parliament. The Social Democrats (SP) received 19.5 percent of votes, followed by the Liberal Party (FDP) with 15.7 percent and the Christian Democratic Party (CVP) with 14.4 percent of votes. These four parties form the coalition government. The Green Party (GPS) has not been part of the government coalition so far, but nevertheless received 9.6 percent of votes.

Even though parties might be key players in the mediated form of direct-democratic campaigns, they are not the only actors involved. Since Swiss political parties are poor organizations in financial terms, they rely heavily on the financial and logistical support from economic interest associations for the organization of direct-democratic campaigns (Brändle 2001: 182). The configuration of interest associations and citizens groups is determined by the interests related to the issue at stake. Economic and social policies typically mobilize the economic interest associations and the unions, while policies more related to the cultural dimension of the political space (immigration, or questions related to cultural liberalism) bring in organizations connected to the citizens’ interests, religious organizations, or professional associations. The relative importance of parties and interest groups in direct-democratic campaigns varies according to policy-specific conditions. (Kriesi and Bernhard: 2010).

In contrast to parties and interest associations, the authorities are expected to accomplish their campaign involvement with a certain restraint. According to this traditional view, which is derived from the specific informal rules of concordance and collegiality (Kriesi 2009), the role of the authorities consists in informing the citizens about the issues at stake ra-

ther than in engaging in propaganda maneuvers. In order to fulfill this task, the government is allowed to defend its standpoint on radio and TV during prime time and to present its arguments in a ballot pamphlet which is sent to every citizen. With respect to the authorities, the minister, i.e. the Federal Councilor responsible for the issue at stake, is particularly important. The Federal Council is the highest governing and executive body of the Swiss Federal State and contains seven members. Federal Councilors are faced with a double task: they govern and lead one of the seven federal ministries (Kriesi and Trechsel 2008). Since there are no institutional leaders in direct-democratic campaigns, ad hoc committees on either side also usually become involved in the campaign. They are set up for the purpose of coordinating the various actors and perform the function of meta-organizations that regroup a wide range of actor types. Alternatively, important actors may take it upon themselves to coordinate the alliance partners on their side of the campaign.

The Swiss Media System

The Swiss media system belongs to the democratic corporatist model, which prevails in Northern continental Europe (Hallin and Mancini 2004: 67f.). This model was initially characterized by *relatively strong ties* between the media and the political world (political parallelism). In Switzerland, the process of “disembedding” of the press, i.e. of its increasing autonomy from politics, did indeed begin late, and it is now largely completed (Blum 2003: 369, 2005: 124, Imhof et al. 2008). Nevertheless, there are still some ties between political actors and journalists. This is also related to the small size of the country. In a small country like Switzerland, the political actors and journalists have probably known each other from sports clubs, their university days, or an activity at the cantonal level, or at least have mutual friends. Moreover, it is almost certain that they will meet again. This leads to the fact that even though the news media is critical, journalists ultimately show solidarity with powerful actors rather

than aggression towards them. As Blum stated, news media is at a smooth distance (Blum 2005: 125f.) from the political system. Journalists respect the powerful actors and the political institutions such as concordance, direct democracy or minority protection (Blum 2006).

Second, the democratic corporatist model is characterized by a *limited development of the media markets* and a considerable degree of *state intervention*. In the last 20 years, the number of newspaper readers has been declining in Switzerland, and the number of media outlets has been shrinking as a consequence of both media concentration and increasing market orientation (Künzler 2005). In addition, we can observe an increase in “infotainment” (Imhof et al. 2008): a small number of free newspapers with a high coverage have come to play an increasingly important role within the media systems. In this respect, the most dramatic change on the newspaper market occurred in 1999, when the two free newspapers “20 Minuten” and “Le Matin bleu” were launched. Nevertheless, the newspapers still remain strong, which is related to the importance of the press. In the context of direct-democratic political campaigns, and of politics in general, the press is still the most important source of information for citizens (Marcinkowski 2006: 398). Swiss citizens spend on average about half an hour per day reading print media (Siegfried 2009). In 2000, there were 453 newspapers sold for every 1000 Swiss adults (Hallin and Mancini 2004: 23). Such a comparatively high rate is only topped by the Scandinavian countries. The high subscription rates (80 percent) form the financial foundation of the press, while advertising provides another 60–80 percent of subscription newspaper revenue (Meier 2004: 251). In addition, the press is still constitutionally protected, but there is no legal obligation for the Swiss press to fulfill a public service mandate (Meier 2004). Newspapers act as private enterprises. In contrast to the print media, the broadcast media has been under greater control of the government. The Swiss Broadcasting Corporation (SRG SSR idée Suisse) has a strong position in the audiovisual media landscape because it is charged with the production and broadcast of radio and television programs. It still operates as a non-profit-making enterprise and has the mandate to provide all

linguistic regions with a TV schedule that reflects and maintains the linguistic and cultural diversity of the country. SRG SSR studios are distributed throughout the various language regions, and the programs also have to contribute to formation of opinion. Swiss public broadcasting is less dependent on market orientation because it is mainly funded by license fee resources and co-financed by non-political advertising (Meier 2004). The TV advertisements are non-political since, as already mentioned in chapter 1, paid political advertising is prohibited on television and radio in Switzerland. The third characteristic of the democratic corporatist model is a strong *journalistic professionalism*. Professional norms support standards such as proportionality, detachment, civility, elite domination and closure (Ferree et al. 2002: 284). In Switzerland, more than 90 percent of Swiss journalists identify with the profile of the neutral intermediary or analyst (Marr et al. 2000: 124, Jarren and Donges 2002: 199–228). At the same time, they consider themselves neither as critical journalists who monitor the powerful and stand up for the weak, nor as market-oriented journalists who sell information to specific target groups.

Furthermore, it is characteristic of the Swiss media system that there are no newspapers and no private television stations on a national level. The Swiss media landscape is *linguistically segmented*. Following the borders of language regions, the Swiss media market is divided into three smaller markets, the German-speaking, French-speaking, and Italian-speaking part. In these regions, not only are domestic media from the market's own linguistic region used, but we see a spill-over from the major neighboring countries (Germany, Austria, France, and Italy) (Künzler 2005). We leave out media outlets from the Italian-speaking part of Switzerland, because Italian is the mother tongue of only seven percent of the Swiss population⁴ and there are no indications that the campaign or public debate in this region were of importance for the national public debate in the three campaigns. Historically, Switzerland has had a larger number of newspaper titles published in proportion to its population and size

⁴ <<http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schweiz>>, December 2009.

(Dahinden and Trappel 2005: 397), which stems from both the linguistic and the cultural diversity of the country.

Swiss newspapers are represented in all major categories of media publication. In terms of circulation, the most important media publication categories are high-quality elite newspapers (“elite”), regional newspapers (“regional”), tabloid newspapers (“tabloid”), free newspapers (“free”), and Public Service TV news (“TV”). Elite newspapers emphasize politics, economics, culture and science. The two daily elite newspapers (“Le Temps” in the French-speaking part, and the “Neue Zürcher Zeitung” in the German-speaking part of the country) continue to belong to the most influential Swiss newspapers (Siegfried 2009). Regional newspapers focus most on the regional part of the paper. The most influential among the regional newspapers is “Tages-Anzeiger” (Siegfried 2009). However, there are several other large regional papers such as “Berner Zeitung”, “Neue Luzerner Zeitung”, “Aargauer Zeitung”, “Basler Zeitung”, and “St. Galler Tagblatt” in the German part and “24 Heures” and “Tribune de Genève” in the French part. Tabloid newspapers are dominated by topics such as crime, society, entertainment, sport and sex (Blum 2003: 373). There are two large Swiss tabloid newspapers, “Blick” and “Le Matin”. “Blick” has the second highest circulation rate. The most widely read newspaper, however, is one of the free newspapers (“20 minutes”) which is distributed on public transportation. It has 490,000 and 1,370,000 readers in the two major language regions, respectively. Finally, 80 percent of all households have access to cable TV (Meier 2004).

The Three Campaigns⁵

Let us now turn to the specific cases, the two optional referendums and the popular initiative investigated in this study. One of the referendum campaigns and the initiative concern the

⁵ This part stems to a large extent from Kriesi and Bernhard 2010.

domain of immigration policy: the referendum by the left against the revised asylum law, which was voted on September 24, 2006, and the initiative “for democratic naturalizations”, launched by the populist right and submitted to the voters on June 1, 2008. The third campaign concerns fiscal matters. It also relates to an optional referendum launched by the left – the referendum against the revision of the corporation tax, on which the Swiss voted on February 24, 2008.

The Case of the Asylum Law 2006

The referendum that led to the vote in September 2006 was launched by the left against the tightening of the law adopted by the government and the center-right Parliamentary majority. On September 24, 2006, the voters accepted the tough new asylum law with a two-thirds majority of 67.7 percent. This result did not really come as a surprise. It was almost identical to that of the two related previous votes in April 1987 and June 1999. The vote on the asylum law was accompanied by a vote on the reform of the Immigration Law, which was also accepted by a similarly impressive majority. Both reforms had been discussed in Parliament in spring 2004. Compared to the government’s proposal, both bills had been toughened during the parliamentary debates, under the pressure of the populist right (SVP), with the support of the moderate right. The latter’s support was mainly motivated by the close outcome of the vote on the SVP’s radical asylum initiative in 2002: although the initiative had been rejected, it had obtained no less than 49.5 percent of the popular vote and the support of 12.5 cantons, which made the moderate right receptive to the far-reaching demands of the SVP.

Among other elements, the new asylum law stipulated that asylum requests from refugees who were already accepted by another state would not be dealt with. It also included the prohibition of social assistance for refugees whose requests had been legally rejected. The Council of States had even gone a step further and had abolished the emergency assistance for

rejected refugees. However, the National Council reintroduced this form of assistance after the Federal Court declared its suppression unconstitutional. In addition, the new law introduced more restrictive rules for considering the question of refugees without proper identification; it adopted a so called “airport procedure” allowing for rapid decisions at the refugees’ point of entry, and it enabled the possibility to exchange information with the refugees’ home country. Finally, more drastic coercive measures (various forms of detention of asylum seekers) were adopted, and the duration of the existing measures was extended. Since these coercive measures concerned not only refugees, but all immigrants without a residence permit, they were included in the reform of the immigration law. It is worth mentioning that the UNHCR and the Council of Europe voiced concern about this reform.

The frames used in this debate had already existed in the public discourse in the previous votes (1987, 1999) and in the parliamentary debate concerning this bill. I will discuss the promoted frames in chapter 4 but, nevertheless, would like to provide an overview of the main frames here. The contra camp maintained that the new asylum law was contrary to the Swiss humanitarian tradition (“*human. trad.*”) and that the provisions of the new law undermined the rule of law (“*rule-of-law*”). The pro camp argued that that Switzerland needed instruments to fight the abuse of its asylum legislation (“*abuse*”) and that the new law provided a more efficient implementation of the asylum legislation (“*efficacy*”).

Table 2.2: Main Frames of Each Campaign

Asylum	Naturalization	Corporation Tax
human. trad.	rule-of-law	tax equity
rule-of-law		tax loss
abuse	people final say	SME
efficacy	mass naturalization	competitiveness

The Case of the Naturalization Initiative 2008

On June 1, 2008, the naturalization initiative of the Swiss people's party (SVP) was voted down by 63.6 percent of the voters. Contrary to the outcome of the vote of our first case, the clarity of this verdict came as a big surprise and constituted a conspicuous defeat for the SVP, for whom this vote had been the most important test of its new opposition politics. The party had won the federal elections in Fall 2007, but it had lost the fight for the composition of the governmental coalition in December 2007: its coalition partners had respected its claim for two out of the total of seven governmental seats, but they had not complied with the party's demand to re-elect both of its incumbent ministers. Instead of the party's charismatic leader Christoph Blocher – the incumbent Minister of Justice, Parliament had chosen another member of the party – Evelyne Widmer-Schlumpf – to replace him. It was essentially a coalition of Social Democrats and Christian Democrats that had unseated the SVP leader. As a reaction to the ousting of its leader, the SVP proceeded to exclude its two newly elected ministers from the party, and decided to adopt a systematic oppositional stance. The exclusion procedure preoccupied the SVP and the Swiss public right up to the vote on the naturalization initiative, which explains why the campaign for the initiative began rather late, just five weeks before the vote. This vote provided the first important test for the party's new overall strategy.

To understand the thrust of the SVP's initiative for "democratic naturalizations", one needs to be aware that local municipalities play a key role in the naturalization process in Switzerland. Moreover, it is important to keep in mind that naturalization has never been a completely administrative procedure in this country, but has always involved political elements as well. In fact, the procedure varies greatly from canton to canton, and even within cantons, from one locality to the other (Helbling and Kriesi 2004, Helbling 2008): individual naturalization decisions can be taken by general assemblies of local citizens, by local parliaments, local executives or local naturalization committees. Prior to a decree by the Federal

Court in 2003, such a decision could even have been taken by popular votes at the ballot box. In reaction to an infamous vote in the city of Emmen, where a series of applicants for Swiss citizenship from the former Yugoslavia had been denied Swiss citizenship in a popular vote, the Federal Judges decided to outlaw such popular votes on naturalizations. They argued that the rejection of naturalization requests required a justification, and that such a justification was not possible in a direct-democratic vote. The popular vote had only been used in a limited number of places, but it could be shown that, in these places, the rejection rate of naturalization applicants was much higher than in the rest of Switzerland (Helbling and Kriesi 2004).

It was in reaction to this decision by the Federal Court that the SVP had launched its popular initiative in 2004. The initiative proposed that the voters in a given municipality should be able to decide which kind of procedure they wanted for naturalizations – in particular whether they wanted to vote at the ballot box on individual naturalizations. Moreover, the initiative stipulated that it should not be possible to appeal against local rejections of naturalization requests. The initiative, in fact, demanded that the act of naturalization should become an exclusively political act of the citizens as sovereign. It was submitted in November 2005 with the required number of signatures.

The government rejected the initiative, arguing above all that it violated international law, in particular the European Convention on Human Rights, the UN Pact II, and the UN Convention against racism. The debate in Parliament on the initiative was rather controversial, since several members of the moderate right felt a good deal of sympathy for the proposal. Eventually, the Parliament decided by a clear majority to reject the initiative. However, it provided the populist right with a substantial concession by elaborating an indirect counter-proposal to the initiative in the form of a modification of the law on civic rights: this proposal stipulated that naturalizations in general local assemblies should still be possible. A rejection of a naturalization request should, however, only be possible on the basis of a request provid-

ing explicit justifications, which was to be introduced during the assembly and which could serve as the basis of a possible later appeal. In the event that the initiative should be rejected, this counter-proposal was to enter into force. In this case, the parliamentary and the direct-democratic debate slightly varied. In the parliament, they were mainly concerned about the procedure they wanted for naturalization. The pro camp asked for fair procedures that complied with basic rights (“*rule of law*”), whereas the pro side conceived naturalizations as political acts and not as administrative ones and claimed that people should have the final say (“*people final say*”). In the direct-democratic phase, the pro camp additionally argued that “mass naturalizations” had to be stopped (Table 2.2).

The Case of the Corporation Tax 2008

The outcome of the third vote was also unexpected. Given the generally favorable attitude of the Swiss voters with respect to the neo-liberal tax reforms, it came as quite a surprise that, on February 24, 2008, the revised corporation tax was accepted in a popular vote with only the barest possible majority of 50.5 percent. The reform had three components. Its core element was a reduction of the tax on dividends for large shareholders – a measure to alleviate the double imposition of dividends, which Switzerland practices as one of the last member states of the OECD. The second component referred to the possibility of introducing an alleviation of the cantonal tax on capital, while the third component provided special measures for ownership succession in private, non-incorporated companies.

The reform constituted a political compromise between the business community, the cantons, and the parties of the right. The business community wanted to do away with the double imposition of dividends altogether, in order to improve the competitiveness of the Swiss economy, but it had to take into account the needs of the cantons, who had proven to be such a formidable adversary in the previous vote on the tax package of 2004. Thus, with re-

spect to the double imposition of dividends, the reform did not go all the way to suppress the tax on dividends entirely, but proposed to reduce the tax to 50 or 60 percent for investors holding at least 10 percent of the shares in company property or private property, respectively. The government had proposed to reduce the tax for all shareholders, but Parliament had introduced the qualification of the 10 percent, which was already in force in several cantons, in order to limit the loss of tax revenue for the cantons. Restricting the measure to large shareholders allowed the cantons to be won over to support the new law. Seventeen (out of the 26) cantons had already introduced such a reduction for their own taxation. Restricting the measure to large shareholders meant that the reduction mainly favored the owners of the myriad of small and medium-sized companies who had invested their money in their own firms. The whole package was designed to strengthen these small and middle-sized firms, which are often considered to constitute the backbone of the Swiss economy.

The second component of the law also carefully took into account the tax autonomy of the cantons. It introduced the possibility (but not the obligation) for those cantons that also levy a tax on profits to suppress their tax on capital, leaving the details of the procedure up to the cantons. Finally, the law introduced alleviations for personal companies in a period of transition. This series of measures was intended to facilitate the transfer of a company from one generation of owners to the next, or to alleviate the fiscal burden for the self-employed who wanted to close down their business.

Regarding the corporation tax reform, the frames have also been part of the parliamentary and public discourse in the past. The adversaries of the corporation tax reform focused on matters of “*tax equity*” and warned that the reform would lead to a shortfall of several hundreds of million Swiss francs with respect to both direct and indirect taxes (“*tax loss*”). The proponents of the new law framed the reform in terms of a necessary fostering of small and

medium enterprises (“*SME*”) and maintained that the new law would boost the economy by encouraging investments (“*competitiveness*”).

Campaign Selection

The case selection is based on the idea that the cases should help to find processes behind frame building: They are exploratory case studies. The suggested explanations of my book should provide a basis for further theory development and empirical tests.

”Researchers initially may observe only one or a few cases of that phenomenon. Careful observation of a small number of cases may suggest possible general explanations for the behavior or attributes that are observed. These explanations (...) can then be tested more systematically by observing more cases” (Johnson and Joslyn 1991: 121).

In exploratory case studies, a “focused comparison” (King et al. 1994: 43ff) can help to generate explanations. I am able to compare the campaigns with regard to five criteria – their complexity, familiarity, imbalance in terms of financial resources, expected closeness, and intensity. The corporation tax constitutes a *complex* object. Complexity is measured by the share of voters who had difficulties in making a decision on a given proposal (Kriesi and Bernhard: 2010). Almost two thirds of the voters had difficulties in making a decision on the corporate tax (Table 2.3), whereas in the other two cases, only around a third of voters were unable to make a decision. In addition, the corporate tax and the naturalization initiative were highly unfamiliar issues, as is indicated by the rather large shares of voters who were still undecided at the beginning of the campaign (Kriesi and Bernhard: 2010). The lack of *familiarity* of the corporation tax and of the naturalization initiative suggests that, in these two cases, the campaigners enjoyed a greater amount of latitude than for the asylum issue.

Table 2.3: Complexity and Familiarity of the Three Proposals: Indicators Based on VOX Surveys

	complexity	familiarity
Asylum	38.0	14.3
Naturalization	27.0	35.7
Corporation Tax	61.1	28.7

The indicators for the *imbalance in financial resources* of the campaigns are provided by the difference of pro to contra advertisements in a selected number of six major newspapers – three each in German- and French-speaking Switzerland – over the final four weeks preceding the vote. This indicator is a proxy of campaign budget, but given that the campaigners mainly use newspaper ads to sway the public, it provides a rather good idea of one-sidedness in monetary terms of a given campaign (Kriesi 2005). Table 2.4 shows that the pro camp was far ahead of the contra camp in terms of financial resources in the corporation tax reform. Advantages such as this one have been extremely rare in Swiss direct-democratic campaigns (Kriesi and Bernhard: 2010). The resources for the pro camp came mainly from the business interest associations, and the amount invested by them signals the singular importance the business community attributed to this particular reform. By contrast, in the asylum law campaign, the two camps were able to rely on almost the same budget. As far as the *expected closeness* is concerned, I draw on the evaluation of the key campaign managers. In the interviews before the vote took place, they were asked to predict the vote outcome. Expected outcomes between 45 to 55 percent of yes votes were coded as signifying a close race. Table 2.4 shows that the naturalization initiative was evaluated as the closest race, whereas only 40 percent of campaigners predicted that the corporation tax would become close. For *intensity*⁶, I rely on the number of news media articles in all content-analyzed newspapers during the whole cam-

⁶ Kriesi (2005) uses the number of political ads as a proxy for the intensity of a campaign. I can rely on the number of newspaper articles here. This seems to be an even better proxy because it comes closer to the intensity of the public debate.

paign. The asylum law gave rise to more intensive campaigns than the other two cases (Table 2.4).

Table 2.4: Imbalance in Financial Resources, Expected Closeness, and Intensity of the Three Proposals

	Asylum	Naturalization	Corporation Tax
imbalance in financial resources (advantage pro in number of ads)	-2	73	362
closeness (percentage of campaigners who expect a close race)	60	80	40
intensity (number of arguments in news media)	2455	1909	2066

Table 2.5 summarizes the general preconditions for the three campaigns. I summarize unfamiliarity and complexity as the difficulty of an issue, whereas the imbalance in financial resources and expected closeness are taken together for imbalance of a campaign. As the table suggests, the immigration issues share rather similar contextual preconditions, which are opposed to the preconditions of the corporation tax. The only difference between the two immigration cases is that the public debate of the asylum law was somewhat more intense than that of the naturalization initiative. Five criteria are too many for a systematic comparison of three cases. Based on theoretical considerations, I will thus focus on familiarity and complexity as the two main comparison criteria in all empirical chapters. Imbalance of financial resources and expected closeness are relevant for crafting the frame, whereas intensity plays a role only for framing effects.

Table 2.5: Overall Preconditions for the Three Proposals, in Terms of Difficulty (Unfamiliarity + Complexity), Imbalance (Imbalance in Financial Resources + Expected Closeness) and Intensity

imbalance	intensity	difficulty	
		high	low
high	average	Corporation Tax	
middle-low	high	Asylum	
	average	Naturalization	

Conclusion

This chapter provided an introduction to one of the most crucial institutions of the Swiss political system: direct democracy. It explained the difference between optional referendum and initiative and introduced the involved political actor types. In addition, in order to be able to understand frame building, it was also necessary to give an overview of the Swiss media landscape. Finally, I turned to the three selected campaigns and discussed case selection.

3

Methods

Data Collection

My research findings are based on data about the campaign behavior of political actors, the journalists, and the public⁷. To explore the framing strategies of the political actors, I will rely mainly on data from a content analysis of the campaign material of all key collective actors, and occasionally also on data collected in interviews with these actors. The relevant organizations were identified on the basis of various sources: the parliamentary debates, the campaign for the collection of signatures, voting recommendations, the press and websites more generally. We used cross-checks with the persons we interviewed in order to complete the set of relevant actors. Data concerning the news media were collected by analyzing the media content of the most important news media in Switzerland. Public opinion was captured by means of two (three in the asylum law) panel surveys in the French- and German-speaking parts of Switzerland. In all surveys, the first panel wave was fielded before the campaign started and

⁷ A group of researchers from mass communication and political science together collected these data. These researchers belonged to a national center of competence in research (<<http://www.nccr-democracy.uzh.ch/research/research-phase-1/module4/module-4>>, January 2010), which was financed by the Swiss National Science Foundation (for the design of the study, see Hänggli et al. 2010).

the final survey took place after the date of vote. The computer-assisted telephone interviews (CATI interviews) were conducted by a single company.

Content Analysis of Campaign Material and Media Content

The content analysis is most important for my study. In all three campaigns, we conducted a content analysis of the media input, political advertisements, letters to the editor, and of the media's news reporting. Additionally, direct mails and information for members were coded in the asylum law campaign. All material was coded with the same codebook⁸, which consists of three levels – the levels of the article, the political actor or journalist, and the argument.

The first level of the codebook refers to the *article*. By article, we mean a document such as a press release or an article in a newspaper. At the article level, we coded formal information such as the date, name of the newspaper, title, position, length, section, article type, the use of an image, and information about the content such as the cause for the report, inter-media agenda-setting, relevance, source, number of points of view, difficulty of terminology, presence or absence of a lead, degree of objectivity and emotionality and emotion. The second level refers to a *political actor* who uses an argument. At this level, we coded information such as organization, institution or party with which the political actor is associated, his/her name or regional provenance, or his/her position.

The third level of the codebook refers to the *argument*. An argument is defined as a verbalization of a specific point of view. In each document – press release, newspaper article, TV news program etc. – we coded *all* of the arguments provided by/reported for each one of the relevant actors (organizations or their individual representatives) in our study in great detail. Note that, for each argument, we introduce two different codes, one for the pro and one for the contra position on the issue (see Appendix: Table A1). The arguments allow for the

⁸ The codebook is available upon request.

linking together of the different actors – politicians, journalists and the voters – and constitute the unit of analysis in this study almost exclusively. I will make clear when the article or speaker level is the relevant level of analysis.

The *arguments* which the two camps produced to support their own position or to undermine the position of their adversaries were used for the operationalization of the *substantive* frames. After coding the arguments, we summarized them in a limited number (<10) of abstract categories (=frames), which we created on the basis of our reading of the controversy in a given campaign. The arguments mainly focus on the aspect of the problem definition. While this procedure does not address all of the possible aspects of a frame (Entman 1993), it does at least deal with the most important one. After grouping the arguments according to frames, we defined the main frames (=most important frames) for each side on the basis of the relative frequency in the media input. The camp which used a main frame more frequently than the other camp in the media input is said to own the frame. The use of a main frame by the opponent is called “offensive” (=trespassing), if the opponent uses the frame approvingly. By contrast, if the opponents reject the frame, it is called “defensive” (=counter-framing) use. Beside the substantive frames, there is another frame type: *Contest frames* consist of personal attacks and conflicts. A conflict refers to a dispute without a specific substantive content. For instance, a general statement of the type “our organization rejects the accusation of our adversaries” is a conflict.

Coding Procedures for Arguments

For the interviews with the political actors, we needed to know the important arguments in advance. On the one hand, we used the parliamentary debate, and newspaper articles of previous debates about the same issue to find these arguments. On the other hand, we relied on

interviews with experts, such as the person responsible for the ballot pamphlet, which is sent to every citizen (Oswald Sigg), a researcher who is very experienced with direct-democratic campaigns and has an astonishing memory (Hans Hirter), a lawyer with excellent knowledge about the asylum law (Maja Gehrig), and experts from the administration (Brigitte Hauser-Süss, Niklaus Sommerer). The arguments used in the interviews with the political actors were also used for the codebook of the content analysis. In addition, we extended the codebook by complementing arguments from the news media. This inductive approach (manual holistic approach, see Matthes and Kohring 2008) was combined with a deductive procedure (Matthes and Kohring 2008). We had the five (conflict, human interest, economic consequences, morality, and responsibility) generic frames (Semetko and Valkenburg 2000) in mind when developing the codebook and were also looking for arguments representing these generic frames. In this way, we used what Matthes calls (2009: 357) a “deductive quantitative procedure”.

Let us illustrate the coding with one example, the abuse frame. We coded the following pro arguments (in favor of the new law): “the abuse of asylum policy must be stopped”, “there are already too many (bogus) asylum seekers in Switzerland”, and “Switzerland is too attractive for asylum seekers”. The contra arguments (against the new law) were the following: “preventing abuse is impossible”, “the new law is not needed, since the number of asylum seekers is low/ declining”, and “tightening the asylum law hits the wrong/real refugees”. As already pointed out, we summarized these (and other) related arguments in a single frame, the abuse frame. Since the pro camp used the abuse frame most often in the media input, it was said to own this frame, and its position on this frame was defined as the offensive use. Thus, if the contra camp uses *pro* arguments of the abuse frame, they are called offensive arguments, and the *contra* arguments of this frame are the defensive arguments.

It is important to note that frames and arguments are not the same. Framing is the process by which political actors define the issue for their audience (e.g., Nelson et al. 1997a, 1997b). A frame highlights some aspects of a perceived reality, and enhances a certain interpretation or evaluation of reality (Entman 1993). In this respect, a frame is more than an argument because it also provides a specific understanding of the world. When I am referring to this defining function of a frame, I will use the term “frame”. By contrast, I will rely on the term “arguments” when I am concerned with the specific statement or with the number of arguments an article contains. In the other cases, I use the terms interchangeably.

Eighteen newspapers and two TV news programs were included in the study of the news media. We selected the most important elite newspapers (which we call “elite”), free newspapers (“free”), regional newspapers (“regional”), tabloid newspapers (“tabloid”), and Public Service TV news (“TV”) both in the German-speaking and in the French-speaking part of the country⁹ (see Appendix: Table A2 for the list). We made sure that the selected media covered all relevant media types. For the asylum law, the coverage of the media was analyzed over a period of 16 calendar weeks. This campaign started earlier than the other two campaigns because the issue was important to many organizations on the contra side and they tried to frame the issue before the summer holiday had started. The other two campaigns were shorter; thirteen calendar weeks before the respective vote were analyzed in both. In the case of the naturalization initiative, the attention paid to the first 100 days of a newly elected member of the Federal Council delayed the beginning of the campaign. Only when the event punctuating the end of these first 100 days had passed did the campaign and the media coverage begin in earnest. The vote about the tax reform took place in February. February votes

⁹ The daily newspapers selected were those with the highest total audience for German-speaking as well as French-speaking Switzerland. Concerning TV, we concentrated on Public Service TV, as commercial and privately owned TV plays only a marginal role in Switzerland. We did not analyze media from the small Italian-speaking part of the country.

usually imply shorter campaigns because they start not until after the Christmas break. In all three campaigns, we covered the direct-democratic campaign from the start to the end.

Table 3.1 shows the total number of articles and arguments which were coded. Most newspaper articles and documents directed towards the media (media input) were found in the asylum law campaign. The average media article contains about five arguments whereas around twelve arguments are found in a media input. In the corporation tax reform, we find most political ads and letters to the editor.

Table 3.1: Total Number of Articles and Arguments Coded by Campaign and Channel

		Asylum	Naturalization	Corporation Tax
number of articles				
news media		559	380	327
media input		92	69	88
political ads		371	327	434
letters to the editor		223	257	272
direct mail		19	-	-
info for members		106	-	-
number of arguments				
news media		2455	1909	2066
media input		1061	782	1056
political ads		1818	1625	1110
letters to the editor		597	989	1057
direct mail		324	-	-
info for members		2099	-	-

In the asylum law campaign, eight different students coded the material. At the argument level, Cohen's Kappa for intercoder *reliability* is 0.61, which is not high, although acceptable. We consider it acceptable because we checked all of the arguments after the coding and corrected for coding errors. In addition, for the analysis, we summarized the detailed codes for arguments into broader categories (frames), which are less error-prone. In the other two campaigns, the coding was carried out by ten students. The reliability of the coding in the naturalization initiative and the tax reform is assumed to be the same or even slightly better because the instructions, support and coding scheme were improved and four of the coders stayed within the coding team.

Expert Interviews with Political Actors

To a minor extent, I will also rely on data collected in interviews. The conversations considering the strategies of the political actors were conducted with the campaign managers of *all* relevant political organizations having taken part in the campaign under scrutiny. Table 3.2 gives an overview of the number and type of organizations interviewed. We distinguish between five types of actors: the ministers (=Swiss Federal Councilor responsible for the issue) and their administration, the political parties, the economic interest groups including unions, the ad hoc campaign committees, and finally, citizens' interest groups including church organizations. In the case of the asylum law, we had 46 different interlocutors. Thirty-three organizations belonged to the challengers' camp, which illustrates that the campaign against the asylum law mobilized a large number of collective actors, especially parties and citizens' interest groups. In the naturalization case, we interviewed 33 organizations, again a much larger number from the contra camp (25) than from the pro camp (8). Half of the conversations were held with parties and citizens' interest groups from the contra camp. In the tax reform campaign, the economic interest groups were particularly active. Overall, we interviewed 30 organizations in this case, 17 on the pro-side, of which 10 were economic interest groups. The number of actors varies in each campaign since the organizations do not have sufficient resources to campaign every time. The involvement of an organization depends not only on the importance of the issue for the organization, but also on the number of important issues on the agenda in a given year.

Table 3.2: Number and Type of Political Organizations Interviewed, by Campaign

	Asylum		Naturalization		Corporation Tax	
	contra	pro	contra	pro	contra	pro
parties (large parties)	10 (2)	6 (3)	10 (4)	3 (1)	7 (2)	5 (3)
citizens' interest groups	14	2	7	3	3	0
economic interest group	4	3	4	1	3	10
ad hoc committees	5	0	1	1	0	0
minister	0	2	3	0	0	2
n per camp	33	13	25	8	13	17
n total		46		33		30

Note: The numbers of large parties are indicated in brackets.

Our research team deliberately did not focus on the leaders of the organizations. Rather, the campaign manager – i.e. the person acting in the background and responsible for the direct-democratic campaign – was better suited to answer our questions about the campaign strategies. We conducted two face-to-face interviews with each campaign manager – one at the outset of the campaign, and one after the citizens' vote. This design is motivated by the fact that questions relating to expectations are preferably asked prior to the vote, whereas evaluation questions only make sense after the end of the campaign. The Swiss campaign managers were very cooperative. With one exception, we had no problem obtaining interview partners. In the one exception, the campaign manager was one of the most powerful politicians at the time, and he did not give a reason for refusing the interview. However, we were still able to interview another key campaign manager of the same party and obtained all of the necessary information. Thus, we can conclude that in Switzerland, conducting interviews with the campaign managers is unproblematic. It was, however, difficult to garner information about the campaign budget. In Switzerland, people only speak about money confidentially. We did receive some honest answers considering the monetary aspect of the campaign, but some campaign managers refused to mention any amount at all, some spoke only in vague terms about the budget, and several even lied about the amounts they spent, as our checks based on secondary material indicate. In order to gain some more reliable information about the financial aspect, we measured the size and numbers of political advertisements – one of the key budgetary items in a Swiss direct-democratic campaign. Based on the total size of political advertisements, we calculated estimators for the money the political actors spent on advertisements.

We recorded the interviews and took notes. Immediately after the interviews, we wrote minutes, in which we summarized the main statements. The detailed record was used only for clarification. We did not transcribe the interviews and accepted that the minutes already in-

clude some interpretation of the two interviewers (Laurent Bernhard and the author). This pragmatic way of using the minutes is sufficient to answer our research questions and allowed us to conduct and analyze a total of no less than 218 interviews. The modal duration of an interview was about 60 minutes. The interviews relied on two structured questionnaires containing more than 200 closed-ended and open-ended questions (see Hänggli et al. 2011 for a more detailed description).

Panel Study

For each campaign, we conducted a panel study. The structure of the questionnaire remained comparable across the three campaigns and differed only in terms of their thematic focus. Cognitive pre-tests preceded the main studies to ensure that the questionnaires were not too long and were respondent-friendly in terms of comprehension. An independent sample was recruited by random quota for each campaign. In order to minimize drop-out, the interviewees received an incentive for their participation. Table 3.3 lists the relevant information pertaining to the panel studies. As can be seen in this table, in the study about the asylum law campaign, participants were interviewed three times, while there were only two waves of interviews in the other two studies. The first interviews always took place before the campaign started. The final wave was started after the vote.

Table 3.3: Details of Three Panel Studies

study details (issues, panel waves, date of interviews)	N	% female	mean age (sd)
panel study I: Asylum			
wave I (7/4–7/20/2006)	1725	52.2	48.5 (17.1)
wave II (8/28–9/2/2006)	1415	53.7	49.3 (17.0)
wave III (9/25–9/30/2006)	1094	54.6	50.4 (17.1)
panel study III: Naturalization			
wave I (4/7–4/25/2008)	1251	51.3	48.5 (16.8)
wave II (6/2–6/20/2008)	999	50.2	49.6 (16.7)
panel study II: Corporation Tax			
wave I (1/9–1/23/2008)	1251	50.3	50.2 (16.3)
wave II (2/25–3/7/2008)	1001	50.4	50.2 (16.4)

Although our samples are representative in terms of participants' sex, age, and residence, three aspects impair the representativeness of our results. First and most problematic is the bias in terms of education, as the lowest educational levels are underrepresented in our data. Second, there is also systematic panel attrition. For instance, less-educated and younger people are more likely to drop out of our samples. These biases, along with a leniency bias, may have produced over-reporting in voting turnout (see Table 3.4). This bias is not problematic for the study at hand because participation as a dependent variable is not analyzed. The panel studies come close to the official outcomes of the vote. Apart from parameter estimates at the population level, there are no indicators that would prevent us from drawing conclusions about structural relations between variables even if these are affected by panel non-random missingness or panel mortality attrition.

Table 3.4: Results and Participation Rates: Comparison of Official Outcomes with Outcomes of our Study

	results (percent in favor)		participation rate	
	official	our study	official	our study
Asylum	67.8	61.3	49.2	87.5
Naturalization	36.0	27.7	45.1	79.9
Corporation Tax	50.4	52.6	39.0	86.2

Note: Official results without Ticino (Italian-speaking part of the country), which was not covered by our surveys.

Most of the constructs in the questionnaire were assessed repeatedly. The first part of the questionnaire captured participants' interest in the campaign, interpersonal communication, and information processing strategies. Subsequently, we asked for the knowledge or salience and the approval of the arguments. The knowledge and approval of arguments are of pivotal interest in the present study. For each panel wave in the three studies, respondents were asked whether they knew the specific arguments and the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with the arguments. Table 3.5 shows the most important arguments proposed by the pro and contra side by each campaign and reports to which frame the argument belongs.

Table 3.5: The Most Important Arguments by Camp and Campaign**Asylum**

pro arguments		frame
	The abuse of asylum policy must be stopped	abuse
	Switzerland is too attractive for asylum seekers	
	There are already too many foreigners in Switzerland	
	The execution of asylum politics must be more efficient	efficacy
contra arguments		
	The humanitarian tradition of Switzerland must be maintained	human. trad.
	Foreign people contribute to the social and cultural quality of Switzerland	
	The rights of asylum seekers have to be protected	rule-of-law

Naturalization

pro arguments		frame
	Mass naturalization has to be stopped	mass naturalization
	There are too many foreigners in Switzerland	
	Each municipality should decide by itself which authority is responsible for naturalization	people final say
	Civil servants should not be allowed to decide about naturalizations	
	The people should decide about naturalizations	
contra arguments		
	This initiative brings discriminatory and arbitrary naturalization decisions	rule-of-law
	Naturalizations have to be in accordance with the rule of law	
	The rights of the foreigners have to be protected	
	Naturalization candidates are well integrated in general	mass naturalization
	This poll damages the image of Switzerland	others

Corporation Tax

pro arguments		frame
	This tax reform advances SMEs	SME
	This tax reform advances the competitiveness of the Swiss economy	competitiveness
	This tax reform advances investments and creates new jobs	
	Double taxation is unfair	tax equity (defensive use)
contra arguments		
	A tax relief for major shareholders is unfair	tax equity
	A clear signal against excessive manager salaries is needed	
	All shareholders should get a tax discount	
	This tax reform harms the old age and survivors insurance (AHV)	tax loss
	This tax reform brings unacceptable tax loss for the federal government and the cantons	
	This tax reform makes the tax system even more complicated	others

After the argument block in the questionnaire, respondents were asked to report their emotional reactions toward asylum seekers in the first study, toward foreigners in general in the second study, and their affective reactions in the context of the corporate tax debate in the third study. Subsequently, the attitudes about the specific issue, people's voting intentions and

the intended (or actual) participation were gauged. In all three surveys, issue-specific predictors were assessed, such as values, authoritarianism, and threat perceptions. A next measure was the use of different communication channels and news media and the reliance on other sources (e.g., radio, web sites, or campaign advertising). Finally, we asked for general political interest, party identification, ideological left-right self-positioning, trust in government, and demographics (e.g., religion, occupation). Questions about sex, age, education, and residence were asked right at the beginning of the interview. These questions ensured that our quota would be completed. The time to complete the CATI interviews was approximately 20 to 30 minutes.

Arguments Were Linked Between the Data Collection Instruments

The questions concerning the arguments were linked between all relevant actors in the political campaign. In all of our instruments, we included questions about the very same arguments (Table 3.5). First, we asked the politicians about the importance of each argument in their campaign and their position on these arguments. For instance, they were asked about the importance of the argument “the abuse of asylum policy must be stopped” and about how much they agreed with it. In the content analysis, we coded how often the argument “the abuse of asylum policy must be stopped” was mentioned in the campaign material and in the news media and whether or not it was used offensively or defensively. Finally, in the panel survey, we asked the survey respondents whether they were aware of the most important arguments and whether they agreed with them. For instance, our interviewees were asked whether they had heard the argument “the abuse of asylum policy must be stopped” and how much they agreed with it. Such an integrated approach in data collection enables us to trace the flow of arguments from political actors via mass media reporting to the public.

Operationalization

I will discuss the operationalization of key concepts – campaign and frame dialogue, as well as power – which are used in several chapters. Concepts which are chapter-specific shall be introduced in the corresponding chapters.

Dialogue

For the operationalization of dialogue (convergence), I rely on two indicators. I use a formula developed by Sigelmann & Buell (2004) in order to calculate the level of *campaign dialogue* (campaign-level convergence):

$$100 - (\Sigma |P_{pf} - P_{cf}| / 2)$$

P_{pf} and P_{cf} are the percentage of total emphasis that the pro and contra camp put on a certain frame, f , respectively. This measure is derived from the total of the absolute differences between the two camps in the share of attention each camp devotes to a certain frame. For example, assume that there were three frames for the two camps to address, and that the sides distributed their attention as follows:

	Frame 1	Frame 2	Frame 3
Pro camp	100%	0%	0%
Contra camp	0%	100%	0%

In this example, the pro camp concentrated exclusively on one frame, the contra camp focused exclusively on a different frame, and both sides ignored the third frame. Obviously, no campaign dialogue occurred during this campaign. Summing together the absolute differences between the camps would produce a difference of 200 – that is, $|100-0| + |0-100| + |0-0|=200$. These differences add up to 200 rather than to 100 because we double-counted them. Thus, we need to divide the sum by 2 in order to calibrate the measure to the range between 0 and

100. In addition, subtracting from 100 converts the measure to one of similarity rather than dissimilarity. Thus, the closer the measure is to 100, the more campaign dialogue we have. A score of, say, 40 for a campaign would indicate a 40% overlap in the two sides' attention profiles.

In addition, to determine the extent of *frame dialogue* (frame-level convergence), we use the following measure proposed by Kaplan et al. (2006), where P_{pf} and P_{cf} again represent the percentages of emphasis that the pro and contra camps put on a certain frame f .

$$(1 - |(P_{pf} - P_{cf}) / (P_{pf} + P_{cf})|) * 100$$

Frame dialogue is less important because we are more interested in the overall dialogue than in the dialogue about a certain frame. Thus, I will use frame dialogue only in chapter 4.

Power

Finally, there is a measure for the *power*, which allows us to specify the influence of the actors involved. Power is operationalized by a reputational indicator and is based on a set of questions referring to the list of all organizations involved (Kriesi et al. 2006). In the second interviews, the campaigners were first asked to name the organizations on the list which, from their point of view, had been particularly influential during the campaign. Next, they were asked to name the three most influential organizations, and, finally, the most influential one. For each organization, a summary indicator reflects the number of times it was mentioned by the other respondents in reaction to these questions: mentions as “most influential” are coded as “3”, mentions among the “three most influential” as “2”, and mentions as “influential” as “1”. The values of the indicator range from 0, for an organization that was never mentioned as influential, to 3 times the number of respondents, for an organization that would have been considered to be the most influential actor by all of them.

Conclusion

I presented the instruments used for data collection and the operationalization of concepts which will be used in several chapters. The *unique set of data* consists of data about the campaign behavior of political actors, the journalists, and the public. It enables us to trace the flow of arguments from political actors via mass media reporting to the public. To explore the framing strategies of the *political actors*, the book relies mainly on data from content analysis of the campaign material of all key actors, and occasionally also on data collected in interviews with these actors. Data concerning the *news media* were collected by analyzing the media content of important (18 newspapers and 2 TV news programs) news media in Switzerland. *Public opinion* was captured by means of two (three) panel surveys in the French- and German-speaking parts of Switzerland. The integrated approach in data collection allow following the framing process from the construction and promotion of the frames by the politicians, to their mediation by the journalists, and their reception and acceptance by the citizen public.

4

Frame Construction for the Media Input (Strategic Framing Choices)

Introduction¹⁰

In order to win a political campaign, political actors try to achieve an *emphasis* effect (Druckman 2001, 2004), i.e. to lead the media or individuals to focus on certain aspects of an issue instead of others when constructing their opinions (Druckman 2001: 230). They frame the issue at stake strategically, and “campaign on behalf of competing ways of understanding what is at issue” (Sniderman and Theriault 2004: 158). I argue that political actors face at least three strategic framing choices. In this chapter, I start by discussing these three choices. In addition, I shall present the main frames of both camps in each campaign and present the empirical analysis structured according to the choices. This chapter focuses exclusively on the frames in the media input because it is the crucial channel for the frame building process. The first aim of the campaigners is to bring their frames into the earned media coverage, because the news media transport their message the furthest and for free.

¹⁰ An earlier version of this chapter is going to be published in: Hänggli et al. (2011) and a paper summarizing the most important aspects of frame construction and frame promotion in the naturalization initiative has been submitted to ABS.

The Three Strategic Choices

In order to win a campaign, the political actors face three strategic choices (Hänggli and Kriesi 2010). First, the strategic actors are expected to search for a frame which they believe has the capacity to become a *strong substantive frame*. I call this choice the “Substantive Emphasis Choice”. Second, the political actors have to decide how much importance they attach to the frames of the opponents compared to their own frames. This choice is labeled the “Oppositional Emphasis Choice”. According to well-known advice, political actors should focus on the issue or issue attributes where they enjoy an advantage. Riker’s (1996) “dominance principle” formulates this type of strategy: “when one side has an advantage on an issue, the other side ignores it”. Issue-ownership theory (Petrocik 1996) suggests that political parties tend to follow this recipe, which means that they essentially talk past each other in political campaigns.

As a consequence, yes and no campaigners fighting against each other are expected to essentially rely on different frames. However, under some conditions, there are reasons to expect dialogue (Kaplan et al. 2006). As introduced in chapter 1, I distinguish between *campaign* and *frame dialogue*. The first looks at the similarity with which the main frames are discussed whereas the latter is concerned about how much the two camps converge on one particular frame. *Issue familiarity* is expected to facilitate campaign dialogue because the arguments are already known. This helps the political actors to anticipate the frames their opponents will campaign on and therefore make it easier to counterattack. In contrast, *issue complexity* handicaps campaign dialogue because the topic is more difficult. Political actors might first have to explain what the issue at stake is about and to build frame ownership before they can discuss among each other. Furthermore, according to Kahn and Kenney (1999: 81–86), the *expected closeness* of a vote or an election increases campaign dialogue. They find that

candidates involved in close races tackle the opponent's policy agenda and issue position more often than is the case in noncompetitive counterparts. Basinger and Lavine (2005) confirm this pattern. They explain the mechanism behind this result as follows: in more competitive campaigns, more voters rely on issue or ideological voting than on partisan cues. This tendency to rely more on issue voting increases the pressure for the political actors to discuss the same frames. No political actor can allow his or her opponent to dominate the information flow and will thus address the frames. In addition, an imbalance in financial resources between the two camps is expected to decrease campaign dialogue. Kaplan et al. (2006: 730) argue that the camps are unable to talk about everything they might wish to talk about. Money helps them to address more aspects. Thus, if the difference in financial terms increases, the possibilities to engage in dialogue become more unequal.

At the frame level, I hypothesize that *salience* (Damore 2005) of the frame in the media increases frame dialogue. When a frame receives attention in the media, it might become more important to the voters too, and the political actors might be forced to take a position on it. Thus, the political actors are expected to more often use a salient frame.

If political actors refer to the frames of their opponents, they can do so either *offensively* or *defensively*. As introduced in chapter 1, the offensive use of the opponents' frames corresponds to what Sides (2006) has called "*trespassing*": political actors may use strong images, issues or issue attributes of their opponents in order to appear responsive to the general public. Sides also refers to this strategy as "*riding the wave*", and shows in his analysis of the 1998 American presidential campaign that it is widely used. Even more widespread, however, may be the defensive use of the opponents' frames: political actors may feel forced to react to the successful frames of their opponents and to adopt *counter-frames* to offer rebuttals, and to counter-attack their adversaries. A full-fledged framing strategy of a political actor should not only mobilize her own constituency and the bystanders, but also try to "neutralize

and discredit the framing efforts of adversaries and rivals, keeping their potential supporters passive” (Gamson 2004: 250). I expect political actors to prefer their own substantive frames, and to rely on defensive strategies only insofar as their opponents’ framing is successful, or they anticipate their opponents’ framing to be successful.

Concerning the third choice, the political actors have to decide how much importance they attach to the campaign contest compared to the substantive content of the campaign. This is the “Contest Emphasis Choice”. In this respect, I distinguish between two types of frames – *contest frames* and *substantive frames*¹¹. The unique feature of the contest frames is that they do not address the issue(s) at stake, but focus on the actors involved or on the contest per se – on politics – while substantive frames focus on the substantive contents of the debate – on policy. In general, I expect that the political actors would like to get their substantive message across and place a high priority on their chosen substantive frame(s).

In addition, I investigate whether the use of contest frames is dependent on the *power* of the political actor. Numerous empirical studies have shown that the media mostly turn to powerful actors when writing their stories (e.g., Bonfadelli 2000, Gans 1979, Sigal 1973, Tresch 2009). The powerful actors benefit from an “inherent” news value and get more access to the media. The weak political actors might use more contest frames as an attempt to compensate and attract more news value. They have a valence disadvantage (Groseclose 2001), i.e. a disadvantage of non-policy factors such as incumbency, better name recognition, or possibly also regarding access to the political system. Groseclose examines a situation in which a candidate has a potential valence advantage. He shows that in an attempt to counter the valence advantage, a challenger will take relatively extreme policy positions (e.g. diverge from

¹¹ De Vreese (2005) makes a distinction between “issue-specific” and “generic” frames. This distinction suffers from the difficulty that it mixes up thematic and contest frames in both the generic and the issue-specific category. In addition, Chong and Druckman (2007c: 107) find it difficult to specify a frame as generic or general. I agree. However, I do not follow these authors when they suggest calling “script” a “feature in the communication such as a conflict” (p. 107). Finally, Entman (2004: 5f.) explores two classes of frames, substantive and procedural frames. My distinction is similar, also in terms of the meaning.

the median), because this minimizes the salience of the valence advantage (see Groseclose 2001: 864–865). Druckman et al. (2009) suggest that the model should be extended further. I support the idea of broadening the model and hypothesize that the weak political actors might emphasize conflicts or personal attacks in order to overcome valence disadvantage. This might especially be the case in direct-democratic campaigns because the choice is binary. The political actors cannot diverge from the median. However, they can resort to the contest frames.

Finally, the *extreme* actors might also use more contest frames, based on the following idea: Extreme actors might pursue a different goal than moderate actors. The latter might pursue the goal of influencing the issue at stake or winning the next election. By contrast, extreme actors often do not have sufficient power to win a direct-democratic campaign or an election, and must have another reason for their participation. For instance, they might aim at maintaining grassroots participation and limiting leadership control. Harmel and Janda (1994: 275) called this goal the “intraparty democracy” goal. I call it the “grassroots participation” goal. Organizations that pursue this “grassroots participation” goal seek to continue the activities after a direct-democratic campaign. This constitutes an aim in itself. A direct-democratic campaign can help to reach this goal by strengthening the group identity. One way to strengthen this identity is to distinguish between ingroup and outgroup, and to denounce the others or to point out the conflicts. Thus, the extreme actors are expected to use more contest frames. In addition, members of extreme organizations are found to use a different style of political engagement (McClosky and Chong 1985). They are more likely to attribute personal failings to those who are far from their own political ideals. In other words, they are again expected to use more contest frames.

Before turning to the methodology, I will summarize the hypotheses: First, the strategic actors are expected to search for a frame which they believe has the capacity to become a

strong substantive frame (“Substantive Emphasis Choice”). Second, yes and no campaigners fighting against each other are expected to essentially rely on different frames. If the political actors refer to the frames of their opponents, they are expected to do so *defensively* insofar as their opponents’ framing is successful or they anticipate their opponents’ framing to be successful (“Oppositional Emphasis Choice”). In addition, at the campaign level, *issue familiarity* and *the expected closeness* are expected to increase campaign dialogue, whereas it probably is handicapped by *issue complexity* and *an imbalance in financial resources*. At the frame level, I hypothesize that the *salience* of the frame in the media increases dialogue. Third, I expect that the political actors would like to get their substantive message across and put a high priority on their chosen substantive frame(s) (“Contest Emphasis Choice”). The weak and the extreme political actors might use more contest frames.

Operationalization

Based on a block-model analysis by Bernhard (2010), I define extreme and moderate actors. *Block-model analysis* allows for distinguishing between structurally equivalent groups of actors on the basis of an analysis of the cooperative relationships. A block model consists of two elements (Wasserman and Faust 1999: 395): (1) a partition of actors in the network into discrete subsets called positions, and (2) for each pair of positions, a statement of the presence or absence of a tie within or between the positions. The CONCOR algorithm was used, which applies successive splits to the network. The first split is expected to generate the two opposing camps, the second split reveals, if existing, two blocks on each camp. In order to arrive at two extreme blocks, I pool together the two center blocks of the asylum law and the corporation tax reform, and call them the moderate block. In the naturalization initiative, there was only one block in the center. The more extreme blocks (left, populist right or conservative right) are labeled extreme left-wing and extreme right-wing blocks. These extreme blocks are

not necessarily extreme in absolute terms, but rather in relative terms: they are more extreme than the moderate block.

I will use a **rare event logistic** regression (relogit) in order to investigate the factors influencing the contest frames. Relogit is used in the case of binary dependent variables, with dozens to thousands fewer “ones” (events, such as contest frames) than “zeros” (“non-events”, such as substantive frames) (King and Zeng 2001).

Results

Substantive Emphasis Choice: Main Frames

We begin this section by identifying and describing the main frames of the three campaigns under scrutiny. The corresponding relative frequencies are typed in bold. We arrive at one to two main frames for each camp in each campaign. As becomes clear from Table 4.1, the campaigners predominantly address their own frame. On average, the most important frame of the contra camp makes up 45 percent of the arguments, whereas the pro camp focused on its most important frame in one third of cases. In the case of the asylum law, each side used two main substantive frames. On the contra-side, the *humanitarian tradition* frame (=“*human. trad.*”) was used most often (=core frame). This frame maintained that the new asylum law violated human dignity and human rights, endangered religious norms, and that it was contrary to the Swiss humanitarian tradition. The second important frame of the no camp can be labeled the “*rule-of-law*” frame. This frame maintained that that the provisions of the new law undermined the rule of law, that they violated international law (e.g. the Geneva Convention), that the principle of proportionality was violated by certain provisions of the new law, and that the risk of judicial errors would increase. On the pro-side, the “*abuse*” frame constituted the core substantive frame. This argued that there were too many false asylum-seekers in the country, and that Switzerland needed instruments to fight the abuse of its asylum legislation. The

second most important substantive frame of the pro-side is a positive frame, which promises a more efficient implementation of the asylum legislation. It does so in general terms, but also by pointing to specific improvements such as greater flexibility for the Swiss member-states (the “Cantons”), especially with respect to returning illegal asylum-seekers to their home countries. I call this the “*efficacy*” frame. Both sides used additional frames, which are summarized under “other” frames in Table 4.1.

The analysis identifies only one main frame for the adversaries of the naturalization initiative. In order to avoid arbitrary decisions, the “*rule-of-law*” frame asks for fair procedures that comply with basic rights. By contrast, the pro-side conceived naturalizations as political acts and not as administrative ones. Therefore, it is not surprising that its key frame is concerned with the claim that people should have the final say (“*people final say*”). Aside from procedural aspects, the proponents adopted a rather xenophobic discourse. They stated that “mass naturalizations” had to be stopped and also alluded to crimes that occurred during the campaign, especially to those committed by recently naturalized persons.

Regarding the corporation tax reform, each side again used two main substantive frames. The adversaries of the corporation tax reform mainly focused on matters of “*tax equity*”. They argued that the tax cuts introduced an unfair privilege for the well-off and went against the principle of fair taxation. They even claimed that the reform was unconstitutional. This line of reasoning mainly applied to a controversial provision that included a reduction in tax rates on dividends for shareholders disposing of at least a ten per cent stake in a corporation. To a lesser extent, the opponents warned that the reform would lead to a shortfall of several hundreds of million Swiss francs with respect to both direct and indirect taxes. More specifically, a powerful argument stated that the old age pension scheme would suffer if people accepted the proposal. I decided to label this kind of argument as the “*tax loss*” frame.

Table 4.1: Substantive and Contest Frames (Percentage Shares), and Dialogue Levels of Substantive Frames in Media Input: By Campaign and Camp

Campaign	Asylum			Naturalization			Corporation Tax					
	con	pro	frame dialogue	con	pro	frame dialogue	con	pro	frame dialogue			
substantive frames	human. trad.	38.8	24.8	80.1	rule-of-law	49.0	19.6	61.7	tax equity	48.5	7.7	30.0
	rule-of-law	21.5	9.3	62.2					tax loss	22.3	8.4	58.9
	abuse	17.6	26.9	77.0	people final say	21.9	39.3	66.8	SME	5.6	38.4	23.4
	efficacy	4.0	17.3	36.1	mass naturalization	17.5	20.6	86.6	competitiveness	14.1	27.3	63.6
	others	13.9	16.1		others	5.0	7.5		others	4.3	11.3	
	all substantive	95.9	94.3		all substantive	93.2	87.9		all substantive	94.8	93.1	
campaign dialogue	69.9			69.3			41.5					
contest frames	4.1	5.7		6.5	13.1		5.2	6.9				
total	100%	100%		100%	100%		100%	100%				
n	726	335		675	107		462	594				

The proponents of the new law framed the reform in terms of a necessary fostering of small and medium enterprises (SMEs), which form the backbone of the Swiss economy. The “*SME*” frame dominated the yes campaign. It stated that these companies were in need of benefiting from a set of planned measures aimed at reducing financial and administrative burdens. The second most important frame of the pro-side turned the public’s attention to the overriding importance of the reform for the Swiss economy. The “*competitiveness*” frame maintained that the new law would boost the economy by encouraging investments and the creation of jobs.

Oppositional Emphasis Choice: Dialogue

The degree of dialogue varies between and within campaigns. The *campaign dialogue* levels are much higher for the immigration ballots (69.9 for the asylum law and 69.3 for the naturalization initiative) than for the campaign on corporation tax (41.5). The results provide support for my hypothesis with the exception that familiarity seems to be less important for campaign dialogue. The tax reform was the most complex issue and the most one-sidedly dominated campaign in terms of financial resources of all the campaigns since the beginning of the 1980s. In addition, the tax reform was evaluated as the most predictable race. Accordingly, the level of campaign dialogue should, indeed, be lowest in the tax reform campaign. Based on the high level of campaign dialogue in the other two campaigns, we can consider closeness of the race and familiarity to be important. The naturalization campaign was expected to be the closest run whereas the asylum law was familiar.

We will now turn to *frame dialogue* and look at whether media frame salience (measured as the relative frequency in news media) increases dialogue. In the case of the asylum law, the humanitarian tradition and the abuse frames were the most salient media frames (chapter 7). Both are characterized by a high level of frame-specific convergence. In the in-

interviews, the campaigners from the contra camp reported that they felt obliged to counter the abuse frame because it was so prevalent in the public discussion. This provides strong support for our hypothesis. However, salience not always increases frame dialogue. In the naturalization and in the tax reform campaign, the political actors did not converge on the two most salient media frames. These contradictory results do not contribute much to clarify the reasons why campaigners ignore a frame or why they may feel compelled to counter a salient frame. Overall, the reason why campaigners ignore a frame or feel compelled to counter a salient frame is not clear. It might be associated with the familiarity of the issue, with timing, or with as yet unknown mechanisms that make a frame a strong frame (Chong and Druckman 2007c).

Is the widespread use of the opponents' arguments a sign of (offensive) trespassing or of (defensive) counter-framing? Table 4.2 provides a rather unequivocal answer to this question. We can see that the two camps use their opponents' frames defensively in almost all cases. In other words, we find little trespassing (=offensive use of the opponents' frames), but mainly counter-framing (=defensive use) in all the communication channels. The only exception to this general finding is the pro camp in the asylum campaign, which does some trespassing with respect to the contra camp's humanitarian tradition frame. In this particular case, the pro camp made use of a double-edged argument by endorsing the concern advanced by their adversaries. In a first step, its actors pointed out that they were strongly in favor of the humanitarian tradition of Switzerland. In a second step, they maintained that the revised law would strengthen this claim because it would help to fight against abuse, thereby helping those asylum seekers who really deserved protection. This clever counter-framing strategy found its expression in slogans that combined both aspects: fighting against abuse and maintaining the humanitarian tradition. For instance, the pro camp endorsed the humanitarian tradition argument, but accused the contra camp of falsely claiming that the new law constituted a threat to this tradition. Or, the pro camp used the humanitarian tradition frame offensively, but turned around and accused the contra camp of tolerating or even stimulating asylum abuse

(which, it claimed, had endangered this very tradition). In another example, the pro camp dismissed the contra camp's complaint that the new law violates the UN Charter of Children's Rights and claimed that the law is compatible with this charter. These types of messages were intended to appeal to moderate and cross-pressured voters in order to assure victory.

Table 4.2: The Offensive Use of the Adversaries' Frames (=Trespassing): Percentage Shares of All Adversaries' Frames Used

Asylum		Naturalization		Corporation Tax	
con	pro	con	pro	con	pro
human. trad.	18.1	rule-of-law	0.0	tax equity	0.0
rule-of-law	0.0			tax loss	0.0
abuse	0.0	people final say	0.0	SME	0.0
efficacy	0.0	mass naturalization	0.0	competitiveness	0.0

Contest Emphasis Choice

Next, we will look at whether political actors primarily used substantive or contest frames. As expected, contest frames such as personal attacks and conflicts are only rarely used by political actors in Swiss direct-democratic campaigns. As depicted in Table 4.1, the proportion of the contest frames is somewhat higher in the naturalization and the tax reform campaign, especially in the case of the pro camp in the naturalization initiative. This might be due to the fact that a former member of the Federal Council from the populist right-wing party (SVP), Christoph Blocher, was not re-elected and was instead replaced by another person from the same party, Eveline Widmer-Schlumpf, on December 12th 2007. As she accepted the election, she was thrown out of the SVP, and a small minority of supporters of Widmer-Schlumpf split off from the party. The issue was contentious and emotional, and the naturalization initiative was the first vote for which Widmer-Schlumpf was the Federal Councilor responsible. I will provide a more detailed overview of this aspect of the vote below, but will first take a look at the factors influencing contest frames in general.

According to the regression model presented in Table 4.3, my hypothesis with regard to power is confirmed in the first campaign. In the case of the asylum law, the more powerful organizations use fewer contest frames. The opposite is the case for the naturalization initiative, whereas in the tax reform, the coefficient is not significant. As mentioned above, the results in the last two campaigns might have been influenced by the special circumstances. We will investigate this aspect below. Moreover, in Table 4.3, it becomes evident that the political actors of the more extreme blocks use more contest frames than the political actors of the moderate block. This effect is significant in both immigration issue campaigns and almost significant at the $p=0.10$ level in the tax reform. As control variables, I also examine whether the right-wing political actors or the governmental camp use more contest frames. In this respect, no clear pattern can be observed based on the political left-right scale. The right-wing actors tend to use more contest frames in the asylum law campaign, whereas in the tax reform they tend to use fewer contest frames. The governmental camp tends to use more contest frames in the naturalization and the tax reform campaign. Further analysis will have to show whether this tendency was caused by the special circumstances or holds true in more general terms.

Table 4.3: Rare Event Logistic Regression (Relogit) Explaining the Use of the Contest Frames

	Asylum			Naturalization			Corporation Tax		
	robust			robust			robust		
	coeff.	s.e.	p	coeff.	s.e.	p	coeff.	s.e.	p
power	-0.031	0.009	***	0.021	0.007	***	0.007	0.006	
extreme	0.988	0.338	**	1.647	0.577	**	0.744	0.475	
li-re	0.146	0.084	°	0.125	0.186		-0.276	0.157	°
governmental camp	0.159	0.420		1.881	1.224		1.408	0.827	°
constant	-3.215	0.430	***	-6.194	2.158	**	-3.067	0.459	***
n	1061			782			1056		

*** $p<.001$, ** $p<.01$, * $p<.05$, ° $p<0.1$

As can be seen in Table 4.1, the share of contest frames is comparatively high in the case of the pro camp in the naturalization initiative. Table 4.4 provides a more detailed overview of this aspect and shows the use the contest frames by the different actor types. It can be seen

that it was the most powerful actor types, i.e. the authorities and the political parties of the pro camp, who campaigned with significantly more conflict frames. In fact, it appears that the dispute between Christoph Blocher, the SVP, and Eveline Widmer-Schlumpf caused the *quarrelling* actors to rely more on these frames. Blocher and the SVP belonged to the political parties of the pro camp, and Widmer-Schlumpf to the authorities. Whereas the parties of the pro camp used both personal attacks and conflicts, the authorities on the contra side mainly emphasized the conflict and abstained from making personal attacks.

Table 4.4: Contest Frames in the Naturalization Initiative: Percentage Shares by Camp and Actor Type

camp	con					pro	
	authori- ties	ad hoc committees	parties	economic interest groups	citizens' interest groups	parties	ad hoc committees
personal attacks	1.7	4.0	2.0	9.2	6.6	8.1	0.0
conflicts	5.6	0.0	2.0	4.1	0.5	8.1	0.0
all contest frames	7.2	4.0	4.1	13.3	7.1	16.2	0.0
power by actor type (mean)	41.1	18.0	8.9	8.3	5.0	80.0	18.0
n	108	25	246	98	198	86	21

In the tax reform campaign, the political parties of the pro camp also used more contest frames than the other actor types. Since both campaigns took place soon after the non-re-election of Blocher, I assume that the actors involved used more contest frame than would otherwise have been the case. This influenced the effect of power in the second and third campaigns. However, in general, we can conclude that in Swiss direct-democratic campaigns, framing is primarily accomplished in substantive terms.

Conclusion

We can summarize the results according to the three strategic choices of framing which we have outlined in this chapter. With regard to the “Substantive Emphasis” and the “Oppositional Emphasis Choices”, we find that political actors tend to emphasize their own frames,

but they do not exclusively revert to this behavior. In addition, it has been shown that addressing the frames owned by the opponents is largely achieved defensively rather than offensively, that is, by means of counter-framing rather than trespassing. We have briefly explored a successful way of using the argument of the opposing side: A promising counter-framing strategy consists in endorsing the argument held by the adversary and simultaneously framing it in a disadvantageous manner. We have established that dialogue varies according to the complexity of the issue, to the imbalance in financial resources and to the expected closeness of the run at the campaign level and to the media salience at the frame level. Surprisingly, issue familiarity is not important for campaign dialogue. With regard to the third choice, the “Contest Emphasis Choice”, we have shown that the political actors mainly focus on substance in direct-democratic campaigns, i.e. they mainly rely on substantive framing. We found that actors with more extreme positions use more contest frames and that the dispute between Christoph Blocher, the SVP, and Eveline Widmer-Schlumpf caused the quarrelling political actors to rely significantly more on conflict frames in the naturalization campaign.

What do these results mean for the quality of the debate in direct-democratic campaigns? There are two reasons to be optimistic. First, it can be seen that the political actors address their opponents’ frames. On average, campaign dialogue in the three direct-democratic campaigns (60.2) is much higher than the average (44.1) found in the study by Kaplan et al. (2006) regarding American candidate television advertising aired in the U.S. Senate campaigns from 1998 to 2002. By contrast, it is lower than the mean (75.3) of dialogue in U.S. presidential campaigns from 1960–2000. However, the two immigration campaigns reach a level which is as high as that observed in U.S. presidential campaigns. Thus, I conclude that there is a quite high level of campaign dialogue in the press releases in Swiss direct-democratic campaigns. The frame dialogue also seems to be quite high (58.8 compared to a mean of 24.9 in the study by Kaplan et al. (2006)). Second, we do not find a high level of contest frames. In the media input, framing is primarily done in substantive terms. In the case

in which we found more contest frames (naturalization initiative), the authorities used the more respectful version of them, i.e. conflicts, instead of personal attacks.

Let me end this chapter by linking the results to research on deliberation. From a classical perspective, deliberation is a unified phenomenon with diverse components (rational argumentation, respect, sincerity) forming a coherent set. Theoretically, the various components should reinforce each other. However, it has been an open question whether this works *empirically* in such a mutually reinforcing way (Bächtiger et al. 2010). The results support the idea that the diverse components are linked to each other: Both, dialogue (as a possible indicator for rational argumentation) and substantive frames (as an indicator for respect) are highly used in direct-democratic campaigns.

5

Frame Promotion: The Variation of the Strategic Framing Choices in the Different Communication Channels and Over Time

Introduction

In this chapter, we investigate how the political actors vary their framing choices over time and in the different communication channels. I call this the promotion process of frame building. To examine the variation in the communication channels, I compare the results with the findings of the media input channel of chapter 4. The media input channel is the baseline or the reference category. As introduced in chapter 1, I distinguish between mediated, unmediated and internal channels. In the mediated channels, campaigners must cater to the needs and values of journalists. The unmediated channels offer campaigners control over the content and form of the message. Both mediated and unmediated channels target the general public, while the internal channel is aimed at the members. There are two mediated channels: media input (e.g. press releases) and letters to the editor. Political advertisements and direct mail are categorized as unmediated channels, and information for members is part of the internal channel.

The comparison between the channels is worth studying for three reasons. First, in the media input, campaigners must satisfy journalists. Thus, news values may determine their framing strategies. By comparing the media input with the unmediated channels, we can evaluate the ways in which the findings of the media input can be taken as the political actors' true framing intention. Second, successful strategic communication depends on coordinating messages across all publications (Norris et al. 1999: 67). As such, despite some variation across channels, there should also be some similarity between them. To my knowledge, the way in which political actors rely on the same message across different channels in direct-democratic campaigns has never been investigated. Third, the differences between the channels should draw the readers' attention to the fact that the results can vary depending on the type of communication channel. For instance, Iyengar (1991) explores the mechanisms by which television has impoverished political discourse. Possibly, the results might have looked different if he had relied on another channel. It is worthwhile to study the variation in the three strategic framing choices over time for the simple reason that we know only little about it.

Direct mail and information for members were coded only in the asylum campaign, as limited resources in terms of time and money restricted analysis in the two other campaigns. Nevertheless, I consider it important to include them in my investigation. First of all, it is imperative to theoretically distinguish between these channels. Second, the results of one campaign can still provide insight into the potential empirical results of another campaign. More problematic is the fact that I use only those letters that were published and appeared in the newspapers, rather than all of the letters sent to the editors. The published letters are not necessarily a representative sample of all letters sent to the editor. It is also possible that journalists have edited the letters published in the newspaper. In addition, not all of the published letters come from the political actors or are the result of their strategic framing.

Nevertheless, there are reasons to look at published letters to the editor: First, the letters section can be seen as an open forum for public debate, which “thrives on minimal editorial intervention” (Wahl-Jorgensen 2007: 154). Editors and journalists see their profession as “a calling in the service of democracy, free speech, and the public” (Wahl-Jorgensen 2007: 154). Or, as Gans (2003: 21) pointed out, “journalism views itself as supporting and strengthening the roles of citizens in democracy”. In addition to these democratic ideals, editors also offer an economic justification for minimal editorial intervention in the letters section (Wahl-Jorgensen 2007: 154). They explain that allowing all citizens to submit letters will boost the newspaper’s popularity and its success in the market. Thus, it is because of democratic ideals and market success that editors are reluctant to edit. Third, there are practical constraints that also prevent editors from radically altering the letters: Editors work under a constant deadline, with the knowledge that the paper has only limited space for letters. I assume that the number of published letters is proportional to the number supplied. The selection criteria are similar across different types of newspapers (Wahl-Jorgensen 2007: 68): Editors prefer short, coherent letters, which are submitted exclusively to the respective newspaper, and from different locally tied writers. In particular, editors avoid letters which appear to be part of an orchestrated letter-writing campaign. Campaigners have thus adapted their strategies accordingly. In direct-democratic campaigns, political actors draft a short letter containing their main frames and request that their members and volunteers personalize and submit it as a letter to the editor. Alternatively, they teach their supporters how to write quality letters to the editor.

Before we start with the investigation of the framing choices, let me illustrate the use of the different channels. First, a look at the total number of arguments (n total) in the different channels (Table 5.1) provides us with a general idea of the importance of the different channels. In the asylum law campaign, the figures indicate that the contra camp was much more active in producing arguments for *media input*, *direct mails* and *information for members*. It produced more than twice as many arguments for the news media, and almost ten

times as many for both direct mails and information for members. By contrast, the pro camp produced twice as many arguments in *political ads*. This suggests that the two camps followed different strategies: While the contra camp relied much more on its internal channel and on media news reporting, the pro camp relied heavily on paid advertisements. This is a result of the organizational structure of the two camps—heterogeneous and decentralized (contra) versus predominance of the major parties, especially of the new populist right (pro), and of the access to resources. The contra camp has access to more personnel, the pro camp to more money (Bernhard 2010). A very similar pattern can be observed in the naturalization initiative. In both cases, the populist right wing party (SVP) had the lead in the pro camp campaign and used the political advertisements channel more often. In the corporation tax reform campaign, the pro camp was also highly involved with political advertisements. This time, the most powerful Swiss economic interest group (economiesuisse) was the leading house of the pro camp.


Table 5.1: The Total Number (n total) of Frames of the Two Camps, by Communication Channel

	con					pro				
	media input	letters to editor	ads	direct mail	info for members	media input	letters to editor	ads	direct mail	info for members
Asylum	726	395	569	315	1907	335	202	1249	9	192
Naturalization	675	628	109			107	361	1358		
Corporation Tax	462	449	45			594	608	1241		


Second, Figure 5.1 presents the weekly development of the frames in the media input, the letters to the editor and the political advertisements of the two camps in the three campaigns. In the asylum law campaign, the panels show that the contra camp launched its *media input* at well-chosen moments (two peaks), while the pro camp's media input was not time-related. Instead, the pro camp ran a low but steady stream of ads that contained its key frame, which it increased heavily towards the end of the campaign. The same can be found in the naturalization initiative.

Figure 5.1: Weekly Development of the Frames in the Media Input, the Letters to the Editor and the Political Advertisements of the Two Camps in the Three Campaigns


Asylum



Naturalization



Corporation Tax



In the corporate tax reform campaign, we find two peaks in both camps, indicating that both camps carefully chose moments to submit input to the media. The peaks are characteristic of the media input, and their high amplitude indicates media conferences. The fact that political actors pause between media conferences explains the steepness. In the asylum law campaign

and the corporate tax reform, we find media input more than ten weeks before voting. In the asylum law, this finding goes back to the institutional routine of the contra camp: Bernhard (2010) finds that the opponents launch their campaigns much earlier with respect to the referendum than the supporters. However, in the case of corporate tax reform, the *pro* camp was also active early in the campaign. In this case, it employed a “planting the seed” strategy (Iyengar and McGrady 2007: 140) with an early media input. From the beginning, the pro camp wanted to present its core frame in order to influence the opinion leaders and the media. In the naturalization initiative, the campaign started later (chapter 2) because the minister was new in office. In addition, the highest peak in the media input occurs seven or six weeks before the vote takes place. This is the beginning of the “critical period” of media coverage (chapter 6).

The number of arguments in the *letters to the editor* increases seven to five weeks before the vote occurs, and it peaks two or three weeks before the vote, when the public has received voting material and has begun voting (primarily by mail). In the graphs of the pro camps in the asylum law campaign and in the naturalization initiative, we see an increase in the use of arguments in the *political advertisements* in the final stages of the campaign. With this additional effort, the campaigners tried to get out the vote. I call this the “mobilizing strategy”. The contra camps lacked advertising money, but also slightly increased their paid media efforts in the final stages of the campaign due to the “mobilizing strategy”. In the corporate tax reform campaign, we see many pro camp ad arguments early in the campaign. The pro camp also followed a “planting the seed” strategy in the advertisements. The direct mail and information for members channel are not presented because the delivery date, i.e. timing, is less important and less well-known.

Let us now turn to the three framing choices. For each choice, I will discuss the variation in the communication channels and present the corresponding results. Then, I will investigate the variation over time followed by a results part. For the same reason as mentioned

above (delivery date is less important and less well-known), the direct mail and the information for members' channels are omitted when looking at the variation over time.

Substantive Emphasis Choice: Variation by Communication Channel

As introduced in chapter 1, strategic actors first have to search for one or two frames they think have the capacity to become a strong substantive frame ("Substantive Emphasis Choice"). Because the *letters to the editor* are mediated and scrutinized by journalists, I expect them to have a set of frames similar to that found in the media input. In the *political advertisements*—in contrast to the media input—I expect political actors to focus more on their core frame for three reasons: First, advertising provides candidates with much greater control over their message than does news coverage. However, advertisements are less credible messengers than news media coverage (Iyengar and McGrady 2007: 164). Thus, political actors have an incentive to use the message that makes them appear most credible, i.e. their core message. Second, advertising allows campaigners to shape their message to specifically target those voters who are most pivotal to the outcome of a vote. Campaigners use the frame they think will most effectively mobilize swing voters. Third, an advertisement focusing on one message can be used to grab the attention of the news media (Iyengar and McGrady 2007: 191). This may be especially relevant with regard to posters, but it can also be seen in advertisements.

For *direct mail*, I expect the political actors to choose the "Substantive Emphasis Strategy" similar to advertisements, because both channels can reach citizens directly. Thus, I expect them to focus more on the core frame as well. In the *information for members*, political actors communicate with motivated or better-informed readers. Members may be able to handle more frames, and they might also want to become more informed and more aware of different arguments. As a result, campaigners may promote their message using more than one

frame. Thus, with regard to variation of the “Substantive Emphasis Choice” in the different communication channels, I expect results in letters to the editors similar to those in media input. I suspect that political actors focus more on their core frame in political advertisements and in direct mail, whereas they may have a wider focus in terms of information for members than they have in media input. I do not expect any variation between campaigns.

Table 5.2 gives an overview of the substantive and contest frames in the media input, the letters to the editor and the political advertisements in all three campaigns, i.e. the asylum, the naturalization and the corporation tax campaigns. For the asylum law, Table 5.2 also shows the frames for the direct mail and the information for members. The main frames of each camp (chapter 4) are in bold. Let us first look at the substantive frames in the different communication channels. Overall, it is clear that the shares of substantive frames in the media input is highly correlated with the shares of the substantive frames in the other channels ($r=0.87$). We already know that in the media input, the most important frame of the contra camp makes up 45 percent of the arguments, whereas the pro camp focused on its most important frame in one third of its arguments (chapter 4).

The findings in the *letters sections* are similar to those in the media input of all three campaigns, and they are in line with my hypothesis that we find a similar set of frames in both mediated channels. In the *political advertisements*, the political actors increase the frequency of their main frame. With one exception, the percentage is about 50 percent. This result shows that the political actors indeed focus most on their main frame in their advertisements: In every second argument, they use their core frame. Nevertheless, in the other half, they speak about something else – using their own second frame or their rival’s frame.

Table 5.2: The Main Substantive Frames of the Two Camps, by Communication Channel: Percentages

Asylum

	con					pro				
	media input	letters to editor	political ads	direct mail	info for members	media input	letters to editor	political ads	direct mail	info for members
substantive										
human. trad.	38.9	36.1	35.7	47.0	33.3	24.8	15.5	13.3	11.1	12.5
rule-of-law	21.9	4.9	14.8	9.2	18.8	9.3	5.3	3.8	0.0	5.7
abuse	17.6	19.4	16.9	14.0	11.7	26.9	30.1	53.1	55.6	21.9
efficacy	4.0	6.4	3.5	4.1	3.0	17.3	7.3	2.8	11.1	24.0
others	13.9	23.5	28.5	21.0	25.2	16.1	26.7	26.0	22.2	32.3
all substantive	96.3	90.3	99.3	95.2	92.0	94.3	85.0	99.0	100.0	96.4
contest	4.1	9.7	0.7	4.8	8.0	5.7	15.1	1.0	0.0	3.7
total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
n	726	395	569	315	1907	335	202	1249	9	192

Naturalization

	con			pro		
	media input	letters to editor	political ads	media input	letters to editor	political ads
substantive						
rule-of-law	49.0	48.1	52.3	19.6	26.3	14.4
people final say	21.9	21.7	28.4	39.3	36.3	23.6
mass naturalization	17.5	10.8	0.0	20.6	19.1	58.1
others	5.0	5.6	14.7	7.5	9.7	3.9
all substantive	93.4	86.2	95.4	86.9	91.4	100.0
contest	6.5	13.9	4.6	13.1	8.6	0.0
total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
n	675	628	109	107	361	1358

Corporation Tax

	con			pro		
	media input	letters to editor	political ads	media input	letters to editor	political ads
substantive						
tax equity	48.5	49.2	60.0	7.7	17.9	3.1
tax loss	22.3	13.1	31.1	8.4	4.1	2.1
SME	5.6	12.9	0.0	38.4	31.6	49.0
competitiveness	14.1	14.5	6.7	27.3	32.4	45.1
others	4.3	2.5	0.0	11.3	6.6	0.2
all substantive	94.8	92.2	97.8	93.1	92.6	99.6
contest	5.2	7.8	2.2	6.9	7.4	0.4
total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
n	462	449	45	594	608	1241

The campaigners use a similar strategy in their *direct mail* as in the *advertisements*. The communication documents of both channels are directed towards the public. In the communication with the *members*, the political actors have a wider focus. They use their main frame for an average of only 27 percent ($= (33+21)/2$) of the time. The pro camp even promoted the “efficacy” frame more than the “abuse” frame.

Figures 5.2–5.4 provide typical examples of *advertisements* which the two sides used during the campaign. These figures illustrate that the camps generally focus on one message in advertisements. There is one exception, in the asylum law campaign, in which the contra camp focused less on one frame. This can be explained in two ways: First, as the interviews revealed, the contra camp perceived the abuse frame to be so strong that they felt the need to counter-frame it, even in their own advertisements. Second, the contra camp also used a higher proportion of “other” frames because many organizations with different foci and different frames were involved in one committee (Figure 5.2 – contra camp).

Figure 5.2: Political Advertisements of the Two Camps in the Asylum Case

Pro Camp



Contra Camp



Figure 5.3: Political Advertisements of the Two Camps in the Naturalization Initiative

a) Advertisement of the Populist Right in Support of Its Initiative



b) Advertisement of the Moderate Right's Contra Campaign



Figure 5.4: Political Advertisements of the Two Camps in the Corporation Tax Case

a) Pro Camp

ANZEIGE

KMU und Gewerbe stärken

Die 300'000 Klein- und Mittelbetriebe (KMU) sind das Herz der Schweizer Wirtschaft. Sie beschäftigen zwei von drei Arbeitnehmenden. Doch gerade die KMU werden steuerlich benachteiligt.

Das heutige Steuersystem

- erschwert die Nachfolge im Betrieb massiv
- verhindert oft eine Neuausrichtung in zukunftsweisende Gebiete
- verteuert Risikokapital - darunter leiden insbesondere Jungunternehmen

KMU-Steuerreform
 KMU-Komitee «JA zur Unternehmenssteuerreform», Postfach, 8032 Zürich
www.kmu-steuerreform.ch

24. Februar
JA

b) Contra Camp

Ich bin doch nicht blöd.

Die AHV schädigen?

NEIN zu Steuergeschenken
 für Grossaktionäre

Abstimmung am 24. Februar 2008

SP
 klar.sozial

In general, the core frame of the media input also remains the core frame of the other channels. However, there are three exceptions. The first is found in the naturalization initiative. The core frame of the pro camp in the media input is the “people final say” frame. In the political *advertisements*, this frame is used in only 23.6 percent of all frames. Instead, the “mass naturalization” frame is used in 58 percent of all frames. This result shows a change in the strategy of the pro camp. The campaigner responsible for this strategic change explained in an interview: Towards the end of the campaign, the pro camp changed its strategy because the campaigners received feedback from their activists indicating that the “people final say” frame was not convincing. In addition, the pro camp had more funds available than they had originally planned. This allowed them to publish a significant number of political advertisements in the last three weeks of the campaign. They tested different arguments and decided to promote primarily the “mass naturalization” frame. As a result, we see the “mass naturalization” frame emphasized in their advertisements. The pro camp reused its well-known advertisement from the 2004 naturalization of second and third generation immigrants campaign (Figure 5.3a). Because the end of the campaign was nearing, the pro camp was unable to change its core frame in the other channels too.

The second exception is found in corporate tax reform. The core frame of the pro camp is the “SME” frame. Nevertheless, in the *letters to the editor*, the “competitiveness” frame is emphasized. This indicates that the “SME” aspect was not particularly controversial and became a weaker frame in this campaign (chapter 8). The third case is found in the asylum law campaign, in which the pro camp most promoted the “abuse” frame in the media input. This is not the case in the *information for members*, in which the pro camp relied most on the “efficacy” frame, most frequently used by the moderates of the pro camp. Thus, in this communication channel, it is the frame of the moderate part of the pro camp that is more visible, while the extreme part of the pro camp dominated the other channels.

Table 5.3 investigates the factors influencing the percentage with which a frame is used. The unit of analysis is the use of a frame in a channel over the whole campaign, as shown in Table 5.2. It shows that core frames are used significantly more, whereas contest frames are used less. In addition, in line with my expectation, the campaigners focus more on their core frames in the *advertisements* and the *direct mail* than in the other channels. Both coefficients (core *direct mails, core * political ads) are positive. The corresponding coefficient from advertisements (core * political ads) is not significant at the five percent level because the focus of the advertisements in the naturalization campaign was not on the core frame. This coefficient becomes significant at the five percent level if the naturalization campaign is excluded.

Table 5.3: Influencing Factors on the Shares of Substantive and Contest Frames: OLS Regression Coefficients, Standard Errors and Levels of Significance

	coef.	s.e.	p
constant	15.07	1.30	***
core	22.68	2.91	***
contest frames	-8.40	2.34	***
political ads	-1.54	2.20	
direct mail	-3.56	3.31	
core * political ads	9.48	5.24	°
core * direct mail	17.19	8.08	*
adj. R2			0.58
n			126

***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, °p<.1

Note: The share of the frames (=dependent variable) are the shares shown in Table 5.2.

Substantive Emphasis Choice: Variation over Time

Do the political actors vary their “Substantive Emphasis Choice” over time? Campaigners should not waffle or flip-flop between the frames (Iyengar and McGrady 2007: 129). Rather, the campaigners should stay on message (Norris et al. 1999, Perron 2007) or on their core frame, which they chose according to the “Substantive Emphasis Choice”. Staying on message means the capacity to repeat the central campaign message, even when challenged by

journalists, the opponents or simply by the campaign environment. This promotion practice goes hand in hand with the well-known advice put forward by the issue-ownership theory (Petrocik 1996), which states that political actors should focus on the issue or issue attribute for which they enjoy an advantage. Of course, if a message is failing, it might be better to jettison plans and adapt to the circumstances. Nevertheless, strategic communication is based on the principle of planning for all eventualities, and developing a popular message well in advance of the crucial phase of the campaign. Thus, I expect the campaigners to stay on their core frames in all channels in all campaigns. The empirical results from the three campaigns show that the campaigners generally stay on frame. The main frames are promoted from the very beginning and no new frame appears in the course of the campaign. In addition, the most important frame of a camp remains the most important over time in all channels. Thus, it can be stated that campaigners normally do not change their “Substantive Emphasis Choice” during a direct-democratic campaign. As already mentioned, there is one exception to this general behavior: The main frame of the pro camp was the “people final say” frame at the beginning. Towards the end of the campaign, however, the pro camp emphasized the “mass naturalization” frame the most in their advertisements.

Substantive Emphasis Choice: Related Factors

Next, we elaborate on two factors which are related to the “Substantive Emphasis Choice”: the management of events and how the political actors play one media outlet against another. In an ideal campaign, each political actor hopes to enjoy a regular stream of favorable news coverage, while his opponent suffers from a lack of attention or poor coverage. In the real world, the campaigners have to compete for media attention. Using Bentele’s term, the political actors adapt to the media logic (Bentele 2005: 211). Thus, the political actors not

only have to decide about their strong frame, but also have to find opportunities to promote it during the campaign.

The “nuts and bolts” of press management is the strategic scheduling of events, i.e. the scheduling of opportunities to promote the message. Put simply, events must be designed and scheduled to attract maximal news coverage. There are three types of events: *genuine*, *mediated*, and *staged* events (Kepplinger and Habermeier 1995, Kepplinger 1998: 662). Genuine events are provided by the daily routine of the policymaking process (e.g. parliamentary votes), mediated events are triggered by key events and influenced by the media (e.g., the world economic forum, elections), and staged events, or so-called “pseudo” (Boorstin 1992) events (e.g., press conferences or demonstrations), are produced only in order to obtain media attention. Staged events would not occur without the mass media since their inherent goal is to transport the message to the media, and ultimately to the audience (Schmitt-Beck and Pfetsch 1994: 114). Staged events have to pass the selection logic of the media. News value research has found that events pass the media logic more easily if they carry news factors such as unexpectedness, damage, controversy, relevance or reach (Schulz 1997, Eilders 1997: 67, 259). Direct-democratic campaign events are neither genuine nor mediated events. Most events happening during direct-democratic campaigns are staged events. There are two kinds of staged events: *routine* and *protest* staged events. Routine staged events take place regularly, such as media releases or conferences, while protest staged events are out-of-the-ordinary events such as demonstrations, concerts, or street theater. Protests are a functional equivalent of media conferences for social movement organizations that are less powerful and have less access to the mass media (Neidhardt 1994: 32). Routine staged events might be central for powerful actors, whereas protest staged events might be more common among weaker actors such as for citizens’ interest groups and social movements.

We find that the political actors in direct-democratic campaigns mainly rely on *routine staged* events such as media conferences and media releases. In the three campaigns, every ad hoc committee and all large political parties involved hold at least one media conference. In the tax reform campaign, the economic interest groups were also active with a media conference. In the three cases, six to nine media conferences took place during a campaign (i.e. in the three months before the vote). The small parties, or the citizens' interest groups, did not organize a media conference on their own due to a lack of resources or know-how, as they reported in the interviews. However, in coalition with large parties, they were also present in conferences. If coalitions held a media conference, different organizations spoke in order to increase the credibility of the message. In addition, the most prominent or powerful speaker of each organization promoted the message in order to increase the chance of media attention. Almost all media conferences are held in the Swiss capital Berne, as political events take place there: The parliament is located in Berne, the important media outlets have journalists on the ground and most parties and citizens' interest groups are also resident in Berne.

The most common form of the routine staged events is the press release. More than thirty press releases were found in every campaign. In the asylum law, the contra camp also relied on protest staged events – it organized one concert, one demonstration, and street theater. As mentioned above, protest staged events are an instrument for the less powerful organizations, especially citizens' interest groups. In the tax reform campaign, a citizens' interest group of the contra camp produced an informative and elaborated videotape about taxes. In the interviews, some citizens' interest groups remarked that they did not fit well into the direct-democratic discourse for two reasons: On the one hand, they assumed that they have a broader perspective because they consider the global situation and international law to a greater extent. On the other hand, they pointed to their longer time horizon. Their campaigns dealt with topics such as the reform of the financial system, which usually last for several years.

In order to attract maximal news coverage, the campaigners produce routine staged events actively but also *reactively*. They can actively attract media attention by informing about their position and the issue at stake only once. This kind of information subsequently loses its news value. The campaigners have to compensate this loss by finding new opportunities to promote their frames, and thus they become *reactive*. Four different ways can be found to achieve this: reaction to events in one's own camp, to the opponent, to the media and to facts. Let us illustrate these four types of reaction with examples from the three campaigns: First, the campaigners react to events occurring in their *own camp*. This is particularly suited to large political parties, who often organize a convention to adopt a recommendation for the vote and take it as an opportunity for promoting their message concerning the next direct-democratic vote: In the asylum law campaign, the right-wing party (SVP) reported on their convention and announced that the senior party members were also in favor of the new law. In the tax reform campaign, the Christian Democrats (CVP) stated that the women of their party also supported the reform. This promotion practice seems to be especially relevant for the large parties because they often announce their position early in the campaign.

Second, the campaigners react to their *opponent*, the opponent camp. For instance, in the asylum law campaign, the pro camp promoted the abuse frame, claiming that the new law was needed in order to prevent abuse. The contra camp felt compelled to react. The contra camp organized a media conference called "the untruths of the pro camp" and counter-framed the abuse argument. In addition, it invited three asylum seekers to speak about their destinies. These asylum seekers had been sent back to their native countries, in which they had been imprisoned. The contra camp alleged that these cases were judicial errors. Most importantly, they argued that the number of judicial errors was much higher than the pro camp claimed and that the new law would increase this number even more. On the very same day, the pro camp, in turn, reacted to the conference of the contra camp. This time, the responsible department of the administration (BfM) responded with a press release in which it refuted the accusation of

the contra camp. It argued that while asylum seekers were, indeed, rarely imprisoned for short periods, the arrests were often aimed at clarifying the asylum seekers' identification, or were made for reasons that are not relevant to the asylum, such as due to non-political criminal acts. On another occasion in the asylum law campaign, the contra camp claimed that the information bulletin sent to each citizen produced by the government did not contain proper information.

Third, the campaigners also react to the *media*. For example, in the naturalization initiative campaign, the pro camp reacted to a TV program (Rundschau), claiming that the descriptions of the circumstances in the program were misleading. In the naturalization initiative campaign, too, the right-wing party (SVP) announced that the former minister and head of the party (Blocher) and the responsible minister and excluded party member (Widmer-Schlumpf) would participate in the Swiss TV debate show (Arena). It appears that the right-wing party tends to be more reactive to the media than the other political actors.

Fourth, the campaigners react to *facts* appearing in the course of the campaign. During the asylum law campaign, it emerged that an asylum seeker (Solongo Chinbat) had abused the system. The pro camp reacted to this fact with a press release in which it used the case to further promote their message: it claimed that a new law was needed in order to prevent such abuse. In the tax reform campaign, the argumentation of the Social Democrats – who were in charge of the contra-committee during the campaign – resonated well with external events happening at the same time. The Social Democrats mainly argued that the tax cuts were an unfair privilege for the well-off and went against the principle of fair taxation (tax equity). They even claimed that the reform was unconstitutional. This line of reasoning mainly applied to a controversial provision that included a reduction in tax rates on dividends for shareholders who held at least a ten per cent stake in a corporation. In the last phase, the Social Democrats reacted to the UBS subprime crises and presented individuals who would profit from the

reform. By that time, the subprime crisis of the UBS had become a political issue: On December 10th 2007, UBS had unveiled 11 billion Swiss francs (10 billion US dollars) of subprime writedowns and announced that it had obtained an emergency capital injection from the Singapore sovereign fund and an unnamed Middle East investor. On January 30th 2008, UBS announced that it would write down 4.4 billion Swiss francs (4 billion US dollars) in bad investments for the year 2007 and would report a net loss of 12.5 billion Swiss francs (11.4 billion US dollars) in the fourth quarter of 2007. On February 14th 2008, UBS confirmed a net loss of 4.4 billion Swiss francs (4.0 billion US dollars) in 2007.¹² For many people, these losses of a major Swiss bank were a strong contradiction to the very high bonuses some managers were being awarded. However, only towards the end of the campaign, on February 14th, did the Social Democrats make an explicit link to the UBS and to its president of the board, Marcel Ospel. They claimed that controlling and major stockholders such as Ospel – who was the president of the board of directors of UBS AG – would be the primary beneficiaries of the tax reform. In the naturalization initiative campaign, the pro camp reacted to the murder of a naturalized person and emphasized the importance of saying yes to the vote. Overall, the campaigners tend to use media conferences actively, whereas in the press releases they tend to act more reactively. Anything that might give the political actors an additional possibility to promote their message further or increase its credibility is used as a reason for a media release.

Besides the strategic managements of events, a second practice to promote one's own frame could be to play one media outlet against another (Iyengar and McGrady 2007: 134). The abundance of journalists covering a campaign provides the campaigners with the option of awarding access to sources on the basis of the anticipated quality of their coverage. Theoretically, this is above all an option for the minister. His campaigner reported that the minister

¹² <<http://www.drs4news.ch/www/de/drs4/themen/news/wirtschaft/die-ubs-im-strudel-der-finanzkrise/72270.64530.chronologie-der-ubs-finanzkrise.html>>, 16.03.2009.

basically has unlimited media attention. However, according to an informal, traditional conception, the minister is expected to exercise his or her campaigning role with a certain restraint (Kriesi 2009). Based on this norm, the minister is not expected to play one media against each other. The other campaigners do not have recourse to this opportunity, because media attention is generally scarce. Playing one source against another seems to be better suited for exclusive stories or unforeseen events such as the announcement of a new party strategy or a resignation of a party's president, which include a high inherent news value. Thus, we cannot expect to find this practice in direct-democratic campaigns.

Indeed, the interviews with the campaigners reveal that playing one source against another is not used in direct-democratic campaigns. Normally, the campaigners send their media releases to all media outlets and invite all of them to their media conferences. Sometimes they might have mailing lists which do not include all of the media outlets. However, they do not intend to play the newspapers against each other or deliver their message exclusively: The missing newspapers are not interested and did not subscribe to the mailing list. It would be a vain endeavor to send the message to all of them. Nevertheless, playing one source against another did occur on one occasion. In the tax reform campaign, a tabloid newspaper (Blick) refused to accept an advertisement from the major Swiss union (SGB). The union used the same slogan ("I am not stupid"), copying Europe's largest retailer for consumer electronics (Media Markt). For the SGB, its slogan and its link to Media Markt fit very well with the issue at stake, because major shareholders of Media Markt are people who would typically benefit from the tax reform. The advertisement showed a photograph of a major shareholder of Media Markt, and it stated that he would benefit from the tax reform. "Blick" refused to show the advertisement because it could harm the personal rights of this major shareholder. For the campaigner, another reason seemed to be more plausible: Blick did not want to upset Media Markt because it was one of its important advertisers. The campaigner then tried to exploit the story and informed other media outlets. The popular TV news pro-

gram “10vor10” was not interested. Finally, it was covered by a regional newspaper, which produced an article called “Blick refuses an advertisement of the SGB”. This is a case in which a campaigner played one source against another. However, this occurred only once in the three cases investigated. It can thus be seen as the exception that proves the rule.

Oppositional Emphasis Choice: Campaign Dialogue by Communication Channel

The extent to which the two camps converge on the same frames is defined as the campaign dialogue (chapter 1). From the *letters* section, we are already aware that editors strive for an open forum and “aim to create dialogue” (Wahl-Jorgensen 2007: 66). I expect the level of campaign dialogue in the letters to be similar to that found in the media input. In their *political advertisements* and *direct mail*, campaigners follow issue ownership theory and emphasize issues on which they enjoy an advantage over their opponent (Iyengar and McGrady 2007: 142). This also appears to be plausible for frames. In addition, we do not have political advertisements on television in Switzerland. Normally, ads in newspapers or flyers are small (half a newspaper page), decreasing the chance of a dialogue. They often include no more than a short, catchy message, and thus do not lend themselves to extensive debate. As a consequence, it is expected that campaigners will engage in less campaign dialogue with regard to ads and direct mail than they will with regard to the media input. When speaking to their own constituency in their *information for members*, political actors focus primarily on their own arguments. For this reason, I expect fewer opponents’ frames in the information for members than in the media input.

Hence, with regard to the variation of the “Oppositional Emphasis Choice” in the different communication channels, I expect a similar amount of campaign dialogue in letters sections to in media input. By contrast, campaigners are expected to use fewer opponents’ frames in their political advertisements, direct mail and information for members than they use in media input. In accordance with the results found in chapter 4, I hypothesize that issue com-

plexity and inequality of financial resources will reduce dialogue in all channels, whereas expected race closeness will increase convergence.

Looking at the non-bold numbers in the first four rows of Table 5.4, we see that in the media input, both sides address the main frames of the opposing camp in an average of every four arguments. They primarily address the most important frame of the opposing camp and, secondarily, the other camp's next most important frame. The pattern in the *letters to the editor* is similar to that found in the media input. On average, the opponents' frames are used in 25 percent of the promoted frames. This suggests that the two main frames on both sides were strong frames, such that neither side could ignore the frames of the opposing side. Instead, both frames elicited strong defensive reactions from opponents in both channels. In all *other* channels, the political actors address their opponents' frames in only around 15 percent of all frames.

Table 5.4: Use of Opponents' Main Frames in the Different Communication Channels

		Contra	Pro	Average
Letters to the Editor	Asylum Law	19.4 + 6.4 = 25.8	15.5+5.3 = 20.8	25.8
	Naturalization	21.7+10.8 = 32.5	26.3	
	Corporation Tax	12.9+14.5 = 27.4	17.9+4.1 = 22.0	
Political Ads	Asylum Law	16.9+3.5 = 23.4	13.3+3.8 = 17.1	18.7
	Naturalization	28.4+0.0 = 28.4	14.4	
	Corporation Tax	0.0+6.7 = 6.7	3.1+2.1 = 5.2	
Info for Members	Asylum Law	11.7+3.0 = 14.7	12.5+5.7 = 18.2	16.5
Direct Mail	Asylum Law	14.0+4.1 = 18.1	11.1+0.0 = 11.1	14.6

Table 5.5 shows the level of campaign dialogue (campaign-level convergence) in the different communication channels of the three campaigns. A number of 100 would mean that they speak about the same frames to the same extent, while number of 0 would indicate that they used totally different frames. The highest level of campaign dialogue is found in the *letters to the editor* in two of the three campaigns. Even in the third case, the naturalization campaign, the level of campaign dialogue in the letters' section is almost as high as that which is found in the media input.

Table 5.5: Campaign Dialogue in the Different Communication Channels

	Asylum	Naturalization	Corporation Tax	mean
letters to editor	72.6	72.5	56.1	67.1
media input	69.9	69.3	41.5	60.2
political ads	51.1	39.5	13.1	34.6
info for members	50.5			(50.5)
direct mail	38.6			(38.6)


In all three campaigns, the dialogue level of the *ads* is low. In the asylum law, we find the lowest level of dialogue in the *direct mail*. In the communication to the *members*, we observe a level of convergence similar to that found in the *political advertisements*. The results support my expectation that the levels of campaign dialogue in the mediated should be higher in the unmediated and internal channels. With regard to the differences between the campaigns, we find further support for the idea that complexity and inequality of financial resources reduces dialogue (chapter 4). The tax reform was the most complex issue and the one that has been most financially dominated by a single camp since the early 1980s. For all communication channels, we find the lowest levels of dialogue in the corporation tax reform campaign. In contrast to the media input results (chapter 4), we do not find more dialogue in the closer race (naturalization initiative). Thus, I conclude that the expected closeness may be of minor importance for campaign dialogue.

Oppositional Emphasis Choice: Campaign Dialogue over Time

How do the campaigners vary the level of campaign dialogue (“Oppositional Emphasis Choice”) over time? In real-world debates, framing strategies such as alternate frames (promotion of one’s own frames) and direct rebuttals (=counter-frames) (Jerit 2009) are common. Gilland and Marquis (2006) document that in contrast to Riker’s so-called “domin-

ance principle”, there is no concentration on a smaller number of frames over the course of a direct-democratic campaign. Koopmans supports this notion, stating that he does not expect a “long-term tendency towards an increasingly uniform public discourse [...] [P]ublic discourse is kept alive by the small minority of ‘distortions’ or ‘mutations’” (Koopmans 2004: 389). Based on this reasoning, I also expect there to be no concentration on a smaller number of frames toward the end of the campaign in the media input, in the letters to the editor or in the media coverage. In the political advertisements, I expect to find less campaign dialogue but I do not have a specific hypothesis about variation over time here. In addition, I expect no variation between the campaigns.

Figure 5.5 shows the level of campaign dialogue (campaign-level convergence) in media input, letters to the editor, and political ads on all three cases taken together over time. In the *media input*, we see that the political actors converge on the most important frames in around 60 percent of the cases when they are active with media input (eight to three weeks before the vote takes place). They continue to use their opponents’ frames during the whole campaign. In the *letters to the editor*, the level of campaign dialogue slightly decreases in the fourth week before the vote but increases again afterwards. Further research will have to elaborate on this finding. It might be possible that in the letters, dialogue is most alive towards the end. In the *political advertisements*, the dialogue level varies more than in the other channels. It drops to very low levels in the last three weeks, when political actors are most actively.

Figure 5.5: Campaign Dialogue Over Time and in the Different Communication Channels

Note: In weeks 15–9, there were too few observations.

Oppositional Emphasis Choice: Offensive or Defensive Use?

With regard to the “Oppositional Emphasis Choice”, campaigners must also decide whether to use their opponents’ frames offensively (=trespassing) or defensively (=counter-framing). To my knowledge, the way in which this choice varies by communication channels has never been investigated. It has been argued that campaigners “have enough rhetorical freedom when designing campaign messages that an amenable frame can likely be found for nearly any issue” (Sides 2007: 467). In a similar way, the campaigners have enough rhetorical freedom to talk effectively about the rival’s frame. Typically, political actors rely on goal ranking, issue categorization, institutional role assignment (Nelson 2004) or direct rebuttal (Jerit 2009) when debating the framing of an issue. In all of these prominent framing tactics, the rival frames are downplayed in a *defensive* way. Thus, I expect offensive use of opponents’ frames to be used rarely in all channels. At first glance, this expectation contradicts what we know from research about (issue) trespassing, i.e. trespassing at the issue level. Issue trespassing is an option, in particular for defeat (Sides 2007). However, issue trespassing refers to the issue and not the frame level. Thus, there is no contradiction. In *mediated* channels, a message will have to be selected by journalists. Acting as gatekeepers (White 1950, Breeds 1955), journalists determine what message is put forth. Trespassing by the political actors may make messages

less credible, potentially reducing the offensive use of frames in the mediated channels. On the other hand, journalists may prefer to take an offensive stance, thereby motivating the political actors to increase the offensive use of frames in the mediated channels. *Political ads* and *direct mail* focus on a camp's core frame, which is indicative of campaigners that are neither interested in their opponents' frames, nor in trespassing. For the same reason, I do not expect much trespassing in the *information for members* channel.

Table 5.6 shows the percentage of the offensive use (=trespassing) of opponents' frames in each channel. The defensive use of the opponents' frames (=counter-framing) is not shown but can easily be calculated (100% - offensive use = defensive use). Overall, the two camps use their opponent's frames defensively in the overwhelming majority of the cases in every channel. In other words, we find few instances of trespassing and an emphasis on counter-framing in all communication channels. Most examples of offensive use of the opponents' frames are found in the *letters section*. In all channels, we see no systematic variation over time. Most of the time, campaigners counter-frame their opponents' frames if they use them at all, i.e. use them in a defensive way (not shown).

Table 5.6: The Offensive Use of the Adversaries' Frames in the Communication Channels: Percentage of Adversaries' Frames Which Were Used Offensively

channel	con	pro
letters to editor	6.9	8.9
info for members	0.6	6.2
political ads	0.0	4.5
media input	0.0	3.6

Note: The percentage shares are averaged over core and second adversaries' frame and over campaigns. The direct mail channel is not presented because of the small number of cases.

Contest Emphasis Choice: Variation by Communication Channel

In general, I expect political actors to rely primarily on substantive frames in all their communication channels. *Letters to editors* are rejected if they place a paper at risk of a libel suit,

alienate advertisers, threaten readers or journalists with violence, or are racist. In all other cases, editors accept letters even if they are “uncomfortable with the tenor of the debate” (Wahl-Jorgensen 2007: 155) because they believe letters highlighting conflict or attacking other persons will encourage dialogue (Wahl-Jorgensen 2007 67f., 154f.). In addition, a letters section can also perform a “safety valve” function (Wahl-Jorgensen 2007: 80) by helping readers vent their anger. In this way, a letters section serves a therapeutic function and help readers cope with their emotions. Consequently, I expect more contest frames in letters sections than in other channels. Although it is primarily the result of angry readers, the greater share of contest frames may also be a result of strategy on the part of volunteers, who want letters to appear authentic.

With regard to *political ads*, I expect that newspaper editors, who depend on advertising revenue, will refuse to print advertisements that are too aggressive in order to avoid alienating potential advertisers. Nevertheless, contest frames, i.e. personal attacks and criticism, are still possible. It is well-known that, in the US, campaigners rely heavily on negative or attack advertisements (Iyengar and McGrady 2007: 147ff). Typically, consultants differentiate between critiques on performance, which focus on opponents’ records, and character assassinations, in which opponents are portrayed as immoral people. As a result of several factors, however, both tactics appear to be insignificant in Swiss direct-democratic campaigns. First, the opponent’s character is not at stake. Second, the Swiss consensus democracy is based on power sharing, which handicaps clear responsibilities and performance critiques. Third, the Swiss culture is less confrontational. As a result, I expect political actors to use arguments in their *advertisements* instead of contest frames, such as attacks.

For similar reasons, I expect the same for *direct mail*. I expect more contest frames in the *information for members*. In this channel, campaigners may resort to using misleading, unsubstantiated, and even outright false allegations against opponents. Such attacks can

strengthen the division between in- and out-groups in such a way as to strengthen the ties of organization members. In line with the results of chapter 4, I expect more contest frames in the naturalization initiative campaign because of the dispute between Christoph Blocher and Eveline Widmer-Schlumpf. Thus, with regard to the variation in the “Contest Emphasis Choice” in the different communication channels, I hypothesize that I will find more contest frames in letters to the editor than in media input. Political actors, however, will rely primarily on substantive frames in political advertisements and in direct mail. In information for members, they may also use more contest frames. I also expect to find more contest frames in the naturalization initiative.

Let us look again at Table 5.2. As expected, contest frames, such as personal attacks and conflicts, are rarely used by political actors in Swiss direct-democratic campaigns, regardless of the communication channel. In the *letters to the editor*, the proportion of contest frames is, with one exception, higher than that of media input. Even though I rely on the published letters to the editors, I can assume that the share of contest frames in the letters submitted is not significantly different: First, letters contain the writer’s name and are submitted by locals. This allows for personal attacks. Second, as argued in the theoretical section, the editors strive for minimal intervention and allow attacks because they believe dialogue will emerge from controversial letters. On average, 10 percent of all statements in the letters section are contest frames. In the naturalization initiative campaign, the pro camp exceptionally used so many contest frames in the media input that the share of contest frames is higher in the media input than in the letters to the editor.

In the *political ads*, the political actors generally refrain from using contest frames. As a result, contest frames are used, on average, in 1.5 percent of the statements in the ads. Similarly, in the *direct mail*, the political actors use contest frames on average only 2.4 percent of the time; in communications with their members, contest frames appear in only 5.8 percent of the

cases. Table 5.7 shows that the difference in the use of the contest frames between the channels is significant. When comparing the frequency of contest frames to the media input (reference category), they are used more often in the *letters to the editor*, and they are used less often in the *political advertisements* and the *direct mail*. The use of contest frames in the direct mail is based on a very small sample ($n=2$), and thus is not significant at the five percent level.

Table 5.7: Influencing Factors on the Share of Contest Frames

	coef.	s.e.	p
constant	6.92	1.17	***
political ads	-5.43	1.66	**
letters to editor	3.50	1.66	*
info for members	-1.10	2.34	
direct mail	-4.40	2.34	°
adj. R2			0.58
n			22

*** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$, ° $p < 0.1$

However, as we see in Table 5.2, substantive frames predominate in all channels. Thus, we can state that in Swiss direct-democratic campaigns, framing is done primarily in substantive terms in all channels. With the exception of the pro camp in the asylum law campaign, there are more contest frames in the naturalization initiative because of the dispute between Christoph Blocher, the populist right-wing party (SVP), and Eveline Widmer-Schlumpf. In the asylum law campaign, AUNS, a citizens' interest group from the conservative right, also campaigned on the pro side. It prepared several aggressive draft versions of letters.

Contest Emphasis Choice: Variation over Time

How do the campaigners vary the "Contest Emphasis Choice" over time? Campaigners of ad hoc committees in the asylum law campaign and of economic interest groups in the corporation tax reform campaign believed to have more influence on the frame building process before the "crucial phase" started. Based on their experience with the media, these

campaigners presumed that scarcity in terms of media attention increases during the “crucial phase” when more actors are involved. To compensate for this increasingly scarce media attention, the political actors might increase the news value of their events (Schulz 1997) by becoming more aggressive or increasing the conflict towards the end of a campaign. This means that they might increase their contest frames in the media input towards the end. For the other channels or between campaigns, I do not expect any variation.

Table 5.8 shows the regression of “time” and other influencing factors on the share of contest frames in the media input. “Time” is measured in campaign weeks. This variable is significant in the asylum law and the corporation tax reform. This means that in the media input of the asylum law and of the corporation tax reform, the campaigners significantly increased the usage of contest frames. The other influencing factors are the same as those used in chapter 4. The respective effects on the contest of the campaign remain the same, with the exception that extremity becomes insignificant at the five percent level in the asylum law campaign. With regard to the use of contest frames over time in the other channels, there is no variation over time. We will see in chapter 7 that the news media follow suit and increase the contest frames towards the end too.

Table 5.8: Rare Event Logistic Regression of Time and Other Influencing Factors on Contest Frames in Media Input

	Asylum			Naturalization			Corporation Tax		
	coef.	s.e.	p	coef.	s.e.	p	coef.	s.e.	p
time	0.108	0.031	***	-0.157	0.080	*	0.104	0.036	**
power	-0.037	0.011	***	0.018	0.008	*	0.009	0.007	
extreme	0.739	0.409	°	1.628	0.563	**	0.524	0.499	
li-re	0.187	0.081		0.159	0.178		-0.164	0.132	
governmental camp	-0.356	0.474		2.003	1.159		0.976	0.688	
constant	-1.918	0.578	***	-7.198	2.024	***	-2.343	0.512	***
n	1061			782			1056		

***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05 °p<0.1

Note: Rare event logistic regression was used because contest frames occur only rarely (4.6%–7.6% of the observations are contest frames; the rest are substantive frames). Relogit provides neither pseudo R2 nor ratios.

Conclusion

We can summarize the results in terms of the strategic framing choices. With respect to the “Substantive Emphasis Choice” and the “Oppositional Emphasis Choice”, we find that political actors generally also use their main frames in channels other than the media input, too. The frame emphases in the letters section are similar to those found in the media input. In the political advertisements, with two exceptions, the core frame of the media input appears more frequently. Similar results have been found for direct mails. Accordingly, the political actors pay more attention to their opponents’ frames in the media input and in the letters to the editor than in the advertisements and direct mails because the *mediation* motivates them to enter into campaign dialogue with each other. This is a critical finding because campaign dialogue is important to the democratic process. Citizens are able to make more informed decisions when they are exposed to different frames. Thus, the likelihood of vote manipulation is reduced when citizens are exposed to counter-frames (Druckman 2004, Chong and Druckman 2007a).

These findings are also relevant to research regarding media-based politics because we show that there are differences between the channels. The quality of debate in the advertisements and direct mails is lower than the quality of debate in the other communication channels. Thus, media input (and –as reported in chapter 6– news media coverage) is capable of evaluating the quality of discourse. Political advertisements and direct mails have functions other than to provide dialogue. They should mobilize citizens to vote or increase public debate. Furthermore, we find instances of counter-framing rather than trespassing, which was virtually absent. With regard to the differences between the campaigns, we find further support for the idea that issue complexity and inequality of financial resources reduce campaign dialogue (chapter 4). In contrast to the results in the media input, we do not find more convergence in the closer race (naturalization initiative).

The findings from the political advertisements also validate the findings of the media input. The use of frames in the advertisements shows the true intentions of the campaigners because they are in sole control of their message in this unmediated channel. The core frames in the media input remains the core frame in the advertisements, which shows that the frames used in the media input are not used simply to placate journalists but are representative of the intentions of the actors.

With regard to variation over time, it can be concluded that the political actors stay on their frame with one exception: In the naturalization initiative, the pro camp switched from the “people final say” frame to the “mass naturalization” frame in its ads toward the end of the campaign. The “people final say” frame was not convincing. Campaign dialogue does not disappear over the course of the campaign. In the media input, campaign dialogue remains high until campaigners stop promoting their message. In the letters to the editor, the level of dialogue is also high and even moderately increases towards the end. In the political advertisements, the dialogue level varies most, but remains rather low during the last three weeks of the campaign when the campaigners rely most on this channel.

Concerning the “Contest Emphasis Choice” in the different communication channels, we show that in direct-democratic campaigns, the political actors often refrain from using contest frames in their ads and in direct mail whereas we find more contest frames in the letters to the editor and in the communication with the members than in the media input. In the communication with the members, attacks are used to strengthen the division between members and non-members whereas the letters section might serve readers also to vent anger. In line with the findings of chapter 4, we notice more contest frames in the naturalization initiative. There is not much variation over time. However, towards the end of the campaign, we identify more contest frames in the media input.

6

Frame Mediation: Contribution of the Journalists

Introduction

Journalists and their sources are mutually dependent on each other. Their relationship is often viewed as more or less “symbiotic” (Gans 1979, Sigal 1973) and has become more controversial in the last decades due to the decline of the traditional party press in Western countries. The leading roles of the political parties have changed or have been challenged (e.g. permanent campaigning). As a consequence, the media has become more independent. Today, scholars agree that the relationship is reciprocal and multi-faceted: “The relationship between sources and journalists resembles a dance, for sources seek access to journalists, and journalists seek access to sources.” Gans’ tango metaphor has been recently discussed by Strömbäck and Nord (2006). They conclude that, in the context of Swedish election campaigns, journalists usually lead the tango because they have ultimate power over the content of news stories. In other words, journalists dominate the selection of the news (Baerns 1979). “In any event, sources can only make themselves available; it is the journalists who will decide if they are suitable. [...] The source-journalist relationship is a tug of war: while sources attempt to ‘manage’ the news, putting the best light on themselves, journalists concurrently ‘manage’ the

sources in order to extract the information they want” (Gans 1979: 117). Direct-democratic campaigns are well institutionalized. By crafting and promoting the frames, political actors provide the set of frames upon which journalists rely. This renders the selection of the journalists secondary to the role of the political actors. Nevertheless, I start from the assumption that the relationship is reciprocal: Journalists need political actors as a source for their stories and political actors need the media to convey their messages to the public and their voters. In this respect, it is not important here who takes the lead in this tango dance. It takes two to tango and it is important to investigate this symbiotic relationship in more detail.

In this chapter, we shall explore the contribution of journalists in frame building (which I call frame mediation). Following Strömbäck and Nord (2006), one can distinguish between a content level and a process level of frame mediation. At the content level, the journalists and the political actors negotiate and battle over how the issue is framed. As has been shown in chapter 4 and 5, the political actors construct and promote the main frames into the public discourse in direct-democratic campaigns. But do journalists also contribute at the content level? At the process level of frame mediation, journalists and the political actors negotiate and battle over when and where the frames are reported. When reporting on direct-democratic campaigns, I argue that the journalists face at least five choices which are relevant for frame building.

Journalists’ Choices

Effort Choice

First, the journalists have to decide how much effort they wish to undertake in frame building (“Effort Choice”). Market orientation challenges resource-intensive ways of covering politics (Baker 2002). As a consequence of the market orientation, the media are pressured by a permanent cost competition. In the last 20 years, this pressure has increased since the number of

readers of the press has been declining, and the number of media outlets has been shrinking. Thus, the expensive and ethical coverage of political matters is increasingly challenged, and, overall, the “effort” of the media in covering politics is put into question (Baker 2007). Resource-intensive journalistic formats such as in-depth commentaries or reportages could be replaced by emotionalized, personalized and provocative horse race coverage, or by simple reprints of press releases of political actors. Nevertheless, in Switzerland, like in other consensus countries, the press is the dominant type of media and still earns more in advertising revenue than other types of media (Künzler 2005): The newspapers enjoy constitutional protection and are part of everyday life for a majority of Swiss citizens (Marcinkowski 2006). In 2000, there were 453 newspapers sold for every 1000 Swiss adults (Hallin and Mancini 2004: 23). Such a comparatively high rate of newspaper readership is only topped by Scandinavian countries. The high subscription rates build the financial foundation of the press; advertising provides another 60–80 percent of subscription newspaper revenue (Meier 2004: 251). These two resources give the press a sound financial basis (Marcinkowski 2006). In addition, direct-democratic campaigns are newsworthy because they are important (Schulz 1997). Importance is measured in terms of lives affected. Direct-democratic campaigns affect the general public and are thus important.

As a consequence, the media are expected to make an effort in all three direct-democratic campaigns and to “provide the public with the campaign information needed for voting on the campaign issue” (Gerth et al. 2009: 85). I expect no variation between the campaigns but to find differences between the media types. In this regard, I distinguish the following types of media: high-quality elite newspapers (“elite”), regional newspapers (“regional”), tabloid newspapers (“tabloid”), free newspapers (“free”), and Public Service TV news (“TV”). Elite newspapers are particularly expected to invest resources in accurate, independent and objective campaign coverage because they primarily aim at providing high-quality news. Regional newspapers are also expected to make an effort in reporting about direct-

democratic campaigns because the process of concentration has strengthened the leading regional papers: Fewer titles produce an increasing level of circulation (Lucht and Udris 2008). Tabloid newspapers are not expected to make an extra effort in direct-democratic campaigns because they want to deliver soft news stories with emotionalized and easy-to-understand messages. The free newspapers want to have the latest news headlines. Direct-democratic campaigns only rarely provide such latest news. Thus, the free newspapers probably report only rarely about direct-democratic campaigns. Even though the effort of the TV cannot directly be compared with the effort of the newspapers, it seems interesting to include TV in the analysis, too. The Swiss public broadcasting organization (SRG) still operates as a non-profit enterprise. It is constitutionally bound to produce television programming for the entire country (Meier 2004: 253), meaning that the TV programming also has to provide information about the political issues of the country. I do not expect variation between the campaigns because direct-democratic campaigns are routine action and the news media are generally expected to cover them.

Balancing Choice

Second, the journalists about the degree to which they want to balance out the messages (“Balancing Choice”). Journalism has always had many functions: it provides information, entertainment, and sometimes also advocates politically. The advocacy function was central when the newspapers began to emerge, in many cases based on the initiative of political parties in the late eighteenth to early nineteenth century (Hallin and Mancini 2004, Blumler and Kavanagh 1999). At this time, the newspaper served a political party and was financed by subsidies from political actors. In this model, the journalist is a political advocate or “political journalist”, i.e. a publicist who wants to influence public opinion in the name of a political faction. By the late nineteenth century, another model of journalist was beginning to emerge –

the “professional journalist”. The “professional journalist” is a neutral provider of information, independent of partisanship or particular interests. This second model of journalism is often connected to a commercial media. Commercial media is financed by political advertisements and its purpose is to make money. In reality, “political journalists” also adopt norms of political balance and no “professional journalist” is fully neutral or free of any political ties. Nevertheless, these two models of journalists differ in the strength of connections between journalists and political actors. The difference between the two models is expressed in more general terms by the concept of political parallelism (Hallin and Mancini 2004, Blumler and Gurevitch 1995(1975), Seymour-Ure 1974). Political parallelism means the degree to which the “structure of the media system paralleled that of the political system” (Hallin and Mancini 2004: 27). It exists when a media outlet can be aligned with a general political tendency and has a number of different components.

Political parallelism can, as already mentioned, be manifested in the journalistic norms and practices. “Perhaps most basically, it refers to *media content* – the extent to which the different media reflect distinct political orientations in their news and current affairs reporting” (Hallin and Mancini 2004: 28). If the media reflect both a pro and a contra view, they provide a rather balanced view, which is associated with a low level of political parallelism. Conversely, a one-sided or imbalanced proliferation of information is associated with a high level of parallelism. In media systems of North and Central Europe, political parallelisms is rather low and the neutral-informational professional journalism is dominant (Hallin and Mancini 2004). Accordingly, the journalists are expected to give a more or less balanced account of messages from both camps. I do not expect to find any differences between the media types or the campaigns as I expect that the same professional ethos has been valid for the country as a whole during the whole period.

Standing Choice

Third, the journalists decide to whom they give standing (“Standing Choice”). By standing, I mean “having a voice in the media” (Ferree et al. 2002: 86). Numerous studies have shown that media attention is biased toward the more powerful actors (e.g., Galtung and Ruge 1965, Gans 1979, Danielian and Page 1994, Schulz 1997). In this line of argumentation, the so-called “indexing hypothesis” predicts that “[m]ass media news professionals (...) tend to ‘index’ the range of voices and viewpoints (...) according to the range of views expressed in mainstream government debate about a given topic” (Bennett 1990: 106). Conflict within the political elite is newsworthy and – based on the news values theory – expected to be reported. In other words, the actors that dominate the decision-making process seem to get preferential access to the media (Danielian and Page 1994). Based on the result by Höglinger (2008) and Tresch (2009), the same seems to be at work in Switzerland. As stated by Tresch (2009: 85), “Swiss media mostly [...] largely reproduce existing hierarchies and structures of influence.” The reporters rely on powerful actors because they prove a convenient and regular flow of information. It makes their job efficient because it eliminates the need to double-check facts (Hackett 1985). I therefore expect powerful actors to garner more standing.

Beside powerful actors, I expect that *political parties* obtain more standing than other actor types. Swiss parties have traditionally been weak because they are lacking in resources (money and staff). In addition, they are weak because the party system is horizontally (a large number of parties) and vertically (subnational level is important as well) fragmented. However, Ladner (2005: 59, 73) has found that direct-democratic instruments offer parties particular opportunities to step on the public stage. He has argued that direct-democratic instruments allow parties an advantage in terms of media attention and as such allow them to compensate their institutionally weak position. This finding is supported by Höglinger (2008) and Tresch (2009). Höglinger (2008) showed that the parties (see also Linder (1994)) benefit from direct

democratic procedures and get more standing than one would expect based on their power. In line with his findings, I expect that the large political parties (for Switzerland these are: SVP, FDP, CVP, SP, and GPS²) find more standing than one would expect based on their power.

I will also control for the influence of *citizens' interest groups* (i.e. political actors such as citizens' interest groups, church organizations and SMOs). Höglinger (2008) reports that citizens' interest groups get more standing in direct-democratic campaigns than in ordinary media coverage. I expect that they do not get more standing when controlling for power. This assumption is based on the finding that direct-democratic institutions give citizens' interest groups the opportunity to become powerful actors (Linder 1994) and is also in line with Höglinger's (2008: 238) results: Only those citizens' interest groups get more standing which have the capacity to organize their members, i.e. which can become powerful. In other words, the influence of citizens' interest groups works indirectly, through power. Citizens' interest groups can become powerful and through their power, they also might garner media attention. Journalists might also rely on experts because the "objectivity routine prevents reporters from overtly expressing their point of view" (Shoemaker and Reese 1996: 125).

The results are not expected to vary depending on the media type with the exception of the regional newspapers which are more tied to parties. The members of the parliament campaign in their home canton for the political parties and the regional newspapers give them particular standing. The findings are expected to vary depending on the campaign issue. Journalists might rely most on powerful actors and on experts in complex issues because it becomes more difficult to evaluate the quality of information and less political actors are capable of making their claims.

Timing Choice

Fourth, the media have to decide when they want to report a frame (“Timing Choice”). I expect the journalists to cover direct democratic campaigns mainly between the sixth and the third week before the final days of the vote. This may not be an obvious assumption, as in Switzerland, political actors are allowed to publicly debate right up to the day of the vote. However, it can be explained by the information routine of the authorities and the voting behavior of the Swiss citizens and is in line with the idea that political institutions appear to influence the timing of the news coverage in ordinary politics (Baerns 1991: 98). Since 1978, the government and Parliament have presented their views in a ballot pamphlet, which is sent to each citizen. The pamphlet presents the government’s position first and in more detail, followed by the challengers’ points of view. This mailing is sent to the citizens three to four weeks before the vote. The majority of citizens wait until they receive the pamphlet and subsequently send their ballot by mail. Thus, the “critical period” of the information processing is situated just before and during this mailing of the ballots. I do not expect to discern any differences between the media types. I expect to find earlier media coverage in the asylum law campaign since the political actors started their campaign earlier.

Dialogue Choice

Fifth, the journalists have to decide how much campaign dialogue they want (“Dialogue Choice”). There is little consensus regarding what constitutes campaign dialogue. Bennett et al. (2004) use the concept of “responsiveness”, i.e. mutual reactions from the opposing political actors. Their concept entails that a political actor not only uses the opponents’ frame but that he also identifies the source of the opponents’ frame. My approach is less demanding. Campaign dialogue does not require that the actors refer to each other. For me, it is crucial that the audience learns about the position of a political actor on each frame. This requires that

both camps are present in the media with the frames of both camps (campaign-level convergence). It seems less important that they refer to each other, because the *issue* is at the fore and not the actors. I expect that this is the case- that the journalists provide campaign dialogue because of the news' media's mediating function. The news media have to *mediate* the message of the political actors. This refers to "any acts of intervening, conveying, or reconciling between different actors, collectives, or institutions" (Mazzoleni and Schulz 1999: 249). In this way, the news media is an intermediary agent which transports meaning from the political actors to the audience and sometimes replaces for interpersonal exchanges. The media fulfill this mediating function by setting limits to the spectrum of the debated frames and by presenting a debate about these main frames. In chapter 4, it has been found that the political actors converge to some extent on the frames. The media is expected to converge even more on the same frames than the political actors, because of its mediating function.

I expect some differences in campaign dialogue between the media types and the styles of coverage. I expect more convergence in tabloid news and on TV, because these media types are particularly prone to simplification and sensationalism. They might address a narrower view and focus more on the same aspects. The same might apply for commentaries in which journalists pick out one or two frames in order to discuss them more profoundly. By contrast, the free press might be less convergent than other media types because it filters the messages less and takes less care in reporting a coherent picture. I would also expect to find less convergence in elite newspapers because they might offer a broader view, meaning that their usage of "other" frames (i.e. non main frames) might be higher (as was the case in the asylum campaign). However, my measure of dialogue excludes these "other" frames and thus I do not expect to find any difference with regard to the elite newspapers. I expect to find less convergence on the front pages, where the journalists want to attract the reader's attention with one message, than in the main body of an article or in commentaries. In the corporation

tax reform, the convergence might be lowest – in line with the findings of chapter 4 – because *issue complexity* handicaps campaign dialogue.

For the “Dialogue Choice”, the number of contest frames can also be relevant. The more contest frames a newspaper reports, the less dialogue is possible because, to put it simply, contest frames are without substantive content. In general, I expect that the journalists will use more contest frames because moderate market competition slightly increases the journalists’ preferences for these frames. With regard to different media types, I expect to find fewer contest frames in elite newspapers because they should be particularly interested in the substantive debate. Conversely, I expect to find more contest frames in tabloid news, on TV and on the front pages. On the front pages, contest frames can attract attention. Tabloid newspapers and TV are interested in emotional and sensational coverage, which would bring about more contest frames. In addition, journalists are expected to use more contest frames toward the end of the campaign, either because political actors promote more contest frames, or because the debate becomes more heated as the campaign comes to a close.

Before turning to methodology, I will summarize the hypotheses (Table 6.1): With regard to the “Effort Choice”, I hypothesize that the journalists make an effort. Elite newspapers might make the greatest effort, whereas free newspapers make the least. Second, the media are expected to balance out the messages between the two camps and tend to provide an equal number of arguments from both camps (“Balancing Choice”). Third, I expect powerful political actors and large political parties to be covered more prominently (“Standing Choice”). In regional newspapers, large parties might garner most standing. In complex issues, I expect power to become even more relevant and journalists to rely on experts. Fourth, journalists are expected to cover direct democratic campaigns mainly between the sixth and the third week before the vote takes place (“Timing Choice”). Fifth, with regard to the “Dialogue Choice”, I expect that journalists will increase dialogue compared to the level of campaign dialogue

found in the media input. Furthermore, I expect more convergence in tabloid news, on TV, and in commentaries. By contrast, I expect to find less convergence in the free media and on the front pages. In the corporation tax reform, dialogue might have been handicapped by the complexity of the issue. With regard to contest frames, overall, I expect to see slightly more contest frames in the news media than in the media input. In addition, I expect to find fewer contest frames in elite newspapers and to find more in tabloid news, on TV, on the front pages and towards the end of the campaign.

Table 6.1: Overview of the Hypotheses

	General expectation Journalists...	Variation depending on.. Media Type, Genres, Timing	Issue Characteristics
Effort Choice	...make an effort	elite: more effort free: less effort	none
Balancing Choice	...balance the news	none	none
Standing Choice	...give higher standing to powerful actors and large political parties	regional: higher standing of large parties (results will additionally show that the effect of power is still significant but weaker in elite and regional newspapers.)	complexity: powerful actors and experts more important
Timing Choice	...cover the campaign mainly between the sixth and the third week before the vote takes place, dependent on activity by political actors	none	none
Dialogue Choice	...provide dialogue	tabloid, TV and commentaries: more dialogue free and front page: less dialogue elite: less contest frames tabloid, TV, front page, end of campaign: more contest frames	complexity: less dialogue

Results

Effort Choice

Table 6.2 addresses the “Effort Choice” and shows the average number of articles produced by a media type in each campaign. At the bottom, the total numbers of articles in each campaign are listed. These numbers show first of all that the media were involved in all three

campaigns. With regard to the media types, we find the highest average number of articles in elite and regional newspapers. Not surprisingly, we find the lowest number in the free media. Across the campaigns, we observe the highest numbers in the familiar and easy issue (asylum law), whereas we discern the lowest in the unfamiliar and complex issue (corporation tax). The early involvement in the asylum law might have increased the number of articles, whereas the late start of the naturalization initiative probably reduced the number of articles produced. In addition, it is possible that the complexity of the issue in the corporation tax reduced the number of articles the journalists produced on this issue. However, further studies need to show whether this finding can be generalized.

Table 6.2: Effort: Average Number of Articles / TV Reports Produced By Media Type

media type	Asylum	Naturalization	Corporation Tax	number of outlets
elite	58	41	28	4 (2)*
regional	44	29	28	9 (1)
tabloid	14	12	11	3 (1)
TV	11	3	5	2
free	6	7	1	2
total	559	380	327	20
analysis of variance	F=3.96, p=0.028	F=2.60, p= 0.081	F=2.23, p=0.118	

* Note: The number in the brackets shows the number of Sunday newspapers. For the mean, the Sunday newspapers were counted as 1/6 according to the proportion of weekdays they produce an issue. For instance, we arrive at 2.33 outlets in the elite media type. The elite newspapers together produced 136 articles in the asylum law campaign. Divided by 2.33, this is 58.

One of the regional newspapers (St. Galler Tagblatt) was remarkably active in the asylum law and corporation tax reform. It produced 81 articles on the asylum law and 51 on the corporation tax reform. This finding might be explained by the fact that in both cases prominent figures with local ties were involved. In the asylum law, one of the ad hoc committees (BK) opposed to the reform proposal was led by a member of the business elite (Markus Rauh), who had grown up and lived in the area. In addition, a minister (Regierungsrat) of St. Gallen, Peter Schönenberger, also joined his committee. On the pro camp, another minister (Regierungsrat) of the canton of St. Gallen, Karin Keller-Sutter, was also active. In the corporation tax reform, a professor (Waldburger) from the University of St. Gallen was an important expert on this is-

sue and criticized the reform from early in the campaign. It is possible that the involvement of these locally tied figures increased the news value and triggered more articles. Proximity is one of the news factors (Galtung and Ruge 1965, Schulz 1976, Price and Tewksbury 1997). A short telephone conversation with the responsible editor from this newspaper (Stefan Schmid) confirmed this suggestion; when presented with the finding, he suggested the very same explanation. In addition, he assented that the journalists were also personally interested in both issues, which might also contribute to explaining this finding.

Balancing Choice

Next, we will look at the ratio between pro and contra arguments in the media input and in the news media coverage (“Balancing Choice”). Table 6.3 reveals that in both immigration issue campaigns, the political actors of the contra camp promoted more frames than the political actors of the pro camp (media input). On the other hand, the pro camp was more active in the tax campaign. The ratio between pro and contra arguments is lower in the news media than in the media input for both immigration issues. This means that the media tend to balance the difference between contra and pro camp on these issues. The same ratio between contra and pro camp arguments as in the media input is found in the news media in the tax campaign. In this campaign, the news media did not balance out the news. Nevertheless, the ratio is most balanced in this case. From these findings, I conclude that, even though the news media do not report exactly the same amount of arguments on each side, they tend to balance the news.

Table 6.3: Balancing: Number of Arguments on Each Side by Campaign and Ratio of Contra / Pro Arguments

	media input			news media		
	contra	pro	contra/pro	contra	pro	contra/pro
asylum	726	335	2.2	1528	927	1.6
naturalization	675	107	6.3	1176	733	1.6
corporation tax	462	594	0.8	943	1123	0.8

Note: There is no difference between media types.

In the second interview of the asylum law, we asked the campaigners in an open-ended question how the media should deal with their media input from a normative point of view. Several actors mentioned that the media should balance the news and that both camps should have a voice. In this regard, the media fulfills their expectation. In another open question, we asked them how the media dealt with their input. Many political actors from both camps answered that the media reported both perspectives. By contrast, Amnesty International and the right-wing party (SVP) were unhappy with the coverage. Amnesty International claimed that the newspapers from the German part were one-sided, whereas the SVP complained that they were often ignored except when they were provocative. Based on the content analysis, there is no hint that the SVP was ignored. In both the asylum law and the naturalization initiative, it was the party that received the most attention in the news media. In the corporation tax reform, the SVP was less active. Interestingly, some political actors reported that the leader of the SVP (Blocher), who was also the responsible minister in the asylum law campaign, had received substantial media attention. This statement can be confirmed based on the content analysis. He was, in fact, the most important individual actor in the news media coverage of the asylum law. In this regard, the statement by Amnesty International finds more empirical support than the critique by the SVP. In both the naturalization initiative and the corporation tax reform, we posed questions in a closed manner. Almost no campaigner (between zero and three percent of all political actors) reported that the media always ignored their media input or did not report their slogan. Thus, the interviews give support to the overall finding that the media tends to balance the news and only very few (SVP inclusive) feel they were treated badly.

Standing Choice

Table 6.4 shows the results for the effects of power and actor characteristics (large party, citizens' interest group, extreme position on left-right scale) on standing, i.e. on the numbers of arguments with which an actor is present in the news media. All variables have a very significant effect on standing: Powerful actors and large political parties get more standing whereas citizens' interest groups and extreme actors get less. A change from 0 (mean) to 2.3 (95 percentile) on the standardized power measure increases the standing by 103 argument counts, with everything else being equal. The other variables are kept constant at their mean, or at zero in the case of the dummy variables. Similarly, large parties have a significantly higher standing. On average, they get 60 more argument counts than other actors, everything else being equal. The high standard error of the corresponding effect can be explained by the fact that there often is only one large party campaigning on a given side. Citizens' interest groups garner a reduced standing of 9 argument counts. Extremity serves as a control variable. It is the deviation from the center, based on the self-evaluation on the political left-right scale. A change from 2.2 (mean) to 4.7 (95 percentile) on the extremity scale decreases standing by 8 argument counts. Extreme actors may get less standing because they are less credible. The effects of power and extremity do not vary between the different media types. The effect of the large political parties is particularly strong in the regional newspaper (not shown here). This might be related to the remaining strong ties of the political parties to the regional units (cantons). In direct-democratic campaigns, the members of the parliament campaign in their home canton and the regional newspapers give them particular standing. Citizens' groups are least present in the free media. Free media might focus on the most powerful political actors in their rather rare coverage.

Table 6.4: The Effect of Power and Actor Characteristics on Standing in the News Media in the Three Campaigns: Negative Binominal Regression Model, Incidence-Rate Ratios (ratio) and Significance Level

	ratio	s.e.	p
power	3.194	0.582	***
large parties	6.328	2.657	***
citizens' int. groups	0.160	0.059	***
extreme	0.627	0.071	***
pseudo R ² =0.111, n=108			

***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05

Note:1. For this analysis, I excluded all of the actors who were not interviewed, as power and extremity are only measured for those who were interviewed. 2. Standing is measured by the total of arguments with which an organization was present in the news media during the whole campaign. 3. Given that we are dealing with count data, the Poisson model is appropriate; however, given the overdispersion we found in the data, we use the negative binomial, a special version of the Poisson model that is more adapted to this particular type of problem. 4. Power is standardized for each campaign (zmean=0, sz=1). 5. There are five large parties in Switzerland (SVP, FDP, CVP, SP, GPS). The citizens' interest groups, church organizations and SMOs are called citizens' int. groups. 6. All coefficients remain highly significant for the different media types or for the different campaigns.

The effects stay more or less the same in all three campaigns (not shown here). In line with the expectation, power has the largest effect in the corporation tax campaign (complex issue). In the asylum law campaign, citizens' interest groups also reach a relatively high standing. In the asylum law campaign, two highly involved ad hoc committees (K2N and BK) with two very famous representative figures also reach a high standing thanks to the prominence of their speakers. In the tax reform campaign, the most resource-rich and powerful economic interest group actor, *economiesuisse*, was the leading house of the pro-committee. In spite of its power and money, it did not dominate the news media. It pursues its specific interest and primarily wants to win the issue-specific vote and not be the most visible actor. Rather, it turns the spotlight on the allied political parties. In all direct-democratic campaigns, it is the task of the political parties to articulate its claims and to inform the citizens about the issue at stake and its position. Thus, the influence of *economiesuisse* works mainly indirect.

The journalists do not exclusively rely on campaign inputs by political actors; they also turn the spotlight on experts. In the asylum and the naturalization initiative campaigns, the experts get a low standing on the contra side (5 and 6 percent) whereas in the contra camp of

the tax reform, the experts reach a high level of standing (20 percent) (not shown). Since the issue is complex, experts are needed to debate it and to explain its meaning. However, for the quality of direct-democratic debates and for the question of the manipulability of the outcome of direct-democratic votes, one has to ask why the experts are more visible on one side. This can be problematic because experts enjoy a high level of legitimacy. A more detailed analysis reveals that the high standing of the experts on the contra side in the corporation tax reform was triggered by an article in a Sunday newspaper, the “NZZ am Sonntag”: In the edition of January 13, 2008, a journalist reported on the experts who criticized the corporation tax reform. The newspapers from the German-speaking part of Switzerland were the first to react. For instance, on January 15, the “Tagesanzeiger” (a centre-left regional newspaper) put the conflict between the experts and the responsible minister (Merz) on the front page and wrote that Merz had been let down by the experts. The “Tagesanzeiger” had already brought up the criticism of one professor (Waldburger) on November 26, 2007. However, it remained on a low level of standing. The story in the “NZZ am Sonntag” was necessary to leverage the issue. The “NZZ” (a liberal quality paper and the weekday-sister of the “NZZ am Sonntag”) reacted differently. On January 16, it published an article by one of the experts. On the very same page, there was an article from the pro side in which the head of the most important economic interest group, *economiesuisse*, was also able to explain his opinion. A third type of reaction can be found in the “St. Galler Tagblatt” (regional newspaper, belongs to NZZ publishing house, i.e. is liberal). This newspaper probably reacted due to the local proximity to the experts. It published an interview with the expert on January 18 but also covered the opposing view. With one exception, the newspapers in the French part of Switzerland did not react to the story in the “NZZ am Sonntag”. Only the quality newspaper of the French part, “Le Temps”, followed on January 28 with coverage of the expert’s criticism. Crossing the language border clearly requires some time. This illustration shows first, that media bias is not the reason for the high standing of the experts of the contra side. Nevertheless, in the reaction

of the “Tagesanzeiger”, one can see an ideological imprint, whereas in the “NZZ”, it seems important that both camps are able to give their opinion. Second, this case also shows that there are two public spaces – one in the French-speaking and one in the German-speaking part of Switzerland (Tresch 2009). It is interesting to note that the pro camp was disappointed by the “NZZ am Sonntag”. They were disappointed that this liberal newspaper reported critically on the tax reform several times. As a short telephone conversation with the responsible journalist revealed (Heidi Gmür), the article in the “NZZ am Sonntag” was based on the curiosity and personal initiative of this journalist. After having heard several times the claim of professor Waldburger that the new law violated the constitution, she was wondering what other professors thought about the issue. She found that, with one exception, all the professors she interviewed were against the new law. Only one of the professors interviewed stated that he believed slightly that the new law did not violate the constitution. However, this one professor was not familiar with the issue and stated that his opinion should not be reported. The journalist also had the required resources to write the story. She had worked for a Sunday newspaper and the issue was important. In addition, the information was relevant and interesting. The journalist did not expect her article to provoke such a reaction.

Table 6.5 investigates whether the standing of the experts in the tax reform is relevant for the content. The adversaries of the corporation tax reform, together with the experts, mainly focused on matters of “*tax equity*”. They argued that the tax cuts were an unfair privilege for the rich and went against the principle of fair taxation. They claimed that the reform was unconstitutional. This line of reasoning mainly applied to a controversial provision that included a reduction in tax rates on dividends for shareholders who held at least a 10 per cent stake in a corporation. Compared to the other actors, the share of the tax equity frame is significantly higher among the experts. Thus, as a result of the increased standing of the experts, the tax equity frame became more important.

Table 6.5: Shares Devoted to the “Tax Equity” Frame in the News Media of the Tax Reform Campaign: Comparison between Experts and Rest

Corporation Tax	contra	pro
experts	63.6	58.6
others	46.8	14.7
n	943	1123
analysis of variance	F=17.02, p=0.000	F=42.29, p=0.000

This is especially relevant for the pro side: The “*SME*” frame dominated the yes campaign. It states that the small and medium companies, which form the backbone of the Swiss economy, needed to benefit from a set of planned measures aimed at reducing financial and administrative burdens. In their media input, the “*SME*” frame was present with 38.4 percent (see Table 7.1). In the news media, the share reduced to only 30.4 percent. At the same time, the use of the tax equity frame by the pro camp increased from 7.7 percent in the media input to 15.3 in the news media. In other words, the “tax equity” frame introduced by the experts crowded out the “*SME*” frame to some extent.

Next, we investigate the role of the regional newspapers in the tax reform campaign. As mentioned, the tax reform was aimed at the small and medium enterprises. Since SMEs are typically an important part of the social life of regions and communities, it is especially important for regional media to cover issues that affect SMEs in the regions they cover. They might do so by portraying collaborators of individual SMEs that are affected by the result of the vote, by explaining consequences for the communities, and by citing regional political actors. Thus, the regional newspapers possibly made an extra effort to focus on the “*SME*” aspect of the issue. Table 6.6 shows that the regional newspapers gave significantly more standing to the regional political actors in the tax reform campaign.

Table 6.6: Standing of Regional Political Actors in Different Media Types and Campaigns

media type	Corporation Tax
regional	50.0
elite	33.5
tabloid	34.3
free	0.0
TV	38.5
n	2066

analysis of variance (regional vs. other media types): $F=44.27$, $p=0.000$

Table 6.7 investigates whether the higher standing of the regional actors in the regional newspapers of the tax reform campaign is relevant for frame building. The regional newspapers possibly emphasized more the “SME” frame because this frame addresses the needs of small and medium companies. This is not the case, as Table 6.7 shows. There is only a negligible difference in the use of the “SME” frame between the different media types. Thus, the regional newspapers gave higher standing to regional actors without giving more emphasis to the “SME” frame.

Table 6.7: Use of the “SME” Frame in Different Media Types

frame	Corporation Tax
regional	22.6
elite	21.2
tabloid	19.1
free	20.0
TV	16.7
total	21.9
n	2066


analysis of variance: $F=0.58$, $p=0.671$

Timing Choice

Figure 6.1 shows the intensity of the three campaigns based on the number of arguments, aggregated over the weeks. First, we see that the campaigns – after being covered on a lower level for some weeks – only started in earnest seven weeks (for the corporation tax) or six weeks (for the asylum law and the naturalization campaign) before the day of the vote. The media coverage of the asylum law campaign started earlier due to some highly involved polit-

ical actors of the contra camp who began early. Second, in the third week before the vote, the debate in the news media peaked. As suggested above, this is related to the mailing of the information bulletin three to four weeks before the campaign. Finally, the debate was covered on a significantly lower level in the two last weeks of the campaign. This result corresponds to findings from previous research about referendum campaigns (De Vreese and Semetko 2004). The timing of the media coverage in the three campaigns correlates highly at around 0.8.¹³ There are no significant differences between the media types.

Figure 6.1: Coverage in the News Media Over Time



Nevertheless, the media can introduce accents during a campaign. First, the TV, in its role as a public service organization, is responsible for one or two public opinion polls during campaigns. In the asylum law campaign, the first of the two public opinion polls predicted a close result, encouraging the contra camp to increase its efforts — without success as we know. In the naturalization initiative, the first of the two polls revealed a surprisingly high number of “yes” voters (48 percent of the respondents). Again, this prompted the contra camp to increase its efforts, which resulted in a successful campaign. In both instances, the second poll did not

¹³ The weekly argument counts of the asylum law and the naturalization campaign correlate at 0.78 (0.89 for the last 10 weeks), those of the asylum law and corporation tax reform at 0.73 (0.79 for the last 10 weeks), and the corporation tax and naturalization campaign correlate at 0.88 (0.84 for the last 10 weeks).

have a comparable effect. In addition, the other camp remained more or less unaffected by the poll. Second, the media organized the Swiss TV debate show (Arena), which, in the case of the naturalization initiative, attracted a record number of viewers (810,000) and triggered news coverage in the following days. This was an extraordinary event that can be explained with the showdown between the new justice minister (Eveline Widmer-Schlumpf) and the former minister (Christoph Blocher) in this TV show. Normally, “Arena” is less important. On average, 234,000 view Arena¹⁴. The timing of this event is important because it can affect the effort a political actor puts forth or the content of a public debate.

Dialogue Choice

The degree of campaign dialogue (campaign-level convergence) in the different campaigns, types of media outlets and media genres is shown in Table 6.8. In the asylum law campaign, we find a dialogue level of 70.1, in the naturalization campaign it is 64.0 and in the corporation tax campaign it is 55.3. With regard to differences between the campaigns, it can be noted that the lowest level of campaign dialogue is found in the case of the complex issue, the corporation tax reform. In comparison to the level of dialogue in the mediated communication channels (chapter 5), we note that there is no more campaign dialogue in the news media. These findings are unexpected because the news media, with its mediation, is expected to increase campaign dialogue. In light of the results, however, it becomes clear that political actors anticipate the mediating function and adapt to the media logic by increasing campaign dialogue in the media input themselves. However, in the corporation tax reform, the news media converge on the main frames in 55 percent of their arguments, whereas in the media input, the two camps speak about the same frames in 41 percent of their main arguments. This result indicates that the mediation function is important in the complex issue.

¹⁴ <http://www.nzz.ch/nachrichten/politik/schweiz/streit_um_neue_arena_nach_der_rekordsendung_1.736781.html>, February 2010.

Surprisingly, the campaign-level convergence is not significantly higher in tabloid newspapers and on TV news. I interpret this as a good sign for democracy. It seems that these media types do not simplify too much. At the same time, the convergence is, as expected, significantly lower in free news media. The free press mediates less and provides a less coherent picture. These newspapers mainly reprint the information provided by the news agency. In addition, convergence is not significantly higher in the commentaries than on the front page.

Table 6.8: Level of Campaign Dialogue by Campaign, Media Type and Media Genre

campaigns	
Asylum	70.1
Naturalization	64.0
Corporation Tax	55.3
all Campaigns (mean)	63.1

media type	all campaigns
regional	64.6
tabloid	63.6
TV	62.9
elite	59.9
free	28.3

analysis of variance (free vs. other media types) $F=7.86$, $p=0.015$

media genre	all campaigns
commentaries	65.5
front page	54.6

analysis of variance (commentaries vs. front page) $F=0.89$, $p=0.402$

Overall, the journalists slightly increased the use of contest frames when compared to those used in the media input. In news media, we find an average share of 15.5 of contest frames (see Table 7.1) compared to an average use of 6.8 percent in the media input. According to the regression model presented in Table 6.9, significantly more contest frames are used on the front pages than in commentaries or in the body of the news articles in all three campaigns. The model predicts the following probability increase (not shown) on front pages: 5.3 percentage points in the corporation tax reform campaign, 9.3 percentage points in asylum law, and 10.3 percentage points in the naturalization initiative campaigns (with the other dummy variables kept constant at zero). With regard to differences between media types, the idea that

significantly fewer contest frames (-4.4 percentage points) are found in the elite newspapers is supported by the results of the asylum law campaign. However, this is not the case in the other two campaigns. In line with my hypothesis, tabloid newspapers use more contest frames in the two immigration issue campaigns (asylum law: +5.5 percentage points, naturalization initiative: +15.8 percentage points). The results are mixed with regard to TV news. In the asylum law, we find an increasing effect of TV (+ 11.9 percentage points), whereas in the corporation tax reform the opposite is the case (- 5.1 percentage points). Probably, the non-profit characteristic of the Swiss public broadcasting service prevents the TV from using more contest frames. As expected, towards the end of the campaign, the news media increased the contest frames (+4.0 percentage points in the asylum law to +7.7 percentage points in the corporation tax reform). “Time” measures the campaign weeks. This result is in line with the findings of chapter 5, which stated that the political actors increase their contest frames in the media input towards the end. In the naturalization initiative, “time” remains insignificant. There are two likely reasons for this: First, the campaign was so short, and second, the campaigners and journalists used more contest frames due to the conflict between Widmer-Schlumpf, Blocher and the SVP. Concerning the control variable, we find a tendency that the governmental camp is reported with more contest frames (asylum law: +3.3 percentage points, corporation tax: +4.0 percentage points). It is not clear what this result means. It is possible that the governmental camp attacks the other camp more in order to reproduce power.

Table 6.9: Logistic Regression Explaining the Use of the Contest Frames

	Asylum			Naturalization			Corporation Tax		
	robust			robust			robust		
	odds	s.e.	p	odds	s.e.	p	odds	s.e.	p
front page	1.949	0.432	**	1.891	0.564	*	1.783	0.565	°
commentaries	0.587	0.141	*	1.040	0.178		0.895	0.177	
elite	0.663	0.104	**	0.833	0.127		0.955	0.180	
tabloid	1.518	0.365	°	2.474	0.576	***	0.563	0.226	
TV	2.368	0.564	***	1.256	0.439		0.414	0.217	°
time	1.038	0.014	**	0.975	0.030		1.116	0.031	**
governmental camp	1.263	0.151	°	0.961	0.124		1.524	0.227	**
n	2455			1909			2066		
pseudo R2	0.030			0.013			0.019		

***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, °p<.1

Conclusion

The results can be summarized based on the five choices: With regard to the “Effort Choice”, we find that journalists make an effort in all three campaigns. Elite newspapers make the greatest effort, whereas free newspapers add the least. In addition, the journalists make more effort in longer campaigns than in shorter ones. One of the regional newspapers made a remarkably high effort in two campaigns because representative figures with local ties were involved and the journalists were interested in the issue. Second, we find that the journalists tend to balance out the messages of each camp in all three campaigns. There are no differences between media types. Third, powerful actors and large political parties are covered more prominently than other political actors, whereas citizens’ interest groups and extreme actors are given less attention (“Standing Choice”). The influence of power is particularly strong in the complex issue, whereas the large political parties garner an especially high standing in the regional newspapers. Furthermore, it seems as if the free newspaper focus more on the powerful political actors in their rather sparse coverage than other media types. In the complex issue, the experts also have a high standing and contributed to the media frames. Fourth, journalists cover direct democratic campaigns mainly between the sixth and the third week before the vote takes place following the institutional routine of the political authorities and actors

(“Timing Choice”). Nevertheless, the media introduced accents in the campaign by conducting public opinion polls. In the naturalization initiative, the TV debate show “Arena” intensified the debate, and the journalists increased their use of contest frames towards the end of the campaign. Fifth, with regard to the “Dialogue Choice”, we do not find any more campaign dialogue in the news media than in the media input (Chapter 5). The political actors probably anticipate the mediation function of the news media and increase campaign dialogue in the media input. However, in the complex issue (Corporation Tax) the news media provides a higher level of dialogue, indicating that the mediating function is important. With regard to differences between media types, we find less campaign dialogue in free news media. The differences between the other media types do not vary significantly. In addition, we find slightly more contest frames in the news media than in the media input. In two of the three campaigns, we find more contest frames on the front pages, in tabloid news and towards the end of the campaign. Surprisingly, significantly more substance in elite newspapers is found only in one campaign.

Is this contribution of the journalists “sufficient”? In terms of the distinction drawn by Strömbäck and Nord (2006), we find that the journalists contribute to the process and content levels of frame mediation. On the process level, journalists generally follow the institutional routine of the political actors when timing news coverage. Nevertheless, they can sometimes introduce accents into a campaign by using a public opinion poll or a TV debate show (“Arena”). With regard to the content level, we reveal that journalists balance the news, give higher standing to powerful actors and large parties and provide campaign dialogue. Additionally, as the corporation tax reform initiative showed, other frames enter a debate in the form of as the experts’ views. Overall, the process is well-institutionalized and made routine, which is seen as a system of checks and balances against too political actors gaining too much power or media influence. Referring to Gans’ metaphor, I can conclude that the journalists and the po-

litical actors are dancing the tango well, as they are familiar with both their dance partners and the music.

7

Key Factors in Frame Building

After having explored the crafting, promoting and mediating processes which result in the media frames, we elaborate now on key factors. We use media frames as dependent variables and investigate the factors that influence the creation or changes of frames applied by journalists. This chapter first explores the ability of political actors to use their media input to influence media frames and investigates whether the relationship between political actors and journalists is reciprocal or unidirectional. Based on the assumption that media input by political actors influences news media frames, the chapter then looks at the factors in more detail with emphasis on the influence of power, the salience of frames in media input, and the multiplication effect of the minister (i.e. the Federal Councilor).

Who Is the Driving Force and Which Communication Channel Is Important?¹⁵

¹⁵ A shortened and earlier version of this chapter is going to be published in: Hänggli, Regula (2011b). On the basis of the naturalization initiative campaign, a paper discussing which key factor of frame building belongs to which part of the model has been submitted to ABS (Hänggli 2011a).

As introduced in chapter 1, my general approach for conceptualizing the relationship between political actors and the mass media is an actor-oriented political process model, as it has been introduced by Wolfsfeld (1997). The relationship between the campaigners in the public debate and the mass media is one of mutual dependence but, significantly, as Gans (1979) stressed, this relationship is likely to be an asymmetrical one: “Although it takes two to tango, either sources or journalists can lead, but more often than not, sources do the leading”. Wolfsfeld’s key hypothesis (p. 3) makes the same point: the political process is likely to be the driving force in this relationship. The reasons he provides for this hypothesis are numerous, but, most importantly, he suggests that the mass media are much more likely to react to political events than to initiate them. This is in line with Sigal’s idea (1973) that by releasing news, political actors take the first step toward making news. It is also in the tradition of Baerns’ “*Determinationsthese*” (1991), a thesis well-known among Swiss and German communication scientists. It says that news coverage is based on contributions from political actors more than sixty percent of the time. In particular, Baerns states that political actors influence the content of news coverage (1991: 98). As discussed in chapter 6, Strömbäck and Nord (2006) disagree with Sigal, Gans and Baerns and conclude that journalists, not politicians, lead the tango. They assert that journalists have the *ultimate* power and control over the framing of news stories. However, they also state that, with the exception of one main national television program, between 65 and 77 percent of the news stories in the four main newspapers and the two main television news programs in Sweden are based on media input from political actors. They agree that the political actors are frequently used as sources in the news stories. Thus, the *political actors* are expected to lead the frame building process by providing the frames. It is in this context that we refer to Bentele et al.’s (1997) term “Induktion”, i.e. a communicative input which has an impact on the news. By framing the issue strategically, we argued (see chapter 4) that political actors face at least three strategic choices. The journalists contribute to the debate by clarifying the opposing positions (which Bennett et al. 2004 call

“recognition”) and by eliciting mutual reactions from the opposing political actors (which they call “responsiveness”). With regard to the second and third choices involved in strategic framing (“Oppositional Emphasis Choice” and “Contest Emphasis Choice”) I expect that moderate market competition slightly increases the journalists’ preferences for the offensive strategy and for contest frames.

I expect that the *media input* is the most important communication channel in the frame building process because the media releases and conferences are, obviously, directed towards the news media and sent or organized several times during the campaign phase. I call this the *channel* hypothesis. Posters and political advertisements (see chapter 1 for an overview of the different communication channels) are not suited for introducing new frames because they can only transport very short messages. Instead, they are used for mobilizing, and rarely also for provocation. Posters might be able to strengthen and support a frame promoted in the media input, also on the emotional level. *Provocative* posters or advertisements can be used to trigger a heated public debate or a debate about a certain framing. Such a heated debate occurs only rarely and none of our campaigns represented such a case.

Power of the Political Actor, Salience of Frames in Media Input and the Role of the Minister

The impact of a promoted frame depends on the *power* of the political actor. Numerous studies have shown that media attention is biased toward the more powerful actors (e.g., Gans 1979, Wolfsfeld 1997, Entman 2007). The so-called “indexing hypothesis” predicts that “[m]ass media news professionals (...) tend to ‘index’ the range of voices and viewpoints (...) according to the range of views expressed in mainstream government debate about a given topic” (Bennett 1990: 106). Conflict within the political elite is newsworthy and – based on the news values theory – expected to be reported. In other words, the actors that dominate the

decision-making process seem to get preferential access to the media (Danielian and Page 1994). Based on the result from chapter 6 (“Standing Choice”), the same seems to be at work in Switzerland. The reliance on powerful actors is expected not only to influence the attention an actor can garner, but also to be essential in the frame building process: more powerful political actors should have more influence in frame building. I call this the *power bias* hypothesis. The idea that powerful actors are influential in frame building goes back to the approach that news media actors follow the political actors depending on the degree and nature of market competition. More specifically, it is in line with the news values theory, which states that news values determine how much prominence an event or a frame is given by the media. In the original theory (Galtung and Ruge 1965), news decisions are traced back to specific properties of events and actors – so-called news factors – that make them newsworthy and increase their chances of making the news. Such news factors include, among other things, conflict or controversy, resonance with well-understood story themes, or the status and relevance of an actor (Galtung and Ruge 1965, Schulz 1976, Price and Tewksbury 1997). Swiss direct-democratic procedures have been shown to increase the media standing of actors who are notoriously weak, such as social movement organizations or the Swiss political parties (Höglinger 2008). However, while outsiders might find more attention in the media due to direct-democratic instruments, I expect that their influence on frame building is still restricted because they attract less media attention than powerful actors and large parties (Chapter 6). Concerning the issue characteristics, I expect *familiarity* and *complexity* to be crucial. In the construction of frames for familiar issues, I expect greater involvement from a higher number of political actors. This is because more political actors are knowledgeable about the issues and have developed clear opinions. Thus, access to media would be more open. With regard to complex issues, however, the opposite is to be expected: Fewer political actors have the expertise to participate in the public debate.

Next, the *salience* of the frame(s) in the media input is crucial. This is in line with studies of agenda building, which have confirmed that the salience of issues in the media input is positively related to the salience of issues in news media (Kiousis et al. 2006). The salience of the frames in the media input can be measured by the frequency with which they are mentioned in the media input of the political actor. The theoretical idea behind this factor is that journalists follow the political actors based on the professional norms in journalism. In Western democracies, the neutral-informational professional journalism is dominant (Hallin and Mancini 2004). Based on this neutral-informational journalistic norm, the media should give an accurate account of important events, actors and messages within the institutionalized arenas of the political system and make the political process transparent for the citizen public. The journalists are expected to disseminate information as neutral chroniclers and impartial observers. This norm is in line with the mirror approach, which conceives of the media as a mirror of political reality (e.g., Schulz 1976, McQuail 1992). Thus, the media are assumed to report the frames proportionally to the degree to which they are promoted. This can be measured by the frequency with which a frame is mentioned in the media input of the political actor. I call this the *salience* hypothesis.

The messages of the *minister*, or in general, of the most prominent institutional speaker of the debate, are expected to be met with higher response by the media than the messages of the other actors. I call this expectation the *multiplication* hypothesis. By minister, I am referring to a Federal Councilor. The Federal Council is the Swiss government which has seven members. Federal Councilors are confronted with a double task: they are a member of the governing college, and they direct one of the seven federal ministries (Kriesi and Trechsel 2008). Based on the news values theory, the minister responsible for the proposition submitted to the vote is expected to garner more media attention. Both, the prominence and prestige of a given actor are expected to increase the news value of a frame promoted by this actor (Galtung and Ruge 1965, Schulz 1976, Price and Tewksbury 1997).

As introduced in chapter 2, there are two different direct-democratic instruments: initiatives and referendums. Both present the voters with a binary choice – either in favor (pro) or against (con) the issue-specific proposition at stake. However, we can distinguish between the two according to the *source* of the proposition: initiatives are propositions “from below”, formulated by organizations representing groups of citizens, while referendums concern propositions “from above”, i.e. legislative acts proposed by the government and adopted by Parliament. Since, in the case of a referendum, the legislative act is worked out (sometimes over several years) and proposed by the government and its administration, the minister is expected to be more important in referendum campaigns than in initiative campaigns. In addition, the minister is expected to be more influential with regard to complex issues in which he and his administration are most knowledgeable. In complex issues, access to information is also more important and/or scarcer, which gives an advantage to the minister. Familiarity does not appear to be critical: Even when they are faced with unfamiliar issues, political actors should be able to compensate for their lack of knowledge.

In summary, the hypotheses are as follows: First, I expect the political actors to take the lead in the frame building process. Second, I expect the media input to be the most important channel in this process (channel hypothesis). Third, the power bias hypothesis states that powerful actors get easier access to the media with their frames than weak actors. I expect power to be less important in familiar issues and more important in complex issues. Fourth, the salience of the frames in the media input is crucial for its frequency in the media (salience hypothesis). Fifth, the minister’s frames are multiplied most (multiplication hypothesis), particularly in referendum campaigns and in complex issues.

Finally, external events taking place during the campaign can be relevant with regard to frame building as well. Lawrence (2000) argues that high-profile media coverage of unplanned events provide a special opportunity for reframing. The same has been shown by

Baumgartner et al. (2008) where unexpected and scandalous events in and around the death penalty debate in the U.S. have triggered a shift in the existing debate towards the innocence frame. Also, banalities such as summer or Christmas holidays structure the debate.

Method

We shall pursue a double strategy for data analysis, and treat the campaign agenda both as an aggregate and a daily phenomenon. The purpose of such a double strategy is to find mutually reinforcing results. In the analysis of daily effects, we use a zero-inflated negative binominal regression model. Given that we are dealing with count data, the Poisson model is appropriate; however, given the overdispersion found in the data, we use the negative binomial, a special version of the Poisson model that is adapted to this particular type of problem.¹⁶ When interpreting zero-inflated models, it is easy to be confused by the meaning of the effect parameters (the incidence-rate ratios). Such models have two parts – an inflation model and a count model. The inflation model estimates the effects (incidence-rate ratios) on the possibility that an argument does not make it into the media, i. e. on the possibility of its absence from the media. The count model estimates the effects (incidence-rate ratios) on the frequency of an argument's presence in the media. When the same independent variables are included in the equation for both models, the effects from the two models often point in opposite directions, i.e. the one is smaller, the other larger than one. This makes sense from a substantive point of view. In the inflation model, a ratio smaller than one implies a higher probability that the

¹⁶ Overdispersion implies the presence of greater variability (statistical dispersion) in the predicted counts for a given value of x than would be expected based on the Poisson regression model. Stata provides a likelihood-ratio test for overdispersion. In addition, due to the excess zeros in the data, also called zero inflation, a zero-inflated count model is necessary. Greene (2000) has proposed the Vuong (1989) test for non-nested models in order to establish whether a zero-inflated model is necessary. Zero-inflated count models assume that there are two latent (i.e. unobserved) groups: an "Always Zero" and a "Not Always Zero" group and that zero counts are generated by two independently operating processes. In the first process (Inflation Model), the zeros belonging to the "Always Zero" group are generated. An argument in this group has an outcome of zero with a probability of one. This process is binary; it generates zeros or ones. If this first process results in one, the second process is assumed to come into play: a negative binominal regression process (Count Model) which generates zeros of the "Not Always" group. An argument in this group might have a zero count, but there is a non-zero probability that it has a positive count.

frame does make it into the media; correspondingly; in the count model, a ratio larger than one increases the frequency in the media.

In other words, these two models allow a distinction to be drawn between frame presence/absence in the media, on the one hand, and frame frequency in the media, on the other hand. Accordingly, frame building can be conceived as being composed of two processes – the daily frame *absence/presence* and the daily frame *frequency*. In a similar way, Tresch (2009) defines two dimensions of standing: presence (=non-absence) and prominence. Since both, absence and frequency are measured on a daily basis, I refer in this context to the daily frame absence/presence and daily frame frequency.

For the estimation of these models, we will use a stacked file, with five (four in the naturalization campaign) cases for each day, one for each of the main frame categories, plus one for the residual category. We shall introduce a dummy variable for each one of the main frames, in order to control for their variable salience. In order to control for contemporaneous correlation, we will cluster the standard errors over time (=robust s.e.).¹⁷ We shall also lag the dependent variable by one day so as to control for the autoregressive effect. Zero-inflated models may be very sensitive to the specification of the inflation model (see Appendix Table A3). It is therefore important to perform a sensitivity analysis (Steenbergen 2008, Long and Freese 2006).

In the first time-series analysis of daily effects (Table 7.2), we will study the lagged effect of the framing of political actors on the framing of the media and vice versa. In order to do so, we can make use of the fact that political actors and the media do not communicate simultaneously, but in a stable morning-evening sequence in which the publication of (morning) newspapers precedes events produced by the political actors during the day, which are in turn consistently followed by the broadcast of (evening) news bulletins and by the press of the

¹⁷ This correction was designed for linear models and it is not completely clear whether it works as well for this kind of model. However, the results are also robust without the clustering (Appendix model s2).

next day. Lagging the independent framing of the political actors of the two camps (contra and pro) by one day ($t-1$) provides the relevant input for the framing of the press, while the framing of the political actors of the same day (t) provides the input for TV. Conversely, the independent framing of the newspaper and of the TV lagged by one day ($t-1$) provides the input for the political actors on day (t). The arguments from the newspaper and from TV were combined in the media variable. In the second time-series analysis (Table 7.3), we will investigate the lagged effect of power, of the counts in the media input, and of the minister variable.¹⁸

Results


The Lead of the Political Actors and Media Input as the Important Communication Channel

Figure 7.1 compares the percentage shares of the frames in the media input with the shares of the frames in the media's news reporting. There are two graphs for each campaign – one with the shares of the contra camp (on the left) and one with the shares of the pro camp (on the right). The overall impression is that, in general, the *news media* rather faithfully reproduce the framing by the two camps. Thus, the percentage shares of the frames in the news media are generally similar to the shares found in the media input. There are two instances (the abuse frame of the pro camp in the asylum campaign and the mass naturalization frame of the pro camp in the naturalization campaign), where the news media increased the share of the *main* frames compared to the media input. This finding is probably due to the advertisements:

¹⁸ I will use the following abbreviations for the variables: Media ($t-1$) is the number of arguments reported in the media on day $t-1$. Contra input ($t-1$) and pro input ($t-1$) is the number of arguments presented as input material by the pro and the contra camps, respectively, on day ($t-1$). Minister ($t-1$) is the minister dummy of day $t-1$. Contra ads ($t-1$) and pro ads ($t-1$) are the number of arguments presented in the political advertisements of the contra or the pro camp on day $t-1$. Power contra ($t-1$) and power pro ($t-1$) are the sum of daily power of the respective camp. Human, trad. and the remaining variables in the count model are dummy indicators for the four (three in the naturalization campaign) main framing categories, with the residual category ("others") forming the reference category.

In both cases, the pro camp was very active with advertisements and focused on the respective frames in the ads (chapter 5). Moreover, compared to media input, the media doubled the share of the pro camp's tax equity counter-frame and also increased the share of the contra camps' efficacy and SME counter-frames. This finding reflects the media logic which favours dialogue.

Figure 7.1: Comparison Between the Percentage Shares of the Frames in the Media Input and in the News Media







Table 7.1: Substantive (Offensive and Defensive Use) and Contest Frames of the Two Camps in the Media Input and the News Media: Percentages

	Asylum	media input		news media		Naturalization	media input		news media		Corporation Tax	media input		news media	
		con	pro	con	pro		con	pro	con	pro		con	pro	con	pro
substantive offensive	human. trad.	38.7	4.5	30.2	2.5	rule-of-law	48.9	0.0	46.0	0.0	tax equity	48.5	0.0	47.8	0.3
	rule-of-law	21.5	0.0	9.3	0.3						tax loss	22.3	0.0	15.2	0.2
	abuse	0.0	26.9	0.0	27.8	people final say	0.0	39.3	0.1	31.5	SME	0.0	38.4	0.3	30.2
	efficacy	0.0	17.3	0.0	12.8	mass naturalization	0.4	20.6	0.1	24.8	competitiveness	0.0	27.3	0.0	25.9
	others	13.9	16.1	23.8	22.1	others	4.9	7.5	7.2	5.8	others	4.3	11.3	2.5	4.5
	all offensive	74.1	64.8	63.4	65.6	all offensive	52.6	65.5	53.3	62.1	all offensive	75.1	76.9	65.8	61.0
defensive	human. trad.	0.1	20.3	0.0	12.6	rule-of-law	0.2	19.6	0.0	18.5	tax equity	0.0	7.7	0.0	15.0
	rule-of-law	0.4	9.3	0.0	4.5						tax loss	0.0	8.4	0.0	8.2
	abuse	17.6	0.0	16.2	0.5	people final say	21.9	0.0	18.5	0.0	SME	5.6	0.0	9.7	0.2
	efficacy	4.0	0.0	7.5	0.1	mass naturalization	17.0	0.0	11.1	0.0	competitiveness	14.1	0.0	11.8	0.2
	others	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	others	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	others	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	all defensive	22.2	29.6	23.8	18.3	all defensive	40.6	19.6	29.6	18.5	all defensive	19.7	16.2	21.6	23.5
contest		4.1	5.7	12.8	16.2		6.5	13.1	17.0	19.0		5.2	6.9	12.7	15.5
total		100%	100%	100%	100%		100%	100%	100%	100%		100%	100%	100%	100%
n		726	335	1528	927		675	107	1176	733		462	594	943	1123

Table 7.1 gives a more detailed overview of the frames in the media input and in the news media of the three campaigns. Compared to Figure 7.1, it adds the distinction between the offensive and defensive use of the frames, and reports the “others” and the “contest” frames. The media input corresponds to what was shown in chapter 4 (Table 4.1). Compared to the media input, there are few additional differences in the media’s news reporting. First, in the case of the asylum law, the media framing is more diverse than the political actors’ input, since the “other” thematic frames account for roughly a quarter of the media frames on either side, while they make up only one seventh (contra camp) or one fifth (pro camp) of the input material produced for the media. The use of this residual type of frame can be interpreted as a sign of the independence of the newspaper from the government’s position, since the most important quality paper of Switzerland – the NZZ – contributed substantively to this category. In the other two campaigns, the media made no special effort with their own or other frames. Thus, the media do not show more frame building power in the case of the unfamiliar issue, the corporate tax reform. Second, as one might also have expected on the basis of the American and British experience, and as already reported in chapter 6, the media rely more heavily on contest frames in their news reporting. However, even in their case, substantive frames largely predominate. Thus, we can state that in Swiss direct-democratic campaigns, framing is primarily conducted in substantive terms. Third, there is also not a great deal of trespassing (=offensive use of the opponents’ frame) in the media, either. If the opponents’ frames are used, they are used defensively.

Having established the predominance of substantive framing and having shown the rare use of trespassing, we now focus exclusively on the substantive frames, i.e. on the arguments, and combine the offensive and defensive use of the substantive frames. Table 7.2 presents the regression results for the three campaigns. On the left-hand side of each table, the media’s fram-

ing constitutes the dependent variable, on the right-hand side it is the framing by the two camps, which constitutes the dependent variables.

Let us first look at the left-hand side of the tables for the three campaigns, where the news media frames are the dependent variable. In the inflation model (absence), the ratios of both camps (contra (t-1) and pro (t-1)) are smaller than one, which means that the input of the political actor decreases the probability of the frame's absence in the media. Two of the corresponding six effects reach conventional levels of significance, one is significant at the ten percent level. In the count model (frequency), the ratios are larger than one. This means that the input of the political actors increases the argument frequency in the news media. With two exceptions, the effects are significant at the five percent level. One is significant at the ten percent level. We will discuss these results in more detail later (Table 7.3).

As is shown by the right-hand side of the three tables, the reverse does not apply: the framing by the media on the previous day (media (t-1)) has a decreasing or no effect on the framing by political actors: In the inflation model (absence), the ratios are smaller than one but only the ratios of the corporation tax reform are significant at the 5 percent level. Moreover, and more importantly, in the count model (frequency), the ratio is smaller than one, which means that if a camp has succeeded in getting into the media on a given day, it will reduce its effort to get into the media on the following day. With two exceptions, these negative effects are significant at the five percent level. In summary, the results of Table 7.2 strongly suggest that the frames promoted by the politicians influenced the media frames, whereas the opposite is less likely. Thus, we feel comfortable in considering the political actors as the driving force in the frame building process and the media input as the crucial communication channel¹⁹.

¹⁹ I also tested whether the previous day's political advertisements influenced the absence/presence of news media frames. I found that there was no effect in all three cases.

Table 7.2: Who Is Driving Whom? Results of Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Regression of Media Framing on Lagged Framing by the Two Camps, and Vice Versa: Ratio, Robust Standard Errors and p-Levels

Asylum

dependent variable: news media				dependent variable: media input							
news media	robust			contra camp	robust			pro camp	robust		
	ratio	s.e.	p		ratio	s.e.	p		ratio	s.e.	p
count model (frequency)				count model (frequency)				count model (frequency)			
media (t-1)	1.021	0.015	0.168	media (t-1)	0.928	0.021	0.001	media (t-1)	0.917	0.036	0.028
contra input	1.032	0.013	0.015	contra input (t-pro input (t-1)	0.984	0.009	0.078	contra input (t-pro input (t-1)	1.060	0.055	0.259
pro input (t-1)	1.066	0.069	0.320	human. trad.	2.173	0.404	0.000	human. trad.	1.668	0.470	0.069
human. trad.	0.955	0.126	0.725	rule-of-law	1.554	0.367	0.062	rule-of-law	0.524	0.194	0.081
rule-of-law	0.415	0.048	0.000	abuse	1.803	0.522	0.042	abuse	1.865	0.360	0.001
abuse	0.904	0.109	0.401	efficacy	0.408	0.096	0.000	efficacy	0.941	0.139	0.678
efficacy	0.492	0.065	0.000								
inflation model (absence)				inflation model (absence)				inflation model (absence)			
media (t-1)	0.289	0.633	0.050	media (t-1)	0.983	0.033	0.609	media (t-1)	0.999	0.053	0.978
contra input	0.287	1.668	0.454	contra input (t-pro input (t-1)	0.943	0.027	0.031	contra input (t-pro input (t-1)	0.984	0.123	0.897
pro input (t-1)	0.000	2.327	0.000	constant	1.731	0.659	0.009	constant	1.602	0.315	0.000
constant	0.602	0.327	0.065								
n total: 560, n zero obs.: 262				n total: 560, n zero obs.: 501				n total: 560, n zero obs.: 488			
Vuong: z=5.37, Pr>z=0.000				Vuong: z=1.4, Pr>z=0.081				Vuong: z=1.88, Pr>z=0.030			

Naturalization


dependent variable: news media				dependent variable: media input							
news media	robust			contra camp	robust			pro camp	robust		
	ratio	s.e.	p		ratio	s.e.	p		ratio	s.e.	p
count model (frequency)				count model (frequency)				count model (frequency)			
media (t-1)	1.008	0.012	0.515	media (t-1)	0.961	0.014	0.008	media (t-1)	0.908	0.047	0.061
contra (t-1)	1.044	0.013	0.001	contra (t-1)	0.987	0.011	0.276	contra (t-1)			
pro (t-1)	1.054	0.034	0.095	pro (t-1)				pro (t-1)	0.865	0.166	0.450
rule-of-law	3.010	0.656	0.000	rule-of-law	8.010	3.093	0.000	rule-of-law	2.626	0.638	0.000
people-final-say	2.541	0.495	0.000	people-final-say	3.351	1.084	0.000	people-final-say	7.684	2.299	0.000
mass naturalization	2.187	0.428	0.000	mass naturalization	3.653	0.877	0.000	mass naturalization	1.804	0.496	0.032
inflation model (absence)				inflation model (absence)				inflation model (absence)			
media (t-1)	0.115	0.998	0.032	media (t-1)	0.982	0.021	0.397	media (t-1)	0.631	0.555	0.407
contra (t-1)	0.003	22.091	0.789	contra (t-1)	0.950	0.080	0.516	contra (t-1)			
pro (t-1)	0.226	0.732	0.042	pro (t-1)				pro (t-1)	0.000	1.338	0.000
constant	1.774	0.298	0.000	constant	1.712	0.574	0.001	constant	1.865	0.976	0.056
n total: 364, n zero obs.: 203				n total: 364, n zero obs.: 308				n total: 364, n zero obs.: 343			
Vuong: z = 6.87, Pr>z=0.000				Vuong: z = 2.12, Pr>z=0.017				Vuong: z = 2.13, Pr>z=0.017			

Corporation Tax

dependent variable: news media				dependent variable: media input							
news media		robust		contra camp		robust		pro camp		robust	
	ratio	s.e.	p		Ratio	s.e.	p		ratio	s.e.	p
count model (frequency)				count model (frequency)				count model (frequency)			
media (t-1)	1.010	0.009	0.271	media (t-1)	0.981	0.009	0.040	media (t-1)	0.981	0.016	0.258
contra input (t-1)	1.095	0.025	0.000	contra input (t-1)	0.781	0.066	0.003	contra input (t-1)			
pro input (t-1)	1.083	0.036	0.015	pro input (t-1)				pro input (t-1)	0.603	0.061	0.000
tax equity	4.931	0.981	0.000	tax equity	4.872	2.619	0.003	tax equity	0.815	0.273	0.541
tax-loss	2.789	0.521	0.000	tax-loss	2.631	1.489	0.087	tax-loss	0.537	0.195	0.088
SME	3.525	0.635	0.000	SME	0.652	0.410	0.497	SME	3.188	0.468	0.000
competitiveness	3.816	0.558	0.000	competitiveness	0.986	0.616	0.983	competitiveness	1.467	0.230	0.015
inflation model (absence)				inflation model (absence)				inflation model (absence)			
media (t-1)	0.166	0.529	0.001	media (t-1)	0.288	0.455	0.006	media (t-1)	0.932	0.030	0.018
contra input (t-1)	0.712	0.237	0.152	contra input (t-1)	0.866	0.275	0.599	contra input (t-1)			
pro input (t-1)	0.891	0.067	0.082	pro input (t-1)				pro input (t-1)	0.605	0.683	0.462
constant	1.044	0.287	0.000	constant	2.102	0.667	0.002	constant	1.734	0.362	0.000
n total: 445, n zero obs.: 246				n total:445, n zero obs.: 395				n total: 445, n zero obs.: 380			
Vuong: z = 5.92, Pr>z=0.000				Vuong: z = 3.5, Pr>z=0.000				Vuong: z = 2.61, Pr>z=0.000			

However, in the corporation tax reform, there are hints that it might also have worked the other way round, i.e. that there is an influence of the media frames on the promoted frames in the media input: The two ratios (0.224, 0.934) in the inflation model (absence) on the right-hand side of Table 7.2 are significant. In the following, we investigate these two cases of the corporation tax reform campaign. For the examination, only the smaller counts in the news media are relevant since 90 percent of the counts in the news media are smaller than or equal to 11 (Figure 7.2).

Figure 7.2: Histogram of the News Media Counts in the Corporation Tax Reform



Figures 7.3 and 7.4 reveal that the frames in the news media probably influenced the media input frames by the *contra* camp, whereas in the case of the *pro* camp, the influence of the news media was not important. The line shows the probabilities of a zero count in the media input dependent on the number of frames in the news media. For each frame, a graph is presented. Figure 7.3 investigates the effect on the frame counts of the *contra* camp. The graphs show that a small number of news media frames bring about a remarkable drop in the probability of a zero count in the media input. This means that the news media significantly and strikingly increases the probability that a frame is used in the media input on the next day. As the upper left graph shows, this is most valid for the tax equity frame, where the corresponding probability increases by more than 0.3. As we already know from chapter 5, the Social

Democrats reacted to the UBS subprime crises. They claimed that stockholders with controlling shares, such as Ospel, who was the president of the board of directors at UBS AG, would also benefit from the tax reform (tax equity).

Figure 7.3: Probability of Zero Counts in the Media Input (t) of the Contra Camp

Corporation Tax





Figure 7.4 examines the effect on the promoted frames of the *pro* camp. There is no similar drop. In the case of the *pro* camp, the predicted decrease in the zero probability is only around 0.1. In summary, the data support the idea that the promoted frames in the media input influence the news media frames, whereas the news media influenced the promoted frames only in the case of the *contra* camp in the exceptional case of the corporation tax reform.


Figure 7.4: Probability of Zero Counts in the Media Input (t) of the Pro Camp**Corporation Tax**

In both count and inflation Model, the lagged dependent variable (media (t-1)) controls for serial correlation. The significant ratio in the inflation model (absence) is smaller than one, which means that the frames in the news media reduce the probability of a zero count on the following day. In other words, the media also writes about the campaign independently of the explicit input of the two camps. It has *established its own routines* for how to deal with a direct-democratic campaign. As is shown by the panels in Figure 7.5, which present the daily development of the media coverage of the two camps, these routines imply that there is a “critical period” of press coverage towards the end of the campaign, when the citizens have received their voting material and are doing their voting (mainly by mail). For the asylum law, and to a lesser extent also for the tax reform, there is also a first “critical period” at the


beginning, when the Swiss media presents the basic issues of the campaign and the contrasting positions of the two camps. Furthermore, *external events* structure the debate. In the asylum law campaign, summer holidays bring a reduction of media coverage in the middle of the campaign (weeks 9–6). In the naturalization initiative, the first 100 days of Eveline Widmer-Schlumpf in office as a minister clearly structured the campaign. Only when this first 100 days had passed in the 8th week before the vote did the campaign and media coverage about this issue start. In the case of the corporate tax reform, the campaign did not begin until after the Christmas break.

Figure 7.5: The Development of the Campaign on a Weekly Basis – by Camp and Campaign: Absolute Counts of Substantive Frames


Asylum



Naturalization



Corporation Tax



Power of the Political Actor, Salience of the Frames in the Media Input and the Role of the Minister

Power is expected to be relevant for frame absence/presence because powerful actors have preferential access to the media (Danielian and Page 1994). A frame needs powerful actors in order not to be ignored. Weak political actors can make a great effort and provide many arguments; they still will not get standing in the media because they are weak and their frames will remain absent in the debate. Thus, the power of the actor promoting a frame, and not the salience of a frame in the media input is crucial for frame absence/presence. Minister status is not responsible for frame absence/presence either, because many powerful actors other than ministers promote their frames and find standing. We expect that access to the media in direct-democratic campaigns is not restricted to ministers but to powerful actors in general. By contrast, the salience of the promoted frame and the involvement of the minister are expected to become relevant for the frequency with which a frame appears in the media. First, in line with the mirror approach, the media are assumed to report the frames proportionally to the degree to which they are promoted. The more a frame is promoted, i.e. the more salient it is in the media input, the more the media will report it the next day – under the condition that a powerful actor is promoting it. In addition, such prominent actors as the minister responsible

for the issue can be expected to get disproportionately high standing. They have an advantage that does not hold for powerful actors in general (for a discussion of which key factors belong to which part of the model see Hänggli 2011a).

We test the same model for news media framing as before (the left hand side of the previous tables), but, given my hypotheses, we now use the daily power of the two sides (and no longer their media input) for the explanation of their absence/presence in the media in the inflation model (but not for frame frequency in the count model), and we add a dummy indicator for the presence of the minister responsible for the campaign for the explanation of frame frequency. The sum of daily power corresponds to the total amount of power of the actors' who promote a given camp on a certain day. For example, two actors of the pro camp hold a media conference together while no other actor of their camp is active on this day. Actor A is a powerful actor who scores 86 on the power measure, whereas actor B reaches only a score of 18. Together, they arrive at 104 points, the sum of daily power of the pro camp. Alternatively, one could have used the mean or median of the power of the actors involved. The results show little change if we operationalize power differently.

The results are presented in Table 7.3. First, let us look at the lower part of Table 7.3 (Inflation Model). The lagged dependent variable (media (t-1)) controls for serial correlation and for continuing frame attention in the dependent variable. All power ratios are smaller than one. This means that power reduces the probability that a frame is absent in the news media. In other words, the greater the power of the actors presenting the arguments of a given camp on a given day, the higher the chance that their argument will be covered in the media on the next day. However, the corresponding ratios are not always significant. Thus, in the asylum law campaign, power has no significant impact on frame presence or absence in the media. This result meets my expectation that in familiar issues, access to the public debate is less restricted to powerful actors as it is in less familiar cases.

Table 7.3: Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Regression of Media Framing: Ratios, Robust Standard Errors and p-Levels

Asylum	robust			Naturalization	robust			Corporation Tax	robust		
	ratio	s.e.	p		ratio	s.e.	p		ratio	s.e.	p
count model (frequency)				count model (frequency)				count model (frequency)			
media (t-1)	1.019	0.018	0.294	media (t-1)	1.008	0.013	0.528	media (t-1)	1.007	0.008	0.380
contra input (t-1)	1.033	0.014	0.015	contra (t-1)	1.032	0.006	0.000	contra input (t-1)	1.082	0.017	0.000
pro input (t-1)	1.010	0.097	0.916	pro (t-1)	1.059	0.038	0.074	pro input (t-1)	1.059	0.025	0.015
minister (t-1)	2.043	1.062	0.169	minister (t-1)	3.038	0.747	0.005	minister (t-1)	4.290	1.345	0.000
human. trad.	0.956	0.129	0.737	rule-of-law	3.572	0.690	0.000	tax equity	5.102	1.017	0.000
rule-of-law	0.401	0.066	0.000					tax loss	2.802	0.561	0.000
abuse	0.931	0.114	0.563	people-final-say	2.928	0.496	0.000	SME	3.780	0.641	0.000
efficacy	0.477	0.065	0.000	mass naturalization	2.421	0.412	0.000	competitiveness	3.875	0.596	0.000
inflation model (absence)				inflation model (absence)				inflation model (absence)			
media (t-1)	0.308	0.905	0.193	media (t-1)	0.106	0.642	0.002	media (t-1)	0.183	0.614	0.006
power contra (t-1)	0.851	0.235	0.490	power contra (t-1)	0.000	0.832	0.004	power contra (t-1)	0.863	0.087	0.092
power pro (t-1)	0.953	0.161	0.763	power pro (t-1)	0.944	0.015	0.118	power pro (t-1)	0.980	0.013	0.120
constant	0.749	0.356	0.035	constant	1.971	0.335	0.000	constant	0.980	0.310	0.000
n total: 560, n zero obs.: 262				n total: 364, n zero obs.: 203				n total: 445, n zero obs.: 246			
Vuong: z=5.70, Pr>z=0.000				Vuong: z=6.14, Pr>z=0.000				Vuong: z=6.49, Pr>z=0.000			

In the naturalization initiative, the power of the contra camp is highly significant while the power of the pro camp is not. There are two reasons for the insignificance: First of all, only two actors were involved on the pro side. One of them produced 75 percent of all frames, which means that there is almost no variation in the power variable. In addition, the pro camp only promoted few arguments, i.e. 94 percent of the counts are zero counts, because for most of the time, no frame was promoted. The small number of cases reduces the significance. In the corporate tax reform, the effects of power are also somewhat limited: powerful actors of the pro camp could not significantly decrease the absence of their frames, whereas power was significant for the contra camp at the 0.10-level only. It is surprising that the power of the pro camp is not more significant, because the most powerful and resource-rich interest group, *economiesuisse*, was the leading house of the pro-committee and was heavily involved in this campaign. There are three reasons which may explain this unexpected finding. First, *economiesuisse* was evaluated as the most powerful actor in the campaign. It gave the money, pulled the strings and led the campaign. However, as we have already observed, it preferred to stay in the background and turn the spotlight onto the political parties with whom it formed a coalition. Its influence on the media is, therefore, underestimated because it was mainly an indirect one, via its political party allies. The model, however, does not account for indirect effects. If we re-estimate the model and try to take this indirect influence into account by assigning the power value of *economiesuisse* to the allied political parties or by lumping *economiesuisse* and its party allies together to form one single actors, the corresponding effect becomes significant at the 0.10 level. Second, *economiesuisse* and the ad hoc pro committee were no longer proactive with press releases and press conferences in the last six weeks. In this last phase, they had planned to concentrate on political advertisements. Moreover, with its three reactions to the press conferences of the Social Democrats, the ad hoc committee could not garner any attention.

Third, the argumentation of the Social Democrats – who were in charge of the contra-committee during the campaign – resonated well with external events happening at the same time (chapter 5). The Social Democrats mainly argued that the tax cuts were an unfair privilege for the well-off and went against the principle of fair taxation (tax equity). Towards the end of the campaign, as mentioned above, they linked their argumentation to the subprime crisis of the UBS and to its president of the board, Marcel Ospel, by claiming that such rich managers as Mr. Ospel would primarily benefit from the corporate tax reform. These events possibly gave support to the tax equity frame and, ultimately, may have convinced undecided voters and helped to explain why the vote unexpectedly (see chapter 2) became so close. This case does not support the idea that power is more important in complex issues, indicating the need for further research.

Next, let us look at the upper part of Table 7.3, the Count Model (frequency). Overall, the lagged number of promoted frames and the lagged minister dummy significantly increase the daily frequency of the frame in the news media. The results are quite robust (not shown here). There is variation between the camps with regard to the specific campaigns. In the *asylum law*, the contra camp significantly influenced the daily frequency of the news media frames, while the pro camp remained without influence. This makes sense for several reasons. First, the economic interest groups remained more or less uninvolved. Second, the centre parties, which belonged to the pro camp, led a half-hearted campaign and preferred to stay invisible, whereas the right-wing party was more active with political advertisements (chapter 5). Third, the pro camp was active indirectly through the responsible minister, who had been a member of the right-wing party. The minister officially wanted to keep a low-profile campaign. He refused, for instance, to participate in the most important TV debate on Swiss German television. The influence of the minister is probably underestimated in this campaign because he was very active unofficially (not included in media input). He gave several speeches at public meetings of the right-wing party. Since these speeches were unofficial we were un-

able to include them in our analysis and they are neither part of the minister dummy nor part of the pro camp indicator. In the *naturalization* initiative, the number of promoted frames by the contra camp was significant, whereas the promoted frames of the pro camp is significant only at the 0.10 level. The pro camp invested a lot of money in political advertisements (chapter 5) and was less active with media input. Finally, the minister dummy is also significant at the 0.05 level in this campaign. In the *corporate* tax reform, the number of promoted frames of both camps and the minister dummy significantly increase the frequency of the news media frames on the next day. The regression results support the salience and the multiplication hypothesis, which state that the number of promoted frames is crucial and the input by the minister is amplified by the news media. The results suggest that the minister plays a particularly important role in complex issues (most significant).

The multiplication effect of the minister's frame is explored in Table 7.4. It is compared with the multiplication effect of the frames of the other actor types of both camps. The table shows the average number of arguments in the news media as a function of the input by different actor types on both sides on the previous day. For instance, in the asylum law campaign, the pro camp was reported 6.2 (top left number) times with the humanitarian tradition frame when the minister had promoted this frame on the previous day. By contrast, the media offered the same frame only 1.5 times when the political parties of the pro camp used it on the previous day or 2.5 times when the citizens' interest groups of the pro camp did the same. When none of the actor types of this camp promoted the frame the day before, the media reported this frame 1.1 times. Compared to other actor types, Table 7.4 reveals that the *minister* (=authorities) meets with the largest response in the asylum law and in the corporation tax reform²⁰. The multiplication effect of the minister is larger in the corporation tax reform than

²⁰ In contrast to Table 7.3, it was possible to include the informal speeches of the minister in the asylum law. Thus, it is not surprising that the minister is so important.

in the asylum law. Both results are in line with the results of Table 7.3. They give support to the ideas that the media multiply the frames used by the minister the most and that the minister is especially influential in complex issues. Compared to the other actor types, the input of the minister was less important in the naturalization initiative. In this campaign, all other actor types of the contra camp reached a higher multiplication effect than the minister. Possibly, the minister is less important in initiatives than in referenda since the initiatives occur at the beginning of the decision-making process and the government and its administration are uninvolved in the policy proposal. Since we did not include other actor types in Table 7.3, we cannot compare the influence of different actor types based on the count model. Nevertheless, the power ratio of the contra camp in the inflation model indicates the same result: It is close to zero which means that – though it is significant – it has almost no effect.

Compared to the number of arguments found in the media input and in the news media in Table 7.1, the small multiplication effects of the pro camp in the naturalization initiative is surprising. We find more than 6 times as many arguments in the news media than in the media input (Table 7.1). This is more than in all other cases and, accordingly, the multiplication effect should have been highest in this case. More detailed analyses reveal four reasons for this finding: First, the initiative text often only consists of a sentence or two. It is sufficiently short that the media referred to it together with a short statement from the launching political actor without any media input from the initiator. Second, the hype surrounding the conflict between Blocher, the populist right-wing party (SVP) and Widmer-Schlumpf also provided the pro camp with media attention. New developments in the conflict were eagerly awaited by the journalists and gave the pro camp opportunities to speak about the initiative in the interviews. In addition, there was the most important TV debate (Arena) in which Blocher and Widmer-Schlumpf participated and which was covered and discussed by the news media very

prominently. Fourth, the pro camp also garnered media attention with its aggressive poster, which is not part of the media input. According to the Swiss Commission against Racism, it was even a racist poster.

Table 7.4: The Media Frames, With Input by the Different Actor Types on Either Side: Average Number of Frames per Day

	core argument contra	2 nd argument contra	core argument pro	2 nd argument pro
Asylum	human. trad.	rule-of-law	abuse	efficacy
pro				
authorities	6.2	0.7	8.3	3.5
pol. parties	1.5	0.3	6.5	2.4
citizens' int. groups	2.5	-	5.5	-
without input	1.1	0.5	1.9	1.0
contra				
ad hoc committees	10.0	1.3	6.6	3.3
citizens' int. groups	6.0	1.5	3.7	4.0
econ. int. groups	5.0	1.5	4.0	-
pol. parties	1.7	1.5	2.0	0.7
without input	4.5	1.4	2.4	1.1
Naturalization	rule-of-law		people final say	mass naturalization
pro				
pol. parties	3.3		4.3	4.1
ad hoc committees	3.0		2.0	-
without input	1.9		3.3	2.4
contra				
pol. parties	18.6		11.3	9.7
econ. int. groups	18.8		8.5	5.5
citizens' int. groups	16.2		7.2	4.8
authorities	14.9		6.4	5.1
without input	5.0		1.9	1.2
Corporation Tax	tax equity	tax loss	SME	competitiveness
pro				
authorities	8.3	7.0	12.3	11.8
econ. int. groups	6.7	1.0	10.4	7.2
pol. parties	6.8	6.0	8.8	5.7
without input	1.4	0.9	2.9	2.8
contra				
pol. parties	14.4	3.2	3.0	1.3
econ. int. groups	12.5	10.7	3.0	1.4
citizens' int. groups	4.5	2.0	-	1.4
without input	4.5	1.4	1.0	1.1

Note: In the asylum law campaign, the economic interest groups of the pro camp are not shown because they were not very active with media input. The same is true for the ad hoc committee of the contra camp in the naturalization initiative.

Table 7.5 shows the predicted change in the news media counts depending on a change from the minimum to the maximum value in the key factors. We can see that the counts are most sensitive to the media input of the two camps and the minister's presence, whereas the predicted change based on a change of power is relatively small.

Table 7.5: Predicted Change in the News Media Counts

Asylum	Naturalization	Corporation Tax	change in ...
3	7	6	power contra (t-1)
1	0	1	power pro (t-1)
29	83	65	contra input (t-1)
1	9	30	pro input (t-1)
6	16	19	minister (t-1)
7	668	148	cumulative effect: minister (t-1) + contra input (t-1) / pro input (t-1)

Note: The predicted change is based on a change in the key factors from the minimal to the maximal value. The remaining variables were set at the mean or at zero (minister (t-1)), and the main frame of the respective camp was used.

Conclusion

The direct-democratic campaigns in Switzerland are a contest of thematic framing, a clash of arguments which, in the final analysis, allows the voters to evaluate the merits of alternative ways of framing an issue. Just as it is argued by Sniderman and Theriault (2004: 158), in real-life politics, “opposing camps campaign on behalf of competing ways of understanding what is at issue”. My analysis confirms that the input of the political actors plays a decisive role in Swiss direct-democratic campaigns. It is the political actors who introduce the most important frames into the public discourse.

With regard to the “Substantive Emphasis Choice”, we find that the political actors tend to emphasize their own frames and that the framing input of the political actors was decisive (channel hypothesis). The media tended to respect frame ownership and reported accordingly. With regard to the “Oppositional Emphasis Choice”, we can summarize that while the political actors did indeed focus predominantly on their own frames, they did not do so exclusively, but referred to their adversaries' frames as well. They did so mainly in a defensive

way, however, relying more on counter-framing than on trespassing. The journalists also reported both camps with their adversaries' frames, and attributed a slightly more offensive stance to both camps. With regard to the "Contest Emphasis Choice", we saw that the political actors mainly focused on substance, i.e. they mainly relied on substantive framing. The substantive frames also dominated in the media. However, the journalists gave more emphasis to conflicts than the political actors.

The results support also the salience, power bias and multiplication hypotheses. With regard to the daily frame *absence/presence* (Inflation Model), the campaign-specific power of a political actor is important, whereas the number of promoted frames and the minister play an influential role for the daily frame *frequency* (count model). It can be shown that power was not important in the case of the familiar issue (asylum law), but further research is needed to determine the relative importance of power in complex issues. The minister's influence is highest in the case of the complex issue (corporate tax). Finally, external events can moderate the influence of frame building.

The question is what the results imply for the quality of direct-democratic debates and for the question of the manipulability of the outcome of direct-democratic votes. We find that the minister (=Federal Councilor) plays an important role. The Swiss political elites are somewhat uneasy with this important role of the authorities in direct-democratic campaigns (Kriesi 2009): According to an informal, traditional conception, the minister is expected to exercise his or her campaigning role with a certain restraint. While entitled to provide the voters with a balanced diet of information, the authorities should leave the opinion formation in the general public primarily to civil society, the social and political forces of the country. This low-key approach of government is not confirmed in the study at hand. We find that the minister is very influential in the frame building process in direct-democratic campaigns. The view that the government's task is to govern would be more adequate. In a direct-democratic campaign,

this means that the government is responsible for the quality of the debate. The best way to guarantee the quality of direct-democratic campaigns is not to prevent the government from defending its position, but to guarantee that the competition of frames is not suppressed by the preponderance of any actor during the campaign – be it the government or some actor from civil society.

The results give rise to optimism with regard to the question of manipulability of the outcome. Even though power of the political actors is helpful for being present with a frame, it does not help in also being predominant with it. In addition, three or four rival frames with the respective counter-frames were supplied by the political actors and found in the media in all three campaigns. Thus, the voters can evaluate the merits of three or four alternative ways of framing an issue and there is no single dominant perspective. Finally, even though the corporate tax reform campaign has been the most one-sidedly dominant campaign in terms of financial resources of all campaigns since the beginning of the 1980s, *economiesuisse* (the leading house of the pro-side in this campaign) was not able to dominate with its frame in the public debate, despite all of its money.

8

Framing Effects

In order to gauge the effects of the frames in communication on the frames in thought, I investigate first the strength of frames. The extent to which a frame influences other elites is defined as the strength of a frame in communication, whereas the strength of a frame in thought is measured through the frame relevance for the vote decision. The question that arises is whether the same frames are strong in both communication and in thought. Even more important is the question of whether this relationship is causal. Do the strong frames in communication cause the frames in thought to become strong? The purpose of this chapter is to answer these questions. Finally, I will look at the relative importance of the frames in thought for the vote decision in comparison to the partisan heuristic. I will be able to show that the same frames are strong in both communication and in thought. In the asylum law and in the corporation tax reform, the core frames in communication even caused the frames in thought to become stronger over time (framing effect). Furthermore, frames in thought are also important when controlling for the partisan-based path of opinion formation.

Strength of Frames in Communication

I will begin by introducing a measure for the strength of frames in communication. This is relevant for several reasons. First, the measure provides a tool for addressing the strength of frames resulting from frame building. We know from chapter 1 that the strategic actors search for a frame that they believe has the capacity to become a strong substantive frame. So far, however, I have not addressed this concept. Second, an understanding about the strength of frames in communication can possibly help to make experiments about framing effects more realistic. If we are aware of the strength of frames in communication in the real world, we can employ the same strength in experiments. Third, such a measure might also contribute to identify the factors that make a frame in thought strong (Chong and Druckman 2007c: 116). It appears evident that the strength of frames in communication is linked to the strength of frames in thought. However, as long as we do not know the strength of a frame in communication, it is also impossible to gauge the extent to which frames in communication and frames in thought are linked.

As introduced in chapter 1, a frame in communication is “the key consideration emphasized in a speech act” (Chong and Druckman 2007c: 106). It “organizes everyday reality” (Tuchman 1978: 193) by providing “meaning to an unfolding strip of events” (Gamson and Modigliani 1987: 143, 1989). Media frames constitute particular frames in communication that are characterized by the fact that the information is provided by the media. Frames in communication are more comprehensive; they also include information presented by campaigners or politicians, i.e. the frames promoted in media input. Accordingly, I have defined a *strong* frame in communication as a frame that *provokes a defensive reaction* by the opponents and/or that resonates in the media (chapter 1). This conceptualization of strength is based on Koopmans’ idea that resonant or provocative messages travel further (Koopmans 2004: 374).

Two characteristics of *frames in communication* have proved to be particularly important in influencing strength: credibility of source and cultural congruence of frame content (Chong and Druckman 2007b: 100). As far as *credibility* of the source is concerned, the theory of *issue ownership* states that the advantage of certain actors on a given issue arises from the reputations they have developed for effective issue-specific policy making, which is created by the accumulated historical evidence of the actors' activities related to the issues in question. As Scammell (1999: 729) observes: "Reputation, based on record and credible promises, is the only thing of substance that a party can promote to potential voters". With respect to *congruence with central cultural themes*, Entman (2004: 14) maintains that the most inherently powerful frames are those that are "fully congruent with schemas habitually used by most members of society". Moreover, Entman (2004) claims that ambiguous contested matters are more difficult to frame, and that frames incongruent with dominant schemas are blocked from spreading by common culture. Gamson (1992: 135) and Wolfsfeld (1997: 32) make similar points in discussing the concept of "cultural resonance". Frames that employ more culturally resonant terms have a greater potential for influence. Snow and Benford (1988: 210) refer to the concept of "narrative fidelity". Some frames, they write, "resonate with cultural narrations, that is, with stories, myths, and folk tales that are part and parcel of one's cultural heritage". Thus, cultural congruence, or narrative fidelity, increase the appeals of a frame by making them appear natural and familiar. Furthermore, the strength of frames in communication might vary depending on the issue. I suggest that the complexity of an issue might weaken a frame, since complexity handicaps campaign dialogue. Political actors might have to explain more what the issue at stake is about before they can discuss each other's frames. Finally, the numbers of main frames discussed per issue probably also reduces the strength of the frames in communication.

Strength of Frames in Thought

Traditionally, a strong frame has been applied to frames in thought and has been defined as a frame that is persuasive or *applicable* (Druckman 2009: 25). “Strong frames are those that emerge from public discussion as the best rationales for contending positions on the issue” (Chong and Druckman 2007c: 116). Frames in thought, also called *individual frames*, are “internal structures of the mind” (Kinder and Sanders 1990: 74). A person who reads a media frame might add some personal experience, forge links that are not explicitly made in the text or use another individual cognitive device to make sense of the political news. In other words, a frame in thought is the individual’s cognitive understanding of a given situation (Goffman 1974). The precondition for a frame in thought to become strong (=applicable) is that it is *accessible* (= one is exposed to this frame) and *available* (=understandable) (Druckman 2009). Accessibility implies conscious information processing.

Ultimately, frame building is only relevant when frames evolving from the construction, promotion and mediation processes have an impact on opinion formation. In direct-democratic campaigns, it is probable that the strong frames in communication achieve the precondition for strong frames in thought: The frames of direct-democratic campaigns are expected to be accessible because they are highly present in the media. They are also expected to be available since they are strategically chosen by the campaigners. The campaigners are well experienced: They typically have a good understanding of the citizen’s cognitive capacity and choose their frames accordingly. In addition, the media are not interested in transporting messages which cannot be understood by their readers. I also suggest that they do not merely reach the precondition of a strong frame in thought, but really become applicable. My first hypothesis (H1) is as follows: In direct-democratic campaigns, strong frames in communication are also strong frames in thought.

Framing Effects

Most importantly, I wish to ascertain whether the link between frames in communication and in thought is causal. When a frame in communication affects an individual's frame in thought, i.e. their cognitive understanding of a given situation and/or their opinion, it is called a *framing effect* (Druckman 2001). In direct-democratic campaigns, I expect the frames in communication to have a causal effect on the frames in thought (H2). The campaigns allow causal inferences to be drawn about direct-democratic campaign effects because they imply the intensification of flow in frame communication. A number of studies identify moderator variables of framing effects such as frame competition, predispositions, citizen deliberation, political information, and source credibility (Druckman 2001: 241). The first two factors seem to be the most relevant ones: First, framing competition is most relevant because the public debate among political elites is the "key engine driving the citizens' voting choices" (Kriesi 2005: 202). Second, the predispositions are conceived as the "clearest limit on framing effects" (Chong and Druckman 2007c: 111). In the rest of this chapter, I will thus concentrate on these.

I will treat these moderating factors as control variables because I am interested in the overall framing effect, when controlling for these factors. In other words, all variables have a direct effect on the vote intention. I am particularly interested in the importance of the frame-based path in comparison to the partisan-based path. Such a comparison is possible only if both paths are modeled as independent variables and used simultaneously. First, I will control for competition between different frames. Sniderman and Theriault (2004) find that people exposed to several frames are less prone to a framing effect (see also Chong and Druckman 2007b). Second, predispositions are also controlled for in the model. Voters might compare the information contained in a frame with their own predispositions and reject frames which contradict their predispositions (e.g. Shen and Edwards 2005). There are general and issue-

specific predispositions. According to the dual-process theories in social psychology (Chaiken and Trop 1999, Eagly and Chaiken 1993), the general predisposition, i.e. the partisan preference, is very important. This approach distinguishes between two paths of individual opinion formation process: the frame-based (=systematic) path and the heuristic path. The main distinction between the two is based on the role played by frames. In systematic opinion formation, frames are important for the voting decision. It also entails conscious thinking and personal involvement (i.e. motivation and ability), increasing the usage of the frame-based path (Druckman and Nelson 2003, Slothuus 2008). Empirical tests of the impact of frame-based reasoning on the voters' decision are scarce, although Kriesi's study (2005) is groundbreaking in this regard. His results show that frame-based voting is reinforced by two key campaign characteristics – intense campaigns preceding the vote and familiar projects. Intense campaigns increase frame-based voting because they reduce information hurdles for the voters (accessibility) and motivate voters to assess conflicting arguments (i.e. assess their applicability) (see Chong and Druckman 2007b). Familiarity of an issue increases the use of the frame-based path because it makes arguments easier to comprehend (availability). A framing effect takes this frame-based path.

In contrast to the frame-based path of opinion formation, heuristic opinion formation is based on heuristic shortcuts. Partisan heuristic is a very important heuristic shortcut in direct-democratic campaigns (Kriesi 2005: 168). It means that voters follow the recommendation made by the partisan elites without necessarily paying attention to frames; it is their partisan preference which influences their voting choice (e.g. Slothuus forthcoming). Indeed, voters might even change their voting position and bring it in line with their favorite party's position in order to be consistent. Several terms are used to describe this behavior, such as rationalization (Jacoby 1988), projection (Iyengar and Kinder 1987), persuasion (Brody and Page 1972), and issue opinion change (Lenz 2009). In all of these cases, the heuristic path dominates the frame-based (=systematic) path. Kriesi (2005: 222) claims that in direct-democratic

campaigns, the frame-based path is more important than the heuristic path. In accordance with his findings, I expect the frame-based path to be important in direct-democratic votes, even when controlling for and in comparison to the partisan-based path (H3).

Besides the general predisposition, there is the *issue-specific* predisposition (issue-specific value, attitude or policy core belief). This predisposition is linked to the substantive content of the specific choice at hand such as, for instance, the xenophobic predisposition in immigration issues. Typically, partisan and issue-specific orientations tend to be consistently aligned in the individual's mind, but this need not always be the case. To the extent that voters are aware of a mismatch between their partisan and their issue-specific orientations, they are likely to be ambivalent with respect to their voting choice (Alvarez and Brehm 1995, 2002, Rudolph 2005, Steenbergen and Brewer 2004, Selb et al. 2009, Kriesi 2010b). In this case, the voter has some grounds to favor the policy and other grounds to oppose it. As Steenbergen and Brewer (2004) point out, most people probably do not care about conflicting predispositions, until they realize that they imply different meanings for their position on a particular policy. Campaigns, being rich in information, are likely to draw people's attention to such conflicting predispositions, and open the possibility for exploiting them. Thus, it is important to control not only for predispositions but also for ambivalence. Since I generally expect different effects for the initially undecided voters (Kriesi 2010b), I will also include control variables for these voters.

In the following, I will discuss methods and then investigate the strength of the frames in communication and in thought. I will first present the results for strength of frames in communication. Second, I will compare my measure of strength of frames in communication with the evaluation by the campaigners. Third, I shall compare it to the commonly used measure of a strong frame, i.e. the strength of frames in thought. Fourth, I will investigate the extent to which the strength of frames in thought increase over time (framing effect). In order

to gauge the strength of frames and the framing effects, I will control for competition among the frames, partisan orientation (i.e. the voters' general predisposition), issue-specific orientation (i.e. the voters' predisposition linked to the substantive content of the specific choice at hand), ambivalence and indecision. Fifth, I will explore the relative importance of the frame-based (=systematic) path of opinion formation process in comparison to the partisan-based (=heuristic) path.

Operationalization and Methods

The strength of the frames in communication is operationalized by the opponents' defensive reactions with respect to a given frame, i.e. by the shares of the opponents' counterarguments, averaged across the frames in the media input and the media frames (Hänggli and Kriesi 2010). This means that trespassing (= offensive use of opponents' substantive frames) is not part of my measure of strength. I believe that trespassing is an attempt to "steal" the frame of the opponent by using the same argument and taking the same position as one's adversary. I consider that a frame which can be stolen is not a strong frame. To provide an example for the calculation: The pro camp counter-framed (=defensive use of the argument) the humanitarian tradition frame with a share of 20.3 in the media input and attained a news media share of 12.6 percent with it (Table 7.1). The average of the two numbers is 16.5 percent, i.e. the strength of this frame. I take the average because it is more intuitive. In such a way, the maximum is 100 percent, which would indicate that the actor defensively speaks only about his or her opponents' frame. The minimum is 0 percent.

Empirically, the strength of frames in thought is usually established by asking individuals to rate the persuasiveness of various frames in communication, on a particular issue.

Since this measure is not at my disposal, I will use the respondents' position²¹ on the different frames and measure the impact the position has on the voting choice. The stronger the corresponding effect, the more important the frame, i.e. the stronger the corresponding frame in thought. I will speak of a framing effect if there is a *significant increase* in the strength of a frame in thought over time. Thus, the strength of frames in thought is measured at a certain point in time, whereas the framing effect refers to the significant increase over time.

The variable to be explained in the models corresponds to the vote intention prior to the vote and to the vote choice after the vote. Vote choice and vote intention will not be distinguished from one another in the following. This variable distinguishes the supporters of the propositions (coded as 1) from both their opponents and the undecided voters (coded as 0)²². For the group of the initially undecided voters, a dummy variable is introduced that takes into account the effects attributable to this group. It takes the value of 1 for those who were undecided at the beginning of the campaign, and 0 otherwise. The voting choice will be estimated based on the position of the different frames, controlling for frame competition, partisan and issue preference, ambivalence, and indecision. Frame competition is controlled for by using different frames at one and the same time. The model makes full use of the panel structure of the data.

Besides the effects of the frames, there are three control variables in the model: one each for the two key predispositions and one for ambivalence. It is important to note that the two predispositions were measured only once, at the beginning of the campaign. Following Tillie (1995) and Van der Eijk et al. (2006), the partisan predispositions are operationalized on the basis of propensity scores, i.e. of a set of questions asking the respondents to indicate

²¹ The specific questionnaire item reads as follows (for the humanitarian tradition frame, for example): "On a scale from 0 (completely disagree) to 5 (completely agree), how much do you agree with the argument: The humanitarian tradition must be maintained?"

²² For the vote intentions, the specific questionnaire item reads as follows: "If there were a ballot tomorrow, would you be strongly in favor, rather in favor, rather against or strongly against the toughening of the asylum law?" Being (strongly or rather) in favor of the proposition is coded as 1, and being undecided or (rather or strongly) against as 0. For the reported vote, the questionnaire item reads: "How did you vote? Did you agree with or reject the asylum law?" Again, agreement is coded as 1 and non-decision and rejection as 0.

how likely it is that they will ever vote for each of the five major Swiss parties. The responses range from “will never vote for this party” (score 0) to “will certainly vote for this party at some time in the future” (score 10). Based on this information, both parties and voters were mapped onto a single latent continuum using a non-parametric multiple unidimensional unfolding technique (see Coombs 1964, Van Schuur 1993). Using voters’ preference orderings among parties, non-parametric unfolding models rank both parties and voters on a latent dimension.²³ Subsequently, the party ordering can be tested against the null hypothesis that the parties are not represented along the latent scale in terms of their rank in the unfoldable order. The unfolding model unveils a rank ordering of the five parties from left to right, which matches conventional agreement (GPS, SPS, CVP, FDP, and SVP) and corresponds to the assumption of unidimensionality for all three campaigns.

The measure for the issue-specific predisposition depends on the type of proposition. Xenophobia, the issue-specific predispositions for the asylum and naturalization campaigns, is measured by a set of questions about the perception of threats caused by foreigners.²⁴ For the corporation tax, the issue-specific predisposition score is intended to measure the individual’s stakes in the market economy²⁵. The ambivalence measure is the product of a respondent’s score on the partisan predisposition scale and the negatively signed issue-specific predisposi-

²³ Respondents who do not attribute a utility higher than five to any of the six parties, plus the (very few) respondents who attribute equal preferences to all of the parties, are considered not to have any particular partisan predisposition and, accordingly, are dropped from the analysis. I have used MUDFOLD 4.0 for my analysis (see van Schuur and Post, 1998).

²⁴ The five statements concerned individual safety threat (“I am afraid of increasing violence and vandalism in my neighborhood by foreigners”), individual economic threat (“I am afraid that my economic prospects will get worse because of foreigners”), collective safety threat (“I am afraid of increasing violence and vandalism in Swiss society by foreigners”), collective cultural threat (“These days, I am afraid that the Swiss culture is threatened by foreigners”), and collective economic threat (“I am afraid that the economic prospects of Swiss society will get worse because of foreigners”). With regard to partisan predispositions, these questions were only asked once, at the beginning of the campaign, since my aim is to determine the extent to which voters converge on their pre-campaign issue-specific predispositions.

²⁵ The questions were part of a battery that asked for the kind of country the respondents preferred. Each item asked the recipient to choose between a polar contrast: “Please tell me what kind of Switzerland you prefer: a Switzerland... a) ...with more state interventions in the economy, or with more market competition; b) ... that places more emphasis on solidarity, or on individual responsibility; c)... with large income differences, or small income differences?” Each item was measured on a five-point scale, ranging from strong agreement with the first part to strong agreement with the second part of the item.

tion scale²⁶. A more detailed discussion of predispositions, ambivalence and indecision can be found in Kriesi (2010b). I build on his model by adding the framing coefficients (β_4 and β_5 , see below), which refer to the effects of the frames on the vote at the different points in time.

Since I have a binary dependent variable and the responses of a voter in a panel are not independent of each other (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2005: 247), I use a random intercept probit model, which takes the following form:

$$\text{vote}_{ij} = (\alpha + u_i) + \beta_1 \text{ip}_i + \beta_2 \text{pp}_i + \beta_3 \text{amb}_i + \beta_4 \text{fc}_i + \beta_5 \text{fp}_i + \sum_j (\alpha_j + \beta_6 \text{fc}_i + \beta_7 \text{fp}_i) + \sum_j (\alpha_j + \beta_8 \text{ip}_i + \beta_9 \text{pp}_i + \beta_{10} \text{amb}_i) + \beta_{11} \text{un}_i + \sum_j \text{un}_i * (\beta_{12} \text{ip}_i + \beta_{13} \text{pp}_i + \beta_{14} \text{amb}_i) + v_i,$$

where “vote” is a dichotomous indicator, either the vote intention or vote at time t , “ip” is the respondent’s issue-specific predisposition, “pp” his or her partisan predisposition, “amb” stands for ambivalence, “fc” the respondent’s position on the contra frames (one or two frames), “fp” the respondent’s position on the pro frames (two frames), and “un” for undecided. The index j refers to later time points in the campaign – the midpoint (only in the case of the asylum law) and the end of the campaign and accounts for additional effects to the overall effect. The index i refers to respondent i .

Results

Strength of Frames in Communication

The first part of the analysis examines the strength of frames in communication in the three campaigns. It is presented in Table 8.1. As this measure shows, in the asylum law campaign, the “humanitarian tradition” frame, which was the most important frame of the contra camp, turns out to have been more or less equally strong as the core frame of the pro camp – the “abuse” frame. Both frames were counter-attacked in one in six arguments. The other frames

²⁶ The most common measures used for ambivalence are the multiplicative measure used here (see Keele and Wolak 2008: 680), and Griffin’s ambivalence index (or a modified version of this index) (see Steenbergen and Brewer 2004: 103f.).

of the two camps, i.e. “rule-of-law” and “efficacy”, still provoked a defensive reaction in the opponent’s camp, but to a much more limited extent. In the naturalization campaign, the “rule-of-law” frame proved to be more or less equally strong as the “people final say” frame, which was the main frame of the pro camp. It is important to note that the “people final say” frame was stronger than the “mass naturalization”. This finding indicates that a strategic framing change of the pro camp was ineffective. In the political *advertisements*, the pro camp changed the strategy (chapter 5). Instead of the “people-final-say” frame, they relied on the “mass naturalization” frame towards the end of the campaign because the campaigners received feedback from their activists indicating that the “people final say” frame was not convincing.

Table 8.1: Strength of the Frames in Communication

		Asylum		Naturalization		Corporation Tax	
contra	core frame	human. trad.	16.5	rule-of-law	19.1	tax equity	11.4
	2 nd frame	rule-of-law	6.9			tax loss	8.3
pro	core frame	abuse	16.9	people final say	20.2	SME	7.7
	2 nd frame	efficacy	5.8	mass naturalization	14.1	competitiveness	13.0

Note: Strength of frames in communication is operationalized by the opponents’ defensive reactions with respect to a given frame, i.e. by the shares of the opponents’ counter-frames, averaged over the frames in the media input and the frames in the news media.

In the corporate tax reform, the competitiveness frame was the strongest frame, despite the fact that it was only the second most important frame of the pro camp. Surprisingly, the main frame of the pro camp, the “SME” (small and medium enterprises) frame is found to be the weakest frame of the whole campaign. This most likely is a result of the fact that it remained without controversy during the debate. The second strongest frame was the core frame of the contra camp (“tax equity”) which more often came under attack in the media. Comparing the three cases, we generally see that the frames in the naturalization campaign were strongest, while the frames in the corporation tax reform campaign were weakest. This is in line with my idea that both the number of main frames of an issue and the complexity reduce the strength of a frame: In the asylum law and in the corporation tax reform, there were four main

frames, whereas in the other case, I found three main frames (chapter 4). The corporation tax reform was the most complex issue.

Strength of Frames in Thought


To assess the strength of frames in thought, I will begin by exploring whether the frames in communication were accessible to the citizens. This is a precondition for frames to become strong in thought. In the interviews, participants were asked whether they had heard of the different arguments.²⁷ It might be argued that these questions make the frames accessible for the respondents. While this criticism cannot be completely denied, as ninety percent of the Swiss electorate considers direct-democratic campaigns as important or very important (Kriesi and Trechsel 2008: 66), the results do not seem implausible. Figure 8.1 shows the proportion of respondents who had heard of the respective frames. There are two graphs for each campaign. On the left hand side, the graphs show the proportion of the *contra* voters who had access to the frame. On the right hand side of the figure, the graphs illustrate the share of the *pro* voters who were exposed to it. The graphs show that, first of all, over 80 percent of the respondents in the asylum law and in the naturalization campaigns had heard of the frames at the end of the campaign (panel wave = 3), whereas in the corporation tax reform, only a little more than 70 percent had heard of them by the end of the campaign. The graphs also show that in the asylum campaign, around 85 percent of the respondents had already heard the arguments at the beginning of the campaign (panel wave = 1), whereas the campaign effect is stronger in the other two campaigns. It is important to note that access to the arguments does not seem to be influenced by the position of the voter. The same arguments are most accessi-

²⁷ The exact question was (example for the humanitarian tradition frame): “There have been different opinions with regard to the asylum law. In the following, I will read loudly some arguments. Could you please indicate with ‘yes’, ‘no’, or ‘don’t know’ whether you have ever heard of them in the current debate: ‘The humanitarian tradition must be maintained’?”


ble for contra and pro voters in all three campaigns, followed by the other core argument. The graph shows that the precondition of accessibility is fulfilled.

Figure 8.1: Accessibility of Frames in Thought


Asylum



Naturalization



Corporation Tax



For those voters who did not have access to the core arguments, it can already be stated that the framing effects, which I will discuss in the following, are insignificant (not shown). This lends support to Nelson et al.'s (1997a) and Druckman's (2009) idea that accessibility is a precondition for applicability. As I do not have data for the availability of the frames, I will turn to applicability next.

Table 8.2 presents the model investigating the strength of frames in thought. For the asylum law, the model is estimated without the coefficient for the initially undecided voters, since in this familiar case, indecision did not influence the vote. Only 14.3 percent of the voters were undecided and all of the effects for the undecided voters turned out to be insignificant. The upper part of the table contains the fixed effects, which are the important effects for the frame strength. In the lower part of the table, information is presented relating to the random effects²⁸. Let us first look at the overall effects of the frame coefficients: In line with the measure for the strength of frames in communication, the results show the following: With one exception, the effects of all of the arguments are significant at the 5 percent level. The coefficients show the effect of the respondents' position on the vote intention. The relationship is as expected: The more a voter holds a contra position, the more he or she is inclined to vote "no", whereas the opposite is true for the pro arguments. Second, in the two immigration campaigns, the coefficients of the core frames tend to be larger than the coefficients of the second frames. However, the difference is not significant. In the corporation tax reform campaign, the opposite is the case: the second arguments are stronger than the core arguments. Again, however, the difference is not significant. For the pro camp, the SME (core pro) fram-

²⁸ Sigma_u is the variance of the individual error component. Rho is the proportion of variance that is attributable to differences between respondents. It increases when the variance between respondents increases compared to the variance within respondents. The Chibar2 values at the bottom of the table refer to a particular likelihood ratio test, which checks whether or not rho is zero. Since the P-values for these tests are large, the null hypothesis has to be rejected in each case. For purposes of comparison, I have also provided the rho-value for the null models, i.e. the models without any covariates. The difference between the rho-value for the null model and the corresponding value for the substantive model gives an indication of the explanatory power of the model. Thus, for the asylum case, this difference (78-46) is 32. In other words, in this case, the proportion of variance attributable to inter-individual differences has been reduced by 41 percent (32/78=.41).

ing effect was – although insignificantly – smaller than the competitiveness (second pro) framing effect. This corresponds to the measure of strength of frames in communication. Even though it is also not significant, it is nevertheless surprising that the same is true for the contra camp: the coefficient of the second frame (tax loss) is also larger than the coefficient of the main frame (tax equity). This might be explained by the fact that the tax loss frame was easy to understand (availability) because everybody understands that a tax reduction reduces the tax income. By contrast, the equity frame was more difficult because one needs to understand that the tax reduction is offered only for those who hold stocks of 10 percent or more. I will return to this aspect below and argue that the strength of the tax equity frame is underestimated. Furthermore, the pro frame coefficients are larger than the contra frames. This also contrasts with the measure of strength in communication, but is again insignificant.

Table 8.2: Applicability (=Strength) of the Frames in Thought – Estimates from the Random Intercept Probit Models of the Vote Choice for the Three Campaigns, Unstandardized Regression Coefficients, Standard Errors and Levels of Significance

	Asylum			Naturalization			Corporation Tax		
	coef.	s.e.	P>z	coef.	s.e.	P>z	coef.	s.e.	P>z
fixed part									
overall effects									
issue pref	0.422	0.067	***	0.253	0.067	***	0.090	0.067	ns
partisan pref	0.408	0.063	***	0.118	0.061	ns	0.184	0.067	**
ambivalence	0.318	0.060	***	0.127	0.053	**	0.083	0.062	ns
core argument contra	-0.034	0.053	ns	-0.185	0.051	***	-0.111	0.049	*
2nd argument contra	-0.269	0.057	***				-0.235	0.053	***
core argument pro	0.231	0.059	***	0.264	0.053	***	0.275	0.055	***
2nd argument pro	0.155	0.055	**	0.220	0.057	***	0.382	0.061	***
undecided				-1.431	0.147	***	-1.175	0.119	***
additional effects at t2									
t2	0.001	0.174	ns						
issue pref t2	0.125	0.091	ns						
partisan pref t2	0.405	0.090	***						
ambivalence t2	-0.086	0.092	ns						
core argument contra t2	-0.297	0.092	**						
2nd argument contra t2	0.130	0.092	ns						
core argument pro t2	0.166	0.094	ns						
2nd argument pro t2	0.212	0.089	*						
additional effects at t3									
t3	0.431	0.193	*	-0.515	0.106	***	0.360	0.132	**
issue pref t3	-0.009	0.111	ns	0.035	0.106	ns	0.039	0.108	ns
partisan pref t3	0.342	0.109	**	0.425	0.106	***	0.102	0.106	ns
ambivalence t3	-0.021	0.108	ns	-0.134	0.091	ns	0.302	0.105	**
core argument contra t3	-0.417	0.112	***	-0.048	0.083	ns	-0.118	0.074	ns
2nd argument contra t3	-0.084	0.116	ns				-0.097	0.076	ns
core argument pro t3	0.290	0.110	**	0.087	0.084	ns	0.191	0.083	*
2nd argument pro t3	0.356	0.107	**	0.013	0.088	ns	0.125	0.089	ns
un_issue pref t3				0.686	0.209	***	-0.177	0.152	ns
un_party pref t3				0.955	0.207	***	0.031	0.142	ns
un_ambivalence t3				0.579	0.196	**	-0.616	0.147	***
constant	0.284	0.115	*	-0.321	0.067	***	0.028	0.094	
random part									
/lnsig2u	-0.144	0.168		-1.743	0.671		-1.364	0.486	
sigma_u	0.930	0.078		0.418	0.140		0.506	0.123	
rho	0.464	0.042		0.149	0.085		0.204	0.079	
Chibar2	113.39		***	2.97		*	6.35		**
rho-Nullmodel	0.78	0.02		0.51	0.04		0.56	0.040	

*p<.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Asylum: n observations = 3262, respondents = 1323

Naturalization: n observations = 1859, respondents = 997

Corporation Tax: n observations = 1669, respondents = 853

Thus, the results support the idea that the same frames are strong in both communication and in thought. The significant frame coefficients confirm Kriesi's general finding: The frames are important in direct-democratic campaigns and the voters are "largely capable of handling the task of direct-democratic voting. It may be that they do not use the best arguments one could use for the task at hand; they still make systematic use of the most important arguments provided by the political elites for their voting choice" (Kriesi 2005: 223). Overall, the core frames in communication tend to also be stronger frames in thought. However, the differences between core and second frames are insignificant. This might indicate that different voters rely on different frames for the vote choice and as such, both become strong and significant.

Framing effects

In Table 8.2, it can be seen that the frame coefficients grow over time (additional effects), especially in the asylum law and the corporation tax reform. This increase of the frame strength is addressed next in Figure 8.2.²⁹ The predicted vote is shown in dependence of the framing position and controlling for partisan preference, issue preference and ambivalence. There is one graph for each frame. In the asylum law, the effects become stronger over time. With the exception of the rule-of-law (2nd frame contra) frame, the difference in frame strength between wave one and wave two/three is significant.³⁰ This means that the frames in communication caused the frames in thought to become stronger. We see a framing effect between the first and the second/third wave. Furthermore, it also shows that the framing effect did not increase between the second and the third wave.

In the naturalization initiative, the frame strength does not significantly grow over time. In this campaign, we cannot speak of a framing effect. It is possible that the conflict


²⁹ These illustrations are based on the model used for Table 8.3. I used the overall effects and the variables relevant for the specific time point and set the other variables at their means.

³⁰ See additional effects of arguments in Table 8.3.


about the new justice minister (Eveline Widmer-Schlumpf) distracted the voters from the substance of the debate. Additionally, Kriesi (2010c) argues that in this initiative the frames were less linked to the issue-specific preferences of the voters. Nevertheless, voters in favor of the pro frame were still more inclined to vote “yes”, whereas voters who were in favor of the contra frame rather rejected the vote. Undecided voters were uninfluenced by the frames. Even though there is no framing effect, we can see a campaign effect in the graphs of the core frame contra and the second frame pro. We see that the curves for the decided voters drop from t1 to t3. At the beginning, the respondents were more inclined to vote “yes” than at the end; this is a campaign effect and can be explained through the late start of the campaign. At the beginning, a third of voters were unfamiliar with the issue and the partisan preferences were unknown. In addition, the initiative was called “for democratic naturalizations”, which was probably also misleading.

Figure 8.2: Framing Effects: Graphical Representation of the Impact of Frame Position on the Voting Choice and Its Variation Over Time


Asylum



Naturalization




Corporation Tax



In the corporation tax, the strength of frames again increases over time. However, the framing effect is only significant for the SME frame (core pro). The effect at t3 of the tax equity frame (core contra) is underestimated because of the undecided voters. This can be demonstrated by another model (shown in the Appendix: Table A4) that includes interaction terms between undecided voters and the framing positions. Figure 8.3 shows the results graphically. First, we can see that the tax equity frame becomes much stronger in t3 than it was previously. The respective coefficient in t3 in this model is -0.405. This additional effect is very significant. Thus, with the interaction term, the framing effect of the tax equity frame is very strong and very significant. Indeed, it is now stronger than the second frame. This result confirms the notion that the external events associated with the involvement of the UBS in the subprime crises were relevant. In chapter 5, I argue that these external events lent support to the “tax equity” frame, which claims that the tax cuts were an unfair privilege for the well-off and went against the principle of fair taxation. Second, the originally undecided voters who were *in favor of the tax equity* frame turned out to be more inclined to vote “yes”. The coefficient is positive (0.994) and very significant. Possibly, these voters preferred tax cuts for all, not only for the well-off. The result is in line with the findings by Kriesi (2010b). In the corporation tax, he found a strong ambivalence effect for the undecided voters.

Figure 8.3: Corporation Tax: Impact of Core Contra Frame (Tax Equity) on the Vote Decision, in Consideration of the Interaction Effect between Undecided Voters and Frame Position



In terms of framing effects, there is a difference between core and second main frames. In two campaigns³¹, the core frames in communication caused the frames in thought to become stronger over time, whereas only once (second main frame of the pro camp in the asylum law) did the strength of a second main frame grow over time. This gives rise to the assumption that there is a difference between core and second main frame and that the core frames are, in fact, stronger than the second main frames.

Next, I explore the importance of the frame-based path in comparison to the partisan-based path. Let us first look at the effects of the partisan preference in Table 8.2. In order to understand the table, it should be noted that the partisan preferences t2 and t3 are *additional* effects to the overall effects. In the asylum law campaign, the voters used the heuristic path for their vote choice during the whole campaign, and its importance grows over time (partisan pref. t2 and t3 are significant and have a positive sign), probably because a part of the voters learned about their preferred party's position during the campaign. The voting preferences from political parties from the center (in particular from the CVP) were not obvious at the beginning. In the naturalization initiative, the campaign started late and the voters did not use the partisan path at the beginning. At this point in time, they did not know the party's position because the campaign had not yet started. Nevertheless, partisan preference is significant at the end. In the corporation tax reform, the heuristic path was again important during the whole campaign. It probably did not gain in importance because it is a "typical" left-right issue with well-known party positions from the beginning. In comparison to the same model without the arguments (not shown here, see Kriesi 2010b), the partisan parameters have the same signs, but their sizes are smaller. As Kriesi (2005: 171) suggests, this is related to the fact that the partisan effects can partly be attributed to the effects of the arguments. This

³¹ If one takes the interaction effect between undecided voters and frame position in the tax reform campaign into consideration.

works indirectly through learning (Lenz 2009). The voters subscribe to the frames favored by their preferred party.

Figure 8.4 presents the voting choice for different partisan preferences and positions on the frames. For the sake of simplicity, all frames were combined into one factor on each side: a pro frames factor and a contra frames factor³². This figure allows us to gauge the importance of the frame-based path in comparison to the partisan path: The slope of a curve shows the importance of the frame-based path, whereas the width at which the three curves are apart from each other is relevant for the importance of the partisan path³³. The general impression provided by this figure is that both frames and partisan heuristics are important in determining the voting choice (the curves are neither flat, nor do they converge on one curve). The third hypothesis cannot be rejected: The frame-based path is important in direct-democratic votes, even when controlling for and in comparison to the partisan-based path. The relative importance varies between pro and contra frame and between the campaigns.

In the asylum law campaign, for the supporters of the contra frames, the partisan logic was more important than the frames. For instance, a voter attached to right-wing parties who strongly agreed on the contra frames is inclined to vote “yes” with a probability of 0.63³⁴. This finding may be attributable to the successful strategy of the pro camp, which made use of a double-edged argument by endorsing the concern advanced by their adversaries. In a first step, they pointed out that they were strongly in favor of the humanitarian tradition of Switzerland. In a second step, they maintained that the revised law would strengthen this claim because it would help fight against abuse, thereby helping those asylum-seekers who really deserved protection.


³² All campaign arguments were jointly included in one factor analysis. Details including a factor analysis can be given upon request.

³³ Based on the partisan predisposition scores, I coded left as including Green and Social Democrat voters, moderate right as in-between voters favoring Christian Democrats and Liberals, and conservative right as including voters favoring the People’s Party.


³⁴ The predicted probabilities are calculated for decided voters at the end of the campaign with mean values on remaining variables.

Figure 8.4: The Combined Impact of Frame-Based and Partisan-Based Paths: Vote Choice (t=3) for Different Political Preferences for Decided Voters


Asylum



Naturalization



Corporation Tax



We see a different pattern on the other side. The supporters of the pro frames voted yes independently of their partisan preferences. For this group of voters, the frame-based path was clearly more important than the heuristic path- in such a way that even a voter from the left, favoring the pro frames, has a predicted probability of voting yes of 0.99. This result derives from the strength of the abuse frame. Moreover, issue familiarity and intensity might also have increased the relevance of the frame-based path.

In the naturalization campaign, the frame-based choice was more important than the partisan path for voters who were strongly in favor of the contra frames or strongly against the pro frames. In the other cases, the partisan preference was also important. For instance, a left voter who was strongly in favor of the pro frames was inclined to vote “yes” with a probability of 0.71. If he or she did not strongly favor the pro frames, but still favored them nevertheless, the probability decreased to 39. If he or she was a right-wing voter who strongly favored the pro frames, the probability increased to 0.95.

In the corporation tax reform, the pro frames were almost as strong as in the asylum law. Surprisingly, however, the heuristic path was not important. This is unexpected because one could think that the heuristic path is more important in complex issues than it is in easier issues since the arguments in complex issues are usually more difficult to understand. The influence of the emotion-based path in the opinion formation process might explain this finding. Wirth et al. (2010) showed that positive emotions were particularly important in the corporation tax reform. In the case of the contra frames, the partisan-based path was more important. For instance, a voter who was strongly in favor of the contra frames and close to a conservative right party voted yes with a probability of 0.69. If he or she was only in favor of the frames, he or she voted yes with a probability of 0.80. If he or she was close to the left and strongly favored the contra frames, the probability decreased to 0.45. The probability increased to 0.73 if he or she was additionally an undecided voter. This shows that undecided

voters who held a strongly favoring position on the contra frames ignored not only their framing position but also their partisan predisposition! It supports the result by Kriesi (2010c: 23) that the undecided voters voted inconsistently in this campaign and that ambivalent voters on the left ended up voting in favor of the law.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have first explored the measures of strength of frames in communication and strength of frames in thought. Both concepts of frame strength allow the identification of the relevant frames. In the case of frames in communication, the campaigners' counterattacks are a measure for the relevancy of a frame. In the case of frames in thought, the importance of a frame in the individuals' opinion formation process measures its relevance. Ultimately, frame building is only important when frames evolving from the construction, promotion and mediation-processes have an effect on opinion formation. The overall result of this chapter is that, frame building is very important.

The results clearly suggest that the main frames on either side were strong frames in communication, since both could not be ignored, but rather elicited strong defensive reactions from the opponent's side in the media input and the news media. However, in two cases the framing strategies of the political actors were not fully successful. First, the pro camps' strategic change from the "people-final-say" frame to the "mass naturalization" frame in the naturalization initiative happened too late in order to have an impact on the strength of a frame. Second, in the corporation tax reform, the core frame of the pro camp (SME) was relatively weak in communication because it remained without controversy. It still became a strong frame in thought even though the "competitiveness" frame was slightly but insignificantly stronger. The evaluation by the campaigners supports the manner in which I measure the strength of a frame in communication, because with one exception, the campaigners evaluate

the same adversaries' frames as strong as are identified by the measure of strong frames in communication. In order to identify strong frames in communication, it is thus crucial to rely on the defensive reaction by the opponents and not to rely, for instance, on the evaluation of the importance of one's own arguments. Depending on the research interest, the measure for the strength of frames in communication can also be extended by including frames from opinion leaders or friends, or in more general terms, by including other channels relevant for the overall flow of communication.

Without exception, the measure of strength of frames in communication identifies (when controlling for the undecided voters in the case of the corporation tax reform) the same frames as relevant and as core frames as the commonly used measure, the strength of frames in thought. Thus, the first hypothesis is confirmed: In direct-democratic campaigns, strong frames in communication are also strong frames in thought. The precondition of accessibility was also fulfilled. The strong frames in communication might help "to anticipate which frames are likely to emerge as being the most applicable on an issue" (Chong and Druckman 2007c: 117). There are differences between the two measures with regard to the size of the strength. For the strength of the frames in *communication*, the difference between core and second important frame and the issue characteristic (complexity, intensity, and familiarity) seem to be relevant. For the strength of frames in *thought*, partisan and issue-specific preference are influential. In addition, the pro frames might be generally, albeit insignificantly, stronger in thought.

This chapter also shows that there is a framing effect from the frames in communication on the frames in thought in two of the three direct-democratic campaigns. Hypothesis 2 is confirmed: In two campaigns, there is a causal link from the frames in communication on the frames in thought. The strongest framing effect was discovered in the asylum law. Three of four main frames in thought became significantly stronger over time. In the corporation tax

reform, both core frames in communication caused the frames in thought to become significantly stronger (when the behavior of the undecided voter was taken into consideration). These results demonstrate that the core frames in communication have a stronger effect than the second main frames. They are indeed stronger frames. In the naturalization initiative, the strength of frames in thought did not become stronger over time. Thus, there was no framing effect in this campaign. The conflict about the new justice minister (Eveline Widmer-Schlumpf) potentially distracted the voters from the substance of the debate. Additionally, Kriesi (2010c) argues that in this initiative the frames were less linked to the issue-specific preferences of the voters. The difficulties to link the frames with the issue-specific preferences are also reflected in the change of the core frame towards the end of the campaign. Finally, the frames remain important for the vote decision, also controlling for and in comparison to partisan heuristic. Hypothesis three is also confirmed.

9

Conclusion

I have analyzed frame building and framing effects in three direct-democratic campaigns in Switzerland. In line with Rohrschneider, I can conclude that “campaign decisions are an area too important for political scientists to ignore” (2002:308). This is in particular true for the *framing* decisions in campaigns. Framing is the process by which political actors define the issue for the public (e.g., Nelson et al. 1997a, 1997b). Since, in our diverse society, the media plays a vital role in conveying frames from the political actors to the public (Lippmann 1947(1922)), I first investigated which processes and factors influence the creation or changes of frames applied by journalists (frames in news media or media frames), i.e. “*frame building*” (Scheufele 1999). Second, I investigated framing effects. Framing effects have been defined as effects from frames in communication on frames in thought (Druckman 2001). The evidence of framing effects found in this study does indeed render the framing decisions in a campaign relevant.

Frame Building

As far as frame building is concerned, in the first chapter, I proposed a distinction between the frame construction, frame promotion and frame mediation process. In the construction of frames, political actors decide about the three strategic framing choices: First, the political actors have to choose one or several substantive frames capable of attracting the attention of the media and the public to their own cause and steering it away from the cause of their opponents (“Substantive Emphasis Choice”). In the “Oppositional Emphasis Choice”, the political actors determine how much attention to devote to their opponents’ substantive frame(s) as compared to their own frames, as well as whether they want to use their opponents’ frames offensively (=trespassing) or defensively (=counter-framing). The third strategic question concerns the decision of whether to focus on the contest (=personal attacks and conflicts) or the substantive content of the debate – on politics or on policy (“Contest Emphasis Choice”). In the frame promotion process, they decide about how to vary these choices in the different communication channels and over time. I have distinguished between mediated (media input and letters to the editor), unmediated (political advertisements and direct mails) and internal (information for members) channels. Both mediated and unmediated channels target the general public, while the internal channel is aimed at the members. In the frame mediation process, the contribution by the journalists is analyzed.

The Three Strategic Framing Choices

With regard to the “Substantive Emphasis Choice”, we find that political actors emphasize one or two strong frames in the media input (Chapter 4). They generally also use these main frames in channels other than the media input and stay on their frames (Chapter 5). In the unmediated channels, the political actors focus most on their core frame, i.e. in around half of all arguments. By contrast, they focus least on the internal communication, in which the core

frame is used in every fourth argument. With regard to variation over time, it can be concluded that the political actors stay on their frame, except for the pro camp in the naturalization initiative. In this case, the pro camp changed their strategy and switched – in particular in their ads – from the “people final say” frame to the “mass naturalization” frame toward the end of the campaign because the “people final say” frame was not convincing. In order to garner media attention during the whole campaign, the political actors mainly rely on routine staged events for media input such as media conferences and media releases. By comparing media input with news media, we find that the percentage shares of the frames in the news media are generally similar to the shares found in the media input. The news media tended to respect frame ownership and reported accordingly. The framing input of the political actors was decisive (Chapter 7).

Second (“Oppositional Emphasis Choice”), political actors do not exclusively revert to their own main frames, but rather also discuss their opponents’ frames. The extent to which they enter into discussion has been called campaign dialogue. We found that the political actors pay more attention to their opponents’ frames in the mediated channels than in the unmediated and internal channels (Chapter 5). Mediation obviously motivates the political actors to enter into dialogue with each other. Unmediated channels should primarily mobilize citizens to vote, whereas the internal channels should inform the members. With regard to variation over time, we can state that campaign dialogue does not disappear over the course of the campaign. Furthermore, issue complexity and inequality of financial resources reduce dialogue. It has been shown that the frames owned by the opponents are largely addressed defensively rather than offensively, that is, by means of counter-framing rather than trespassing. Trespassing was virtually absent, also in the different communication channels and over time. The journalists also reported on both camps with their adversaries’ frames, and attributed a slightly more offensive stance to both camps (Chapter 7).

As far as the third strategic question “Contest Emphasis Choice” is concerned, we showed that the political actors mainly rely on substantive framing. We found that actors with more extreme partisan positions use more contest frames and that the dispute between Christoph Blocher, the SVP, and Eveline Widmer-Schlumpf caused the quarrelling political actors to rely significantly more on contest frames in the naturalization campaign (Chapter 4). Concerning the different communication channels, we find that in direct-democratic campaigns, the political actors often refrain from using contest frames in their ads and in direct mail. By contrast, they use more contest frames in the letters to the editor and in the communication with the members than in the media input. Towards the end of the campaign, we find more contest frames only in the media input and in the news media. In the other channels, the use of contest frames is not increased. The substantive frames also dominated in the media. However, the journalists gave slightly more emphasis to contest frames than the political actors (Chapter 7).

Contribution of the Journalists (Frame Mediation)

Direct democracy is not only the well-institutionalized interaction among government, parliament, parties and the public (Linder et al. 2008: 214). It also requires the contribution of the media, and I was able to show (Chapter 6) that the interaction with the media is also well institutionalized. Journalists and the political actors are dancing the tango well together, as they are familiar with both their dance partners and the music. Their mediating function was most important in the corporation tax reform. In this complex issue, the journalists also gave standing to experts, which additionally contributed to the media frames (“Standing Choice”) and increased the low level of campaign dialogue provided by the political actors (“Dialogue Choice”). The media also introduced their own accents in the campaign by conducting public opinion polls. In addition, in the naturalization initiative, the TV debate show “Arena” intensi-

fied the debate (“Timing Choice”). Free newspapers fulfill the mediating function less well than the other media types because they make the least effort (“Effort Choice”) and offer less campaign dialogue.

Key Factors in Frame Building

My analysis shows that the political actors are the ones who introduce the most important frames into the public discourse in direct-democratic campaigns. With regard to the daily frame *absence / presence*, the campaign-specific power of a political actor is important, whereas the number of promoted frames and the minister play an influential role for the daily frame *frequency*. Power was not important in the case of the familiar issue (asylum law), but further research is needed to determine the relative importance of power in complex issues. The minister’s influence is highest in the case of the complex issue (corporate tax) and is probably lower in campaigns dealing initiatives. Finally, external events can moderate the influence of frame building.

Framing Effects

The analysis of framing effects complements the analyses of frame building. Frame building is important because the media frames have an impact in different ways. First of all, the results clearly suggest that the main frames on either side were strong frames in communication, since both could not be ignored, but rather elicited strong defensive reactions from the opponent’s side in the media input and the news media. Second, the strong frames in communication were also strong frames in thought because they were important for the vote decision. Furthermore, the frames remain important for the vote decision, also when controlling for and in comparison to partisan heuristic. These results support previous work by Kriesi (2005), who showed that arguments have a very strong impact on the outcome of the vote, also when

controlling for the voters' ideological predisposition. Finally, the results also show that there is a framing effect. This means that the frames in communication had an effect on the frames in thought.

Contributions and Implications for Further Research

This research theoretically contributes to studies on political communication by identifying processes and key factors in frame building. Among other factors, power has been identified as important in frame building. It has been operationalized based on a reputational indicator measuring the overall influence of an organization in a campaign and is relevant for frame absence/presence. However, not all powerful actors were also highly present in the media: *Economiesuisse*, the most powerful actor and leading house of the pro camp in the corporation tax reform, did not aim at being present in the media. Instead, the allied large party was in the public eye. The model for media framing (Table 7.3) does not account for such indirect impact of power. Thus, the influence of power in frame building is underestimated. This problem occurs because the power measure combines both issue-specific and general power. Large parties are key players in direct democracy as it is practiced in Switzerland (Linder et al. 2008: 213). They have general power and they are the institutionalized information source of journalists and often the mouthpiece of coalitions. However, they are not the only actors involved. Policies are made in domain-specific subsystems, which, in addition to political parties, include a large number of actors whose composition varies from one policy domain to the other. Some of the organizations active only in specific domains prefer to stay in the background. For further research, I suggest using two different power measures, one for general and one for issue-specific power. It is possible that general power has a direct effect on frame absence/presence, whereas issue-specific power perhaps works indirectly by reinforcing the general power of allied actors (interaction between issue-specific and general power).

The second theoretical contribution of this research is the discussion and empirical measurement of the three strategic framing choices taken by the political actors. With regard to the “Oppositional Emphasis Choice”, I was able to show that political actors enter into dialogue and discuss each others’ frames in the mediated channels. The results support the findings by Jerit (2008), who concludes that engagement (= dialogue) is common in election campaigns. We found that, by discussing each others’ frames, the political actors mainly use counter-frames (=defensive use of opponents’ frames). Trespassing (=offensive use of opponents’ frames) is mainly absent. As a consequence, we should look at defense in greater detail and identify different types of counter-framing and their impact. In Jerit’s terms, this would mean that we should identify different uses of direct rebuttals (Jerit 2009) and engagement (2008). Nelson (2004) provided a basis for such a typology. In an endeavor to do so, framing research should also be combined with research on deliberation. I suggest thinking about whether counter-framing makes the discussion deliberative, or which counter-frames are deliberative for which reasons. In addition, this study opens up the question of how many frames a public debate should ideally carry. Are four main frames good in terms of discourse quality?

My next contribution suggests distinguishing between contest and substantive frames (“Contest Emphasis Choice”), which is important because it allows us to measure the degree of substance in a debate. For further research, it is important to refine coding instruments. Contest frames consist of personal attacks and conflicts. Personal attacks were coded directly, whereas conflicts were coded as non-arguments which contain a conflict. This coding is sub-optimal because it measured conflicts only indirectly. By coding conflicts directly, we might also consider other types of contest frames such as, for example, contradiction, prejudices, stereotypes, and criticism. Even though the coding of conflicts was suboptimal, it does not mean that the results are unreliable. I am confident in stating that if we had coded the contest frames directly, the overall impression and the results would stay the same: Direct-democratic

campaigns are mainly substantive. The refinement of instruments is essential in particular for election campaigns, in which we might find more contest.

In methodological terms, I have introduced a tool for measuring the strength of frames in communication. A strong frame in communication has been defined as a frame that provokes a defensive reaction by the opponents and/or that resonates in the media. It is operationalized by the opponents' defensive reactions with respect to a given frame, i.e. by the shares of the opponents' counter-frames, averaged over the frames in the media input and the news media frames. However, it remains an open question why the campaigners feel compelled to react to an opponent's frame or what ultimately makes a frame strong in communication or in thoughts. As mentioned in chapter 8, the speaker's credibility and congruence with central cultural themes might strengthen a frame in communication. I addressed neither of these factors because they did not vary, and as preconditions they seemed to be fulfilled. It appears that these two factors are more important when frames are evolving. Direct-democratic campaigns come at the end of a political process, after the debate in parliament, and after the procedures for qualifying a proposition for ballot. Thus, the frames used in direct-democratic campaigns are not new.

From the analysis, I can suggest other factors which might make a frame strong in communication or/and in thought. First, as we know from the interviews with the campaigners, almost all people were against abuse and in favor of small and medium enterprises. These two frames (abuse and SME) were *valence* frames, because similar to valence issues (Schneider 1972), voters take one side on them. I suggest that valence frames potentially become very strong in communication and in thought, as was the case in terms of the abuse frame. At the same time, however, valence frames bear the risk of being less debated in the campaign because they are uncontroversial. This was the case in the SME frame. Those valence frames that connect to a negative emotion (e.g. fear) might become controversial, whe-

reas valence frames that connect to a positive emotion (e.g. proud) might be less debated. In any case, the question for further research is whether a valence frame is stronger than other frames, and under which circumstances it becomes highly debated by the opponent or in the media.

Second, the pro camp in the asylum law succeeded in linking their abuse frame with the humanitarian tradition frame by arguing that the new law is needed in order to fight abuse and to protect the Swiss humanitarian tradition. Hence, linking one's own frame with the opponents' frames might also make one's own frame stronger. The code book can also be improved in this regard. So far, links between the frames have not been coded. Linking seems to require the offensive use of the opponents' frame. Third, the strength of a frame in thought might be dependent on how closely the frame is linked to emotions, and issue-specific predispositions.

In order to learn more about what makes a frame strong in thought, I suggest additionally interviewing selected respondents of the panel in an open manner and in more depth about the reasons for their voting choice and the importance of the different frames. It would also help to validate the influence of external events. In addition, I suggest complementing the research design with experiments. It appears to me to be unrealistic to expect to observe exposure effects in a panel. I agree with Kriesi (2010c) that the multiplicity of channels to which a voter is exposed makes it difficult to attribute an exposure effect to one particular channel. In addition to the channels examined here, inter-personal communication is also important, and cannot be controlled in a panel. In order to gauge exposure effects, experiments are much more suitable. Finally, the strength of the frames should be measured by asking individuals of the panel to rate the persuasiveness of various frames in communication, on a particular issue.

Generalizability of the Study

First of all, the generalizability of the findings is restricted because of the *small number of cases*. However, since frame building in Swiss direct-democratic campaigns is routine action which usually follows the same pattern, the three cases still provide an insight into the typical frame building process. According to this, the theoretical framework provided in this study and the main findings should be representative for Swiss direct-democratic campaigns in general. With regard to the differences *between* direct-democratic campaigns, the results vary above all depending on issue complexity and familiarity and whether the direct-democratic campaign is an initiative or a referendum. Further research is needed in order to appraise the generalizability of the issue-specific and instrument-specific findings.

Second, the *campaign specificity* limits the generalizability of my findings. In order to strengthen their generalizability, I end this conclusion by presenting three types of campaigns and outlining in which regard the theoretical framework and my results might depend on the type of campaign. As introduced in chapter 2, direct-democratic campaigns imply *two camps involved*, which guarantees a contest of substantive framing. Secondly, direct-democratic campaigns are of *limited duration*, with a clear beginning and a clear ending. They imply thirdly an *issue-specific choice*. Based on these three criteria, direct-democratic campaigns can be distinguished from election campaigns and public debates (Table 9.1). Similar to direct-democratic campaigns, *election campaigns*³⁵ are also characterized by frame contestation. In majoritarian electoral systems, election campaigns typically give rise to the confrontation between two opposing camps, whereas in proportional electoral systems, more camps are involved. The presence of two or more camps guarantees competing information flows. In addition, election campaigns also include a close end, as direct-democratic campaigns do. In con-

³⁵ More precisely, I am thinking of *national* election campaigns.

trast to direct-democratic debates, they do not have an issue-specific focus. *Public debates* share the advantage of direct-democratic campaigns that they are issues-specific. They are “the sum of all public communications related to a particular issue” (Helbling, Höglinger and Wüest 2009: 5). In contrast to direct-democratic campaigns, however, public debates are not necessarily prestructured into a binary logic and no final vote is taking place.

Table 9.1: Different Types of Campaigns

	campaign type		
	direct-democratic campaigns	election campaigns	public debates
degree of frame contestation	frame contest: 2 opposing camps	frame contest: 2 or more opposing candidates	frame dominance is possible
deadline	close end by final vote	close end by final vote	open end
focus	issue-specific	no given focus	issue-specific

Third, we studied frame building and framing effects only in one single *country*. With regard to differences between countries, I suggest that at least three aspects are relevant. First, the *degree of control exercised by the elites* (Smith 1976, Bowler and Donovan 2006: 665, Budge 1996: 90) is important. Swiss direct-democratic campaigns are organized and tightly controlled by the political elites. Both the executive branch and parliament have an important role to play in the preparation of the proposals submitted to the voters. The control of the whole process by the government and the parliamentary majority implies the formation of two specific coalitions, the government camp versus the issue-specific opposition. Political campaigns in most other European countries also are organized by the elites (de Vreese 2004: 50, Bowler and Donovan 2006). By contrast, in the U.S., the government has less control over the direct-democratic process. The U.S. populist and progressive reformers of the late 19th century introduced direct-democratic procedures in order, above all, to restrict the power of political parties and their political machines, which were in control of the state parliaments at the time (Cronin 1989: 50-57; Smith and Tolbert 2001: 740, 2004: 112ff.; Bowler and Donovan 2006). Even today, in the U.S., the popular initiative is primarily used by social movements

and interest groups to circumvent the state parliaments controlled by the parties. This is possible because the popular initiatives are submitted to popular vote without the intervention of the state governments and their parliaments. Second, the *scope and frequency of votes* matter (Gallagher and Uleri 1996: 9, Budge 1996: 85 f.). Referendums are generally held on two types of subject: on constitutional changes and on questions of territorial adjustment. Initiatives have a greater scope: The call by a non-official body allows for a greater range of voting. In most countries, the government calls a referendum, whereas only in a small number of countries (Switzerland, Italy, half of the American states) can a group of the electorate call an initiative. In Switzerland, California, and a few other American states, referendums and initiatives take place frequently, whereas in all other countries, they are held infrequently. Third, the *political communication culture* is relevant. Pfetsch (2003) suggests that the communication culture is characterized by two dimensions: the distance between journalists and political actors and the orientation of political communication. Distance is related to different professional and social norms. For instance, in the U.S., journalists refer more to professional norms such as vocational professionalism, objectivity and impartiality of information, balanced content and diversity, and transparency, whereas German actors give priority to social norms such as ethically correct behavior, openness and honesty. As a consequence, we find a greater distance between journalists and political actors in the United States than in Germany. The orientation of political communication is dependent on the relative importance of media and political logic. If the media logic (Mazzoleni 1987) prevails, then journalists are relatively independent. The media can set the agenda of an election debate. News values, selection criteria and media attention are important in the news production. The actors try to garner as much media attention as possible and to reach positive news coverage. If the political logic dominates, power-political aspects are at the fore. The political actors aim at strengthening their organization, at legitimizing their position, or at increasing support and trust for their own

policy positions. Based on the two dimensions, we arrive at four different types of political communication culture (Table 9.2).

Table 9.2: Political Communication Culture and its Two Dimensions

Distance between political actors and journalists	Orientation of Political Communication	
	dominant media logic	dominant political logic
strong / great distance	media-oriented political communication culture example: US	strategic political communication culture example: Germany, Switzerland, Denmark
weak / small distance	PR-oriented political communication culture example: Italy	party-political communication culture example: France

The media-oriented political communication culture is characterized by distance between political and media actors and dominance of media logic (example: US). In the PR-oriented political communication culture, political and media actors are close but the production of news is media-oriented (example: Italy). When we find a great distance between politicians and journalists and the political logic is dominant, we call it strategic political communication culture (examples: Germany, Switzerland and Denmark). The party-political communication culture is identified by a weak distance and the dominance of the party logic (example: France).

Interaction between Context (Campaign Type, Country) and Frame Construction

The “Substantive Emphasis Choice” – the choice of a strong substantive frame – is the most important choice and quite independent of the campaign type. To win political power, the political actors “must compete, and a central aspect of this competition is their effort to define the terms of political choice” (Sniderman 2000: 75). However, the campaign type does matter with regard to the second and the third choices. The “Oppositional Emphasis Choice” (how much priority the political actors give to the opponents’ substantive frame(s) compared to their own frames) might become more complicated in proportional election campaigns because more sides are involved and an actor has to take care of more than one opponent. In

public debates, it is possible for there to be no competition about issue framing and for only one camp to be involved. If only one side is campaigning, its position could become very influential. This is a very different situation than we have in direct-democratic campaigns, which might be characterized by less campaign dialogue. It will render the second choice more relevant in public debates in general. Hence, it is not surprising that Entman's (2003) cascading model addresses the very question of whether frame contestation arises in public debates. From my point of view, it appears that public debates on *foreign policy* bear the highest risk of a dominant frame situation because government monopolizes information, which impedes opposition. Such one-sided situations seem to be rare in terms of everyday politics. This is why I consider the typical research object of indexing approaches as rather atypical cases. The "Contest Emphasis Choice" (the priority of the substantive frames compared to the campaign contest) might be more important in electoral campaigns, where candidates might analyze the rationale and strategy underlying the rhetoric and positions of their opponents or emphasize and attack some of their personal characteristics.

I expect the "Substantive Emphasis Choice" and the "Oppositional Emphasis Choice" to also be quite independent of the differences between countries. For instance, in Denmark, the yes camp was also campaigning with one main message (de Vreese and Semetko 2004: 172). By contrast, we might find more contest frames ("Contest Emphasis Choice") in countries with less control by elites, because extreme and non-government actors rely more on contest frames. The same expectation holds for countries with a media-oriented political communication culture.³⁶ Media orientation increases the use of news values. For instance, in US presidential election campaigns, contest frames are more important due to commercialization of the media, the important role of TV in general and the involvement of political advertisements on TV in particular, and because of the majoritarian democratic system. By contrast,

³⁶ When comparing the results with those of de Vreese and Semetko (2004: 101, 174), we find less substance (measured as issue frames) in the Danish referendum campaigns. Since Denmark is classified as a similar country to Switzerland, we would not expect large differences. The differences are probably caused by different coding procedures. In my analysis, the argument was the unit of analysis, whereas De Vreese and Semetko's study is based on the topic of the story. In order to attract the attention of the reader, the media might use strategic frames in their headlines or leads, but still might use substance in the article.

Hardmeier (2003: 251) reached the conclusion that only seven percent of articles used an emotional or personalized style of coverage in Swiss parliamentary election campaigns.

Interaction between Context (Campaign Type, Country) and Frame Promotion

In election campaigns, the frame promotion process is probably more important than in direct-democratic campaigns. This is related to the fact that election campaigns are not restricted to the issue and have more the character of a race. In addition, election campaigns generally involve more resources than direct-democratic campaigns. The budget of the three investigated direct-democratic campaigns can be roughly estimated based on the interviews with the campaigners. In the naturalization initiative, around 0.8 million Swiss francs were spent. In the asylum law, there were 2.8 million Swiss francs involved, whereas in the corporation tax reform, the budget rose to around 7.0 million Swiss francs. In the 1995 elections for the Swiss Parliament, the parties in the three largest Swiss cantons (=sub-national-level units similar to states in the US context) alone spent around 7.8 million (Kriesi 1998: 3). We also know that at the cantonal level, parties use 12 percent of their budget for direct-democratic campaigns, whereas they spend 30 percent for elections (Brändle 2001: 163). Thus, I can conclude that in election campaigns, parties spend more money, which will increase the importance of the frame promotion process.

Regarding variations between countries, I expect the frame promotion process to be more important in countries with a media-oriented political communication culture because the media logic increases the willingness to spend money. This expectation is supported by the fact that more resources are involved in American campaigns. For the general election, Obama's campaign committee had raised more than \$650 million in 2008³⁷. However, these election campaigns are considered as being an outlier, because nowhere else is such a high amount of the

³⁷ <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Barack_Obama_presidential_campaign,_2008>, December 2009.

budget used for election campaigns (Nassmacher 2002: 9). As a consequence, I expect the promotion process to be more important in US presidential election campaigns than anywhere else. Besides this difference, I expect similar patterns in the frame promotion process of different countries as found in this study. In particular, I expect that also elsewhere, the actors will try to stay on message and will increase the use of the contest frames towards the end of a campaign. In Denmark, for instance, de Vreese and Semetko (2004: 172) report that the political actors did, in fact, stay on message (although they ultimately failed with this strategy because the message was discredited). In addition, the Danish campaigners also increased the use of contest frames towards the end of the campaign (2004: 99). Similar to Switzerland, they also rely on a traditional or routinized mode of campaigning (de Vreese and Semetko 2004: 172), which means that their campaign communication was not particularly sophisticated or targeted.

Interaction between Context (Campaign Type, Country) and Frame Mediation

The first journalistic choice (“Effort Choice”) seems to be influenced by the type of campaign. In election campaigns, the effort of journalists might be higher than in direct-democratic campaigns because the former only take place every four years. The effort in public debates might depend on the specific case and vary more depending on whether the issue is at the top of the media agenda. The second and third journalistic choice (“Balancing Choice” and “Standing Choice”) are less dependent on the campaign type. The fourth choice (“Timing Choice”) depends again on the type of campaign. In election campaigns, the critical period might begin earlier and last longer than in direct-democratic campaigns. Again, the longest campaign will be found in the U.S. presidential election campaigns. In public debates, it is unclear whether a debate includes a critical period at all, or when the campaign or the critical period starts or ends. External events taking place might be particularly relevant be-

cause they can set the issue at the top of the agenda. For instance, Baumgartner et al. (2008) showed that unexpected and scandalous events in and around the death penalty debate have triggered a new public debate. The fifth choice (“Dialogue Choice”) probably depends also on the type of campaign. Particularly in public debates, the media sometimes also step in and lead a campaign. If the media lead a public debate, the journalists might act as a major speaker themselves and advocate an opinion or they might sharpen the message of the one camp without being stopped or confronted by a campaign calling for another point of view. In Switzerland, the campaign against pitbulls and other fighting breeds can be considered as an example of a public debate which was led by the media. The issue arose because several children were attacked or even killed by such dogs. Since 2000, the major Swiss tabloid paper “Blick” has set the issue at the top of its agenda several times and supported the claim that these dogs should be banned. Another example is the media campaign against former Federal Councillor Samuel Schmid because of scandals and accidents in the Swiss military in summer 2008. In this case, a Sunday newspaper “Sonntags Zeitung” started the campaign. Samuel Schmid made the mistake of not counter-arguing during the summer silly season, preferring to sit the problem out. Furthermore, he was under intense political pressure from his former party, the Swiss People's Party, because he had accepted re-election when Blocher was replaced by Eveline Widmer-Schlumpf (at the end of 2007). Since Blocher was not re-elected, the Swiss People's Party wanted to go into opposition and wanted Samuel Schmid to resign from office as well. There was no party which counter-argued. As a consequence, the media campaign had a large impact and Samuel Schmid had resigned from the Federal Council by the end of 2008.

Country characteristics seem to influence the frame mediation process as well. I expect the first (“Effort Choice”) and the fifth (“Dialogue Choice”) journalistic choice to be dependent on the control of the elites. Based on the indexing hypothesis, we know that the media report on the frames the government uses. Furthermore, the first (“Effort Choice”) and the fourth

(“Timing Choice”) journalistic choice are expected to be dependent on the communication culture. When the political logic dominates, the media follow the institutional routine of the political authorities and actors: They make an effort in accordance with the importance and timing of the issue on the political agenda. This expectation is supported by Danish results, where the media devotes a large amount of news to the referendum campaign (de Vreese and Semetko 2004: 174). The second and third journalistic choice (“Balancing Choice” and “Standing Choice”) are likely to be dependent on distance between media and political actors. Less distant journalists might balance the news less and might rely more on powerful actors. In Western European democracies, journalistic norms include elite domination, proportionality, detachment, civility, and closure, whereas in the USA, norms such as endorsement of narrative and empowerment are prevalent (Ferree et al. 2002: 284).

Interaction between Context (Campaign Type, Country) and Framing Effects

The campaign type does matter with regard to framing effects. In election campaigns, the effects of contest frames might be important. For instance, the image of a candidate plays a role which is influenced by contest frames. In public debates, the situation might be much more open. There is no vote or election taking place. The public is possibly less involved, less informed, or less aware that an opinion formation process is taking place. There might be no clear question to be answered.

The differences between countries can be relevant as well. First, in countries with less control by the elite, such as the U.S. version of direct democracy, voters are less able to orient themselves to partisan cues and they cannot rely on a pamphlet sent by government in all states (Cronin 1989: 83). This makes the vote decision more difficult and increases the possibility of frame manipulation. Second, the frequency with which direct-democratic campaigns take place possibly matters. If direct-democratic instruments are used only rarely, citizens and

elites rely less on routine and are less used to these procedures. They need more effort to become informed and to cast a ballot. The number of initiatives on the same ballot is relevant too: If citizens have to vote on a large number of proposals at the same time, the chances of framing effects might decrease because citizens rely on heuristic rather than on systematic voting (for instance, see Swiss ballot from 18 May, 2003, when Swiss citizens voted on nine different proposals). By contrast, a long ballot does not seem to cause a consistent pattern of negative voting, as Zisk (1987) showed. Finally, the political communication culture is expected to be relevant as well. If the media logic prevails, the risk of frame manipulation might be higher because the campaign instruments are more sophisticated, and more money is involved.

What do the results mean for the quality of democracy?

Overall, I am optimistic about what my results imply for the quality of direct-democratic decisions. From my point of view, direct-democratic campaigns are likely to function according to the “responsive leadership” model. As introduced at the beginning, this model acknowledges that political leaders use rhetoric to sway public opinion, but they “use it in a way which facilitates public discussion”, and the leaders are held in check by a public that is capable of assessing the validity of their discourse. In this model, the chance that the democratic process will produce “largely not a genuine but a manufactured will”, as Schumpeter (1976 (1942)) suggested, is small. Since the chances of a manufactured will are small, I conceive it as normatively desirable to strive for such a democracy model. Kriesi (2011) suggests that such a model requires the combination of three preconditions. First, it depends on the competitiveness of the political process, which implies the presence of competing frames. Second, it requires an attentive public. Third, the news media needs to be independent, resourceful and pluralistic.

The first precondition (competitiveness of the political process) is likely to be met because of the characteristics of direct-democratic campaigns: Direct-democratic campaigns imply two camps which compete against each other. An indicator for this competitiveness is frame contestation. We saw in chapter 4 that the political actors in our three campaigns addressed their opponents' frames. On average, campaign dialogue in the three direct-democratic campaigns (60.2) is much higher than the average (44.1) found in the study by Kaplan et al. (2006) regarding American candidate television advertising aired in the U.S. Senate campaigns from 1998 to 2002. By contrast, it is lower than the mean (75.3) of dialogue in U.S. presidential campaigns from 1960–2000. However, the two immigration campaigns reach a level which is as high as that observed in U.S. presidential campaigns. If only one side is involved, there is no opponents' frame to address.

The second precondition for the “responsive leadership” model is an attentive public. The chances that the public will be attentive are relatively good. First, the institutionalization of direct-democratic campaigns reduces information costs, which increases the chance that citizens will be attentive: The government produces an official information pamphlet and sends it to all citizens. Additionally, the political actors prepare the information well and the issue is at the top of the news agenda. The easy access to information helps the average citizen to grasp the main arguments. This expectation is supported by the results presented in chapter 9. The citizens typically get the most important arguments. This impression is also confirmed for the American context. “Experience in the states suggest that on most issues, especially well-publicized ones, voters do grasp the meaning of the issue on which they are asked to vote, and that they act competently” (Cronin 1989: 87). Second, the institutionalization helps people to become attentive at critical moments: All parties announce their slogans. If a party section at the sub-national (=cantonal) level disagrees with the national party, it declares their different slogan. In such a way, the slogans from the parties at the cantonal level are an indicator for

the level of agreement among the political elite. Disagreement can increase the attention of the public. If agreement is prevalent among the elite, citizens can rely on the partisan heuristic and do not necessarily need to get to know the proposal in detail. This signal helps them to choose the level of attention needed for an informed choice. They know how to vote efficiently. The amount of advertisements and/or posters serves as another signal. If there are many advertisements and/or posters, the citizens probably increase their attention.

The third precondition for the “responsive leadership” model is independent, resourceful and pluralistic news media. The journalists generally make an effort in direct-democratic campaigns (“Effort Choice”), tend to balance the news (“Balancing Choice”), and provide campaign dialogue (“Dialogue Choice”). Additionally, as the corporation tax reform initiative showed, other frames enter the debate in the form of experts’ views.

Direct-democratic campaigns in Switzerland constitute contests of framing between political actors, which are disseminated and supported by the media and taken into consideration by the public. These characteristics of direct-democratic campaigns increase the chances that the preconditions are met. The chances of a genuine will seem high in direct-democratic campaigns. Thus, I am optimistic about the democratic quality of direct-democratic campaigns. However, there are also some reasons to be *pessimistic*. The competitiveness of the political process (first precondition) is reduced by the fact that *powerful* actors more easily garner media attention. Power is necessary for media attention and direct-democratic campaigns foster the reproduction of power. The attentive public also has its limits (second precondition). We saw that in the complex issue (corporation tax reform), the public is less informed about the frames, which increases the danger of manipulation. The effect of the contra frames on the voters’ choice in this campaign was relatively weak. Furthermore, we also observed that in the naturalization campaign, people can become distorted by a scandal. The contest was less

substantive and influenced by the conflict between Widmer-Schlumpf and Blocher. Finally, the independence, resourcefulness and pluralism of the news media (third precondition) can also be questioned. We saw in chapter 6 that journalists rely on the messages by the political actors and give higher standing to powerful actors and large parties (“Standing Choice”). In addition, they generally follow the institutional routine of the political actors in the timing of the news coverage (“Timing Choice”), even though they sometimes introduce accents into a campaign by using a public opinion poll or a TV debate show (“Arena”). Overall, the media are not totally independent of powerful actors. They rather conform to the actor-centered political process model (Wolfsfeld 1997), which assumes that the political actors are the first source of influence in frame building. Furthermore, the media do not guarantee that we read about the most urgent, the most relevant or the most difficult problems, nor are the media committed to a long-term perspective. The front-page news are influenced by real-world events, prior attention, agenda congestion, scope of discussion, journalistic obligations and norms, entrepreneurial activity, public opinion, and political context (Boydston 2012). In addition, it should be asked to what extent the journalists are able to discover untrue messages, or to point to other relevant aspects not emphasized by powerful political actors. Similarly, the mediated views are limited in their pluralism. Two non-state actors (Attac and Declaration of Berne) remarked that they abstained from providing a global world view. In order to garner media attention, they were forced to adapt their framing to the national focus of the debate. In other words, the framing has a national imprint even though our problems might be global.

Despite these concerns, I evaluate the quality of direct-democratic campaigns as positive because the preconditions of the “responsive leadership” model overall are more likely to be met. If one examines the quality based on the results of direct-democratic choices, I also come to an optimistic conclusion. Few legislators or political analysts can cite any negative results

of popular democratic procedures (Cronin 1989: 89), but acknowledge “that the legislative processes in their states leave much to be desired and [...] that even with staffs, hearings, bicameralism, and the other features of representative democracy, mistakes are made and defective bills are enacted into law by legislature” (Cronin 1989: 89).

Appendix

Table A1: Codebook of Substantive and Contest Frames (in German) (Chapter 3)

a) Substantive Frames

Asylum

code	pro arguments	frame	code	contra arguments	frame
100	Humanitäre Tradition allgemein	human. trad.: defensive use	200	Humanitäre Tradition <i>allgemein</i>	human. trad.: offensive use
101	Menschenwürde, Konformität mit Menschenrechten, keine Menschenrechtsverletzung		201	Menschenwürde/Menschenrechte/ Grundsatz der Menschlichkeit in Gefahr	
102	Gesetz entspricht Schweizerischen Tradition		202	Gesetz ist unschweizerisch / widerspricht Schweizer Tradition	
103	Konformität mit Kinderrechtskonvention		203	Kinderrechte in Gefahr/UNO-Kinderrechtskonvention (auch Trennung von Kindern und Eltern Ausschaffungshaft)	
104	Verbesserung der sozialen und kulturellen Qualität		204	Verbesserung der sozialen und kulturellen Qualität	
105	Konformität mit religiösen Normen		205	Religiöse Normen in Gefahr	
			206	Die Grundrechte der Asylbewerber müssen geschützt werden	
109	Sonstiges <i>spezifisches</i> ethisches / humanitäres Pro-Argument		209	Sonstiges <i>spezifisches</i> ethisches / humanitäres Argument	

110	Anwendung/Umsetzungs- Pro-Argumente allgemein	efficacy: offensive use	210	Anwendung/Umsetzung-Argument allgemein	efficacy: defensive use
111	Vollzug effizienter, besser, verbessert, effektiver gestalten		211	Gesetz nur schwierig umzusetzen (allgemein)	
112	Gesetz kann Ausschaffung besser gewährleisten		212	Hohe Kosten der Umsetzung / bürokratischer Aufwand / Vollzug wird erschwert	
113	Höhere Flexibilität der Kantone (positiv: können Ausschaffungshaft bzw. Durchsetzungshaft verhängen, aber auch Aufenthaltsbewilligung erteilen)		213	Kantonale Unterschiede in der Anwendung des Gesetzes	
119	Sonstiges <i>spezifisches</i> Pro-Argument zur Anwendung / Umsetzung		219	Sonstiges <i>spezifisches</i> Umsetzung-sargument	
120	Wirkung/Effizienz/Erfordernis des Gesetzes allgemein	abuse: offensive use	220	Wirkung/Effizienz allgemein: Gesetz ist wirkungslos	abuse: defensive use
121	Schweiz zu attraktiv für Asylbewerber		221	Verschärfung hat keine Abschreckungswirkung auf Asylsuchende	
122	zu viele (falsche) Ausländer in der Schweiz		222	Verschärfung trifft die Falschen/die wirklich Verfolgten	
123	Ähnlich wie Code 122, aber auf Zukunft gerichtet: Ausländer abschrecken		223	Missbrauch wird nicht verhindert	
124	zu viele (falsche) (Schein)-Asylanten in der Schweiz		224	Gesetz überflüssig, da Anzahl der Asylgesuche ohnehin niedrig / rückläufig	
125	Ähnlich wie Code 124, aber auf Zukunft gerichtet: Asylanten abschrecken				
126	(aktuellen) Missbrauch bekämpfen				
127	Ähnlich wie Code 126, aber auf Zukunft gerichtet: Missbrauch vorbeugen				
129	Sonstiges <i>spezifisches</i> Pro-Argument zur Anwendung / Umsetzung		229	Sonstiges <i>spezifisches</i> Argument zur Wirkungslosigkeit	
130	Kriminalität allgemein	others (criminality)	230	Kriminalität allgemein	others (criminality)
131	Gesetz verhindert Ausländerkriminalität und Drogenhandel		231	Verschärfung fördert Ausländerkriminalität und Drogenhandel	
132	Gesetz hat Abschreckungswirkung (auf Schlepper)		232	Verschärfung hat keine Abschreckungswirkung (auf Schlepper)	
133	Gesetz verhindert Abtauchen in Illegalität		233	Verschärfung fördert Abtauchen in Illegalität	
139	Sonstiges <i>spezifisches</i> Pro-Argument zur Kriminalität		239	Sonstiges <i>spezifisches</i> Argument zur Kriminalität	

140	Arbeitsmarkt/Schutz des einheimischen Arbeitsmarktes allgemein	others (lab. market)	240	Arbeitsmarkt allgemein	others (lab. market)
141	Ausländer besetzen Schweizer Arbeitsstellen		241	Schweizerischer Arbeitsmarkt auf Asylanten angewiesen	
149	Sonstiges <i>spezifisches</i> Pro-Argument zum Arbeitsmarkt		249	Sonstiges <i>spezifisches</i> Argument zum Arbeitsmarkt	
150	Sozial- und Wirtschaftsfaktoren allgemein	others (soc. and ec. factors)	250	Sozial- und Wirtschaftsfaktoren allgemein	others (soc. and ec. factors)
151	Die Schulen werden, das Schulsystem wird zu stark belastet.		251	Die Schulen werden, das Schulsystem werden nicht belastet.	
152	Das Gesundheitssystem wird zu stark belastet.		252	Das Gesundheitssystem wird nicht belastet.	
153	Der Strafvollzug wird zu stark belastet.		253	Der Strafvollzug wird nicht belastet.	
159	Sonstiges <i>spezifisches</i> Pro-Argument zu Sozial- und Wirtschaftsfaktoren		259	Sonstiges <i>spezifisches</i> Contra-Argument zu Sozial- und Wirtschaftsfaktoren	
160	Recht allgemein	rule-of-law: defensive use	260	Rechtliche Argumente allgemein	rule-of-law: offensive use
161	Harmonisierung der Gesetzgebung mit Gesetzgebung anderer Länder (z.B. andere Länder haben Asylgesetz auch verschärft)		261	Aushöhlung des Rechtsstaates	
162	Schaffung von Rechtssicherheit auch für Asylanten (bislang z.T. Behördenwillkür)		262	Verstoss gegen Völkerrecht (z.B. Genfer Konvention)	
			263	Rechtssicherheitsproblem für Betroffene/Mit mehr Nichteintretensentscheiden wächst Risiko von Fehlentscheiden	
			264	Bei Verschärfung (insbesondere Ausschaffungshaft von 24 Monaten) Verhältnismässigkeitsprinzip des Rechtssystems in Frage gestellt	
169	Sonstiges <i>spezifisches</i> rechtliches Pro-Argument		269	Sonstiges <i>spezifisches</i> rechtliches Argument	
170	Gesetz senkt Integration/Diskriminierung/Misstrauen/Fremdenangst allgemein	others (integration)	270	Gesetz fördert Diskriminierung/Misstrauen/Fremdenangst allgemein	others (integration)
171	Gesetz bietet (bessere) Möglichkeiten der Integration		271	Gesetz bietet keine Ideen zur Integration	
179	Sonstiges <i>spezifisches</i> Argument zur Integrationsproblematik		279	Sonstiges <i>spezifisches</i> Argument zur Integrationsproblematik	
180	Die Verlagerung der Kosten im Asylwesen auf die Städte muss verhindert werden	others (costs)	280	Verschärfungen allein sind falscher Ansatzpunkt	others (costs)
			281	Die Verlagerung der Kosten im Asylwesen auf die Städte muss verhindert werden	
199	Sonstige Pro-Argumente, die nicht in eine der Haupt- oder Unterkategorien passen	others	299	Sonstiges Argument, die nicht in eine der Haupt- oder Unterkategorien passen	others

Naturalization

code	pro arguments	frame	code	contra arguments	frame
100	Migrationspolitische Argumente allgemein	mass naturalization: offensive use	200	Migrationspolitische Argumente allgemein	mass naturalization: defensive use
101	Zu hoher Ausländeranteil		201	Ausländeranteil ist angemessen	
102	Quantität von Einbürgerungen reduzieren		202	Quantität von Einbürgerungen ist angemessen	
103	Einbürgerung von Kriminellen oder Sozialhilfebezüglern verhindern		203	Bereits heute werden keine Kriminellen oder Sozialhilfebezüglern eingebürgert	
104	Einbürgerungen von nicht integrierten Ausländern verhindern		204	Einbürgerungswillige Ausländer sind gut integriert	
			205	Heutiges Verfahren ist gut und sorgfältig	
110	Zuständigkeitsargumente allgemein	people final say: offensive use	210	Zuständigkeitsargumente allgemein	people final say: defensive use
111	Einbürgerung ist ein politischer Akt, bei dem die demokratischen Mitwirkungsrechte gestärkt werden sollen		211	Rechtsstaatlichkeit: Einbürgerung soll ein rechtsstaatliches Verfahren sein	
112	Volk kann bei Einbürgerungen besser urteilen und als Richter und Beamte		212	Einbürgerungen sind Verwaltungsakte	
113	Heutige Einbürgerungspraxis widerspricht föderativem System der Schweiz		214	Initiative widerspricht dem föderativen System der Schweiz	
			215	Gemeindezuständigkeit führt zu Chaos und reduziert Chance auf Gleichbehandlung	

120	Rechtliche Argumente allgemein	rule-of-law: defensive use	220	Rechtliche Argumente allgemein	rule-of-law: offensive use
121	Rechtssicherheit wiederherstellen		221	Fairness, Verfahrensgerechtigkeit	
122	Rekurse und Beschwerden gegen negative Entscheidungen von direktdemokratischen Abstimmungen sollen nicht erlaubt sein		222	Diskriminierung, Willkür und Sorglosigkeit vermeiden	
123	Gegen internationale Fremdbestimmung		223	Grundrechte und Beschwerdemöglichkeit garantieren (Verfassungskonformität)	
124	Schweizer Pass ist kein Grundrecht		224	Für die Einhaltung von internationalen Rechtsabkommen	
125	Hohe Machbarkeit		225	Fehlende Machbarkeit	
131	Wirtschaftliche Argumente	others	231	Wirtschaftliche Argumente	others
141	Kulturelle und soziale Argumente		241	Kulturelle und soziale Argumente	
151	Image-Gewinn im Ausland		251	Image-Schaden im Ausland vermeiden	
161	Bewährte Tradition weiterführen		261	Tradition kennt kaum direktdemokratische Einbürgerungen	
199	sonstiges Pro-Argument		299	sonstiges Contra-Argument	

Corporation Tax

code	pro arguments	frame	code	contra arguments	frame
100	Wirtschaftsförderung allgemein	competitiveness: offensive use	200	Wirtschaftsförderung allgemein	competitiveness: defensive use
101	„Die Reform fördert die Wettbewerbsfähigkeit des Wirtschaftsstandortes Schweiz.“		201	„Der Steuerwettbewerb ist schädlich für die Schweiz.“	
102	„Diese Reform fördert Investitionen und schafft Arbeitsplätze.“		202	Diese Reform gefährdet Arbeitsplätze.	
103	Diese Reform setzt am richtigen Punkt an, nämlich bei der Reduktion der Steuern für Aktionäre.		203	Diese Reform setzt am falschen Punkt an: Nicht die Aktionäre, sondern die Unternehmen sollten von Steuern entlastet werden.	
109	Andere, spezifische Argumente mit Bezug zu Wirtschaftsförderung		209	Andere, spezifische Argumente mit Bezug zu Wirtschaftsförderung	
110	KMU-Förderung allgemein	SME: offensive use	210	Keine KMU-Förderung (allgemein)	SME: defensive use
111	KMU und Gewerbe entlasten von übermässigen Steuerbelastungen				
112	(Spezifische) „Steuerliche Hindernisse abbauen“				
119	Andere, spezifische Argumente mit Bezug zu KMU-Förderung		219	Andere, spezifische Argumente mit Bezug zu KMU-Förderung	
120	Ethische und rechtliche Argumente allgemein	tax equity: defensive use	220	Ethische und rechtliche Argumente allgemein	tax equity: offensive use
121	Die Doppelbesteuerung (als Gewinn beim Unternehmen und als Dividendeneinkommen beim Aktionär) ist ungerecht / soll gemildert werden.		221	Die Vorlage führt zu Ungleichbehandlung von Steuerpflichtigen und fördert die Steuergerechtigkeit.	
122	Unternehmer sind keine Abzocker, sondern tragen Verantwortung.		222	Alle Einkommensarten (Löhne, Dividenden, Renten) sollen (gemäss Bundesverfassung) gleich besteuert werden.	
126	Die Vorlage steht im Einklang mit der Schweizer Verfassung.		223	„Steuerrabatte sollten grundsätzlich allen Aktionären gewährt werden.“	
			224	„Es muss ein Zeichen gegen überhöhte Managerlöhne gesetzt werden.“	
			225	Alle KMUs sollten gleichbehandelt werden (hier werden aber gewisse bevorzugt).	
			226	Die Vorlage verletzt die Schweizer Verfassung.	
129	Andere, spezifische Argumente mit Bezug zu Ethik und Recht		229	Andere, spezifische Argumente mit Bezug zu Ethik und Recht	

130	Ausgabenbereiche	tax loss: defensive use	230	Ausgabenbereiche	tax loss: offensive use
131	Die Mindereinnahmen sind klein / nicht gravierend.		231	„Diese Reform bringt inakzeptable Steuerausfälle für Bund oder Kantone.“	
132	Diese Reform sichert Steuereinkommen für die AHV.		232	„Diese Reform schadet der AHV.“	
133	Diese Reform sichert Steuereinkommen für Bund oder Kantone.				
139	Andere, spezifische Argumente mit Bezug zu Wirkungen auf Ausgabenbereiche		239	Andere, spezifische Argumente mit Bezug zu Ausgabenbereichen	
140	Breite Unterstützung für Reform (allgemein)	others (support)	240	Breiter Widerstand gegen Reform (allgemein)	others (support)
141	Bundesrat und Parlament unterstützen die Reform klar		241	Widerstand von Kantonen	
142	Viele Kantone stehen hinter Vorlage.		242	Widerstand von Parteien	
143	Viele Parteien unterstützen die Vorlage		243	Widerstand von einzelnen Unternehmer und Wirtschaftskreise	
144	Viele Unternehmer und Wirtschaftskreise unterstützen die Vorlage		244	Widerstand von Gewerkschaften	
			245	Widerstand von anderen Organisationen	
150	„Durch diese Reform wird das Steuersystem einfacher“	others	250	„Durch diese Reform wird das Steuersystem noch komplizierter“	others
199	Andere Pro-Argumente		299	Andere Contra-Argumente	

b) Contest Frames (in All Campaigns)

190	Angriff auf Personen der Contra-Seite (Bsp. „Ruth Dreifuss sollte sich als ehemalige Bundesrätin nicht mehr in die Politik einmischen“).	attack	290	Angriff auf Person der Pro-Seite (Bsp. „Blocher darf sich als Bundesrat nicht in eine laufende Abstimmung einmischen“).	attack
995	conflict (no argument but a conflict)	conflict	995	conflict (no argument but a conflict)	conflict

Table A2: News Media Analyzed (Chapter 3)

Type	Media	Language
Elite	Le Temps	French
	Neue Zürcher Zeitung	German
	NZZ am Sonntag	
	Sonntagszeitung	
Free	20 Minutes	French
	20 Minuten	German
Regional	24 heures	French
	Tribune de Genève	
	Aargauer Zeitung	German
	Basler Zeitung	
	Berner Zeitung	
	Die Südostschweiz	
	Neue Luzerner Zeitung	
	St. Galler Tagblatt	
Tabloid	Tagesanzeiger	
	Le Matin	French
	Blick	German
	Sonntagsblick	
TV	le journal	French
	Tagesschau	German

Table A3: Sensitivity Analyses (Chapter 7)

Asylum

model s1	ratio	robust s.e.	p	model s2	ratio	s.e.	p
count model				count model			
media (t-1)	1.062	0.031	0.038	media (t-1)	1.019	0.010	0.067
media (t-1) ²	0.999	0.001	0.015	contra input (t-1)	1.033	0.014	0.016
contra input (t-1)	1.031	0.013	0.017	pro input (t-1)	1.010	0.062	0.869
pro input (t-1)	0.976	0.066	0.716	minister (t-1)	2.043	0.689	0.034
minister (t-1)	2.432	1.211	0.074	human. trad.	0.956	0.186	0.815
human. trad.	0.963	0.139	0.797	rule-of-law	0.401	0.088	0.000
rule-of-law	0.397	0.043	0.000	abuse	0.931	0.184	0.719
abuse	0.912	0.119	0.483	efficacy	0.477	0.097	0.000
efficacy	0.483	0.061	0.000	inflation model			
inflation model				media (t-1)	0.308	0.433	0.006
media (t-1)	0.302	1.252	0.339	power contra (t-1)	0.851	0.107	0.132
media (t-1) ²	1.018	0.019	0.365	power pro (t-1)	0.953	0.061	0.423
power contra (t-1)	0.773	0.271	0.341	constant	0.749	0.192	0.000
power pro (t-1)	0.834	0.070	0.010	n total: 560, n zero obs.: 262			
constant	0.774	0.394	0.049	vuong: z=5.70, Pr>z=0.000			

n total: 560, n zero obs.: 262

vuong: z=5.56, Pr>z=0.000

model s3	ratio	robust s.e.	p	model s4	ratio	robust s.e.	p
count model				count model			
media (t-1)	1.020	0.017	0.248	media (t-1)	1.019	0.017	0.263
contra input (t-1)	1.034	0.014	0.015	contra input (t-1)	1.034	0.014	0.015
pro input (t-1)	1.030	0.050	0.542	pro input (t-1)	1.042	0.050	0.389
minister (t-1)	1.846	0.793	0.154	minister (t-1)	1.803	0.759	0.162
human. trad.	0.942	0.124	0.652	human. trad.	0.947	0.126	0.684
rule-of-law	0.390	0.046	0.000	rule-of-law	0.391	0.045	0.000
abuse	0.904	0.111	0.411	abuse	0.910	0.113	0.446
efficacy	0.477	0.065	0.000	efficacy	0.480	0.065	0.000
inflation model				inflation model			
media (t-1)	0.273	0.918	0.157	media (t-1)	0.276	0.910	0.157
power contra (t-1)	0.862	0.192	0.439	power contra (t-1)	0.849	0.200	0.414
power pro (t-1)	0.590	0.226	0.020	power pro (t-1)	0.643	0.120	0.000
contra input (t-1)	0.485	1.408	0.608	contra input (t-1)	85.514	2.591	0.086
pro input (t-1)	3.880	0.530	0.011	pro input (t-1)	2.343	0.329	0.010
constant	0.833	0.376	0.027	i_power*contra input (t-1)	0.396	0.542	0.088
				i_power*pro input (t-1)	1.028	0.008	0.000
				constant	0.850	0.373	0.023

n total: 560, n zero obs.: 262

vuong: z=6.12, Pr>z=0.000

n total: 560, n zero obs.: 262

vuong: z=6.04, Pr>z=0.000

Naturalization

model s1	robust			model s2	robust		
	Ratio	s.e.	p		Ratio	s.e.	p
Count Model				Count Model			
media (t-1)	1.017	0.021	0.429	media (t-1)	1.008	0.009	0.336
media (t-1) ²	1.000	0.000	0.372	contra (t-1)	1.032	0.009	0.000
contra (t-1)	1.033	0.006	0.000	pro (t-1)	1.059	0.041	0.143
pro (t-1)	1.063	0.035	0.065	minister (t-1)	3.038	1.208	0.005
minister (t-1)	3.036	1.291	0.009	rule-of-law	3.572	0.919	0.000
rule-of-law	3.454	0.706	0.000	people-final-say	2.928	0.708	0.000
people-final-say	2.820	0.503	0.000	mass naturalization	2.421	0.595	0.000
mass naturalization	2.351	0.411	0.000	Inflation Model			
Inflation Model				media (t-1)	0.106	0.799	0.005
media (t-1)	0.104	1.103	0.040	power contra (t-1)	0.000	6877	0.998
media (t-1) ²	1.001	0.000	0.055	power pro (t-1)	0.944	0.027	0.031
power contra (t-1)	0.000	0.832	0.000	constant	1.971	0.262	0.000
power pro (t-1)	0.943	0.015	0.000	n total: 364, n zero obs.: 203			
constant	1.685	0.337	0.893	Vuong: z = 6.14, Pr>z=0.000			

n total: 364, n zero obs.: 203

Vuong: z = 5.78, Pr>z=0.000

model s3	robust			model s4	robust		
	Ratio	s.e.	p		Ratio	s.e.	p
Count Model				Count Model			
media (t-1)	1.007	0.013	0.548	media (t-1)	1.007	0.013	0.545
contra (t-1)	1.032	0.006	0.000	contra (t-1)	1.032	0.006	0.000
pro (t-1)	1.057	0.033	0.077	pro (t-1)	1.057	0.033	0.077
minister (t-1)	2.980	1.180	0.006	minister (t-1)	2.980	1.180	0.006
rule-of-law	3.436	0.670	0.000	rule-of-law	3.436	0.670	0.000
people-final-say	2.817	0.487	0.000	people-final-say	2.817	0.487	0.000
mass naturalization	2.395	0.424	0.000	mass naturalization	2.395	0.424	0.000
Inflation Model				Inflation Model			
media (t-1)	0.108	0.984	0.024	media (t-1)	0.103	1.110	0.041
power contra (t-1)	0.853	0.240	0.509	power contra (t-1)	0.853	0.247	0.518
power pro (t-1)	1.002	0.017	0.897	power pro (t-1)	1.015	0.023	0.492
contra (t-1)	0.000	1.183	0.000	contra (t-1)	0.000	1.323	0.000
pro (t-1)	0.222	0.872	0.084	pro (t-1)	0.283	0.905	0.163
constant	1.874	0.333	0.000	i_power*contra (t-1)	0.810	0.268	0.432
n total: 364, n zero obs.: 203				i_power*pro (t-1)	0.969	0.020	0.119
Vuong: z = 6.69, Pr>z=0.000				constant	1.871	0.322	0.000

n total: 364, n zero obs.: 203

Vuong: z = 6.69, Pr>z=0.000

Corporation Tax

model s1	ratio	robust s.e.	p	model s2	ratio	s.e.	p
count model				count model			
media (t-1)	1.009	0.020	0.666	media (t-1)	1.007	0.007	0.303
media (t-1) ²	1.000	0.000	0.908	contra input (t-1)	1.082	0.025	0.001
contra input (t-1)	1.082	0.016	0.000	pro input (t-1)	1.059	0.022	0.006
pro input (t-1)	1.059	0.025	0.015	minister (t-1)	4.290	1.927	0.001
minister (t-1)	4.275	1.353	0.000	tax equity	5.102	1.363	0.000
tax equity	5.083	1.068	0.000	tax-loss	2.802	0.785	0.000
tax-loss	2.792	0.536	0.000	SME	3.780	1.002	0.000
SME	3.762	0.657	0.000	competitiveness	3.875	1.027	0.000
competitiveness	3.861	0.588	0.000				
inflation model				inflation model			
media (t-1)	0.180	0.626	0.006	media (t-1)	0.183	0.532	0.001
media (t-1) ²	1.019	0.007	0.008	power contra (t-1)	0.863	0.095	0.122
power contra (t-1)	0.863	0.088	0.092	power pro (t-1)	0.980	0.010	0.037
power pro (t-1)	0.980	0.013	0.120	constant	1.272	0.198	0.000
constant	1.270	0.310	0.000	n total: 445, n zero obs.: 246			
				vuong: z=6.49, Pr>z=0.000			

n total: 445, n zero obs.: 246

vuong: z=6.40, Pr>z=0.000

model s3	ratio	robust s.e.	p	model s4	ratio	robust s.e.	p
count model				count model			
media (t-1)	1.007	0.008	0.381	media (t-1)	1.007	0.008	0.372
contra input (t-1)	1.082	0.017	0.000	contra input (t-1)	1.083	0.017	0.000
pro input (t-1)	1.059	0.025	0.015	pro input (t-1)	1.058	0.025	0.014
minister (t-1)	4.296	1.342	0.000	minister (t-1)	4.356	1.328	0.000
tax equity	5.121	1.020	0.000	tax equity	5.188	1.050	0.000
tax-loss	2.813	0.564	0.000	tax-loss	2.837	0.570	0.000
SME	3.786	0.640	0.000	SME	3.835	0.655	0.000
competitiveness	3.883	0.596	0.000	competitiveness	3.924	0.609	0.000
inflation model				inflation model			
media (t-1)	0.183	0.605	0.005	media (t-1)	0.163	0.723	0.012
power contra (t-1)	0.771	0.301	0.386	power contra (t-1)	0.766	0.306	0.384
power pro (t-1)	0.983	0.019	0.354	power pro (t-1)	0.984	0.017	0.331
contra input (t-1)	1.232	0.345	0.546	contra input (t-1)	1.698	0.409	0.196
pro input (t-1)	0.980	0.056	0.720	pro input (t-1)	1.150	0.217	0.518
constant	1.280	0.312	0.000	i_power*contra input (t-1)	0.981	0.021	0.348
				i_power*pro input (t-1)	0.997	0.005	0.468
				constant	1.251	0.315	0.000

n total: 445, n zero obs.: 246

vuong: z=6.53, Pr>z=0.000

n total: 445, n zero obs.: 246

vuong: z=6.61, Pr>z=0.000

Note:

model s1: with media (t-1)² in inflation and count model

model s2: non-clustered standard errors

model s3: with contra input (t-1) and pro input (t-1) in inflation model

model s4: with contra input (t-1), pro input (t-1), interaction between power contra (t-1) * contra input (t-1), and interaction between power pro input (t-1) * pro input (t-1) in inflation model

Table A4: Applicability (=Strength) of the Frames in Thought – Estimates from the Random Intercept Probit Models of the Vote Choice for the Corporation Tax Campaign, Unstandardized Regression Coefficients, Standard Errors and Levels of Significance. Model with Interaction Terms between Undecided Voters and Frame Positions on t2 (Chapter 8)

Corporation Tax	coef.	s.e.	P>z
fixed part			
issue pref	0.119	0.079	ns
partisan pref	0.205	0.080	**
ambivalence	-0.112	0.073	ns
core frame contra	-0.137	0.059	*
2nd frame contra	-0.264	0.061	***
core frame pro	0.319	0.064	***
2nd frame pro	0.431	0.072	***
t2			
issue pref t2			
partisan pref t2			
ambivalence t2			
core frame contra t2			
2nd frame contra t2			
core frame pro t2			
2nd frame pro t2			
t3	0.427	0.149	**
issue pref t3	0.014	0.118	ns
partisan pref t3	0.127	0.116	ns
ambivalence t3	0.243	0.114	*
core frame contra t3	-0.405	0.093	***
2nd frame contra t3	-0.083	0.093	
core frame pro t3	0.086	0.105	
2nd frame pro t3	0.052	0.112	
undecided	-2.115	0.204	***
un_issue pref t3	-0.398	0.180	*
un_party pref t3	0.174	0.163	
un_ambivalence t3	0.402	0.162	*
i_undec. core frame contra t3	0.994	0.130	***
i_undec. 2nd frame contra t3	-0.178	0.140	
i_undec. core frame pro t3	0.294	0.152	
i_undec. 2nd frame pro t3	0.347	0.170	*
constant	0.202	0.111	
random part			
/lnsig2u	-0.535	0.329	
sigma_u	0.765	0.126	
rho	0.369	0.077	
Chibar2	19.430		***
rho-Nullmodel	0.560	0.040	

*p<.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Corporation Tax: n observations=1669, respondents=853

Note: Figure 8.3 is based on this model

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